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ABSTRACT 
ASEAN aimed to create a highly competitive, single market, production-based 
AEC in 2015 by applying strategic measures set out in the AEC Blueprint. However, 
after seven years of its adoption, the deadline has become merely the beginning of the 
AEC, not the finished line. Since November 2015, ASEAN has adopted the AEC 
Blueprint 2025 which aims to create a competitive, innovative, and dynamic AEC by 
2025. One of the measures ASEAN uses is ensuring effective competition policy 
through greater harmonisation and convergence of national competition law. 
The key concept of this thesis is competitiveness. It applies Professor Michael E 
Porter’s concept of competitive advantage and gathers 15 years of data on the ASEAN 
Member States’ competitiveness. And it questions whether competition law and policy 
attribute to a nation’s competitiveness. If yes, to what extent. Then it questions whether 
it is necessary for ASEAN to take a supranational approach to become a competitive 
region because ASEAN has its own norm of cooperation, the ASEAN way, which is 
ingrained in ASEAN since its establishment. And it is now formally recognised in the 
ASEAN Charter.  
The results show that competition law and policy is not a sole key determinant of 
competitiveness. Having a low degree of market concentration, effective competition law 
and policy, and efficient goods market does not necessarily correlate to high 
competitiveness. A country’s competitiveness is affected by its stage of development too. 
Additionally, the political economy of a country has a certain degree of effect on 
efficiency in competition law enforcement. However, the determinant factor of efficient 
competition law enforcement lies on political will rather than type of the government 
administration as in the case of Taiwan and South Korea.  
The disparities in the economic development of AMSs are obvious. Therefore, 
trying to harmonise AMSs’ competition law and policy using an all-sector approach is 
not recommended and proved difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, a supranational 
approach is not compatible with the ASEAN way. Hence, a sectoral approach is more 
likely to help ASEAN achieve its goal. ASEAN has already begun its own sectoral 
approach to competitiveness in the aviation market. The Aviation Agreements which the 
AMSs have signed between them provide much more details and commitments on 
competition rules concerning this industry than in the Regional Guidelines 2010. The 
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application of sectoral approach alongside with the comprehensive approach to 
competition law and policy to enhance competitiveness of the relevant market is 
practiced in many countries. Examples of how regulatory body in electricity in the US, 
the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea collaborate with their 
competition agencies provide evidence that it is possible and efficient. Therefore, 
ASEAN does not need a supranational approach to improve its competitiveness 
regarding competition law and policy. This thesis suggests that ASEAN should pursue a 
sectoral approach in dealing with competition issues among member state the ASEAN 
way. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an intergovernmental 
organisation1 of ten member states namely Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.2 ASEAN Member States 
(AMSs) have signed many trade agreements including the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) and the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA). There is no common 
external tariff imposed on products imported from outside the region. The AMSs signed 
an Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (CEPT), but the CEPT applies to goods originating from AMSs only.3 
Therefore, ASEAN’s level of integration is at a free trade area stage. 
ASEAN operates under the norm called the ASEAN way. In short, the ASEAN 
way means that ASEAN operates through consultation, consensus, non-legal binding 
agreements, and non-interference.  
 The objective of this thesis is to examine whether ASEAN needs a 
supranational approach to its competition law and policy to create a highly competitive 
ASEAN Economic Community as is suggested by many scholars; especially, in the 
                                                 
1 Article 3 of  the ASEAN Charter which came into force on 15 December 2008 
2 Although the spelling Vietnam is also used, official documents produced by the Government of  Viet 
Nam as well as the documents of  the United Nations use the spelling Viet Nam. Therefore, in 
this thesis, the country is referred to as Viet Nam. 
3 Article 1(1) of  Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff  Scheme for the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area. 
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context of ASEAN’s current competition policy frameworks, AMSs’ national 
competition laws, and the ASEAN way. There is particular focus on whether the non-
legal binding approaches as stated in the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 
(AEC Blueprint 2015), the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (AEC 
Blueprint 2025) (together referred to as the AEC Blueprints), and the Regional 
Guidelines on Competition Policy (Regional Guidelines 2010) will have an impact in 
helping ASEAN realise its goal of becoming a highly competitive economic region in 
2025. It should be reiterated that this thesis is neither concerned with total welfare, nor 
consumer welfare, nor with efficiency aspects of the competition law and policy. It 
focuses solely on the connection between competition law and competitiveness.  
In order to achieve this objective, the research will begin by clarifying and 
conceptualising competitiveness and its measurements. It will examine attempts to 
harmonise and converge competition law and policy by international organisations, 
specifically the approach countries use to deal with anticompetitive practices in the trade 
agreements they sign, especially trade agreements among AMSs and trade agreements 
between ASEAN and dialogue partners. Then ASEAN’s approach stated in the AEC 
Blueprints and the Regional Guidelines 2010 regarding competition policy and law will 
be studied in order to identify to what extent competition law and policy play an 
important role in helping ASEAN become a highly competitive single market. In this 
regard, the concept of the ASEAN way will be scrutinised because it affects the 
functioning and effectiveness of the AMSs in carrying out their commitments under the 
aforementioned frameworks.  
Some aspects of the European Union’s (EU) supranational approach to enforce 
regional competition law and policy will be studied. The purpose of studying the EU 
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experience is not to compare the EU with ASEAN or to suggest that ASEAN should 
adopt a supranational approach in its competition law and policy, but to prove that the 
supranational approach is not compatible with the ASEAN way and the ASEAN 
Charter.   
Then, the disparities of enforcement of provisions on abuse of dominance in 
Singapore and Thailand will be examined to understand the potential obstacles which 
ASEAN may face when trying to converge comprehensive national competition laws. 
The examples of Singapore and Thailand are used as case studies, not for the purpose of 
a comparative law study. The purpose is to demonstrate the degree of disparity between 
the two countries which are expected to have an established competition law regime. 
Thailand and Singapore are chosen because there are four AMSs which have enacted and 
enforced their competition laws for more than 10 years namely Indonesia, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam. However, language barriers prevent this thesis from analysing 
Indonesian and Vietnamese national competition laws. A period of 10 years should be 
long enough for a country’s national competition authority to develop its competencies 
in competition law enforcement and advocacy. 
The selected case studies from Singapore and Thailand will focus on abuse of 
dominance cases because ASEAN aims to attract more inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to the region by becoming a single production based market. Foreign investors 
will potentially face challenges from domestic incumbents or foreign dominant 
undertakings may abuse their dominance in the AMSs’ markets. Hence, the study of 
abuse of dominance is appropriate. 
The experience of the United States of America (the US) does not fall within the 
scope of this thesis because the US, although comprised of 50 states, is considered one 
14 
 
country. The disparity between states and the challenges from market integration are not 
as great as for the AMSs. Moreover, the US enacted its federal antitrust law before the 
individual states enacted their own antitrust laws. This gave the US a platform for the 
unification of competition law right from the beginning. Each state follows the Sherman 
Act 1890 and other federal antitrust laws4 such as the Clayton Act, while in ASEAN 
there is no unified competition law to begin with. Considering that ASEAN countries 
are at significant different levels of development, the differences in the development 
level of the US’ states are not comparable.  
After examining the concept of competitiveness, different approaches to 
competition policy applied by international organisations, trade agreements, and trading 
blocs, ASEAN’s competition policy frameworks, the ASEAN way, the EU approach, 
and the disparities in AMSs’ enforcement of competition laws, the thesis aims to draw a 
conclusion on whether ASEAN needs a supranational approach to its competition law 
and policy to create a highly competitive AEC.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND: INTRODUCTION OF ASEAN 
AND THE AEC 
This thesis argues that ASEAN does not need a supranational approach to 
competition law and policy to realise a highly competitive AEC, because competition law 
and policy is only one of the very many determinants of competitiveness. This does not 
mean that competition law and policy are irrelevant.  They are relevant, but only in a 
                                                 
4 Federal Trade Commission, ‘Guide to Antitrust Laws: The Antitrust Laws’ <https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws> accessed 12 May 2016 
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limited way, and there are many other factors that can increase or decrease 
competitiveness. Supranationalism is not compatible with the ASEAN way and the 
ASEAN Charter, especially because of a general sense of nationalism among the AMSs. 
It is highly unlikely that each AMS will surrender its sovereignty, specifically in judiciary 
matters, to any supranational body. Therefore, it is necessary to know the background of 
the founding members of ASEAN5 during the WWII period and the enlargement in 
order to understand why nationalism is common in ASEAN and why ASEAN operates 
under the ASEAN way.  
Before the end of the World War II (WWII), many countries in Southeast Asia 
were colonised under Western powers such as the British, the Dutch, and the French. 
The Japanese invasion into the region during WWII had impact on many levels and in 
many ways.  
In Indonesia, Japanese troops invaded Indonesia and took over the control of 
Indonesia from the Dutch. When Japan surrendered in 1945, the East Indies nationalists 
took the opportunities to proclaim independence, the battle with the Dutch continued 
and the nationalists finally gain independence on 2nd November, 1949.6  
The Philippines had been colonised by the Spanish for hundreds of years and 
had fought countless battles against them only to be betrayed by the US and then 
became colonised by the US for decades. However, the American ruling differed from 
                                                 
5 Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand 
6 Entoen.nu, ‘Indonesia 1945-1949: A Colony Fights for Freedom’ 
<http://www.entoen.nu/indonesie/en> accessed 14 May 2015; Richard Cavendish, 
‘Independence for Indonesia’ <http://www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/independence-
indonesia> accessed 14 May 2015 
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the Spanish one – it promised the Filipinos freedom in 1945 and it did grant 
independence to the Philippines on 4th July 1946.7 
Singapore had been colonised by the British and used as trade post under control 
of the British East India Company. But it became a separate crown colony with civil 
administration in 1946 after the Japanese were defeated in WWII. Malaysia and 
Singapore are situated on the same peninsula, and Brunei is on the border to Sarawak of 
Malaysia, so their histories intertwine. In short, after being ruled by the Portuguese, then 
the Dutch, and finally by the British for centuries, they became independent. Nine Malay 
States, excluding Singapore, were formed as the Federation of Malaya and became an 
independent state on 31st August, 1957. The reason that Singapore was excluded was 
because the ethnic Chinese majority in Singapore was seen as a potential problem in 
creating unity with the rest of the Federation where the population were mainly Malay. 
During the Japanese occupation in the WWII, the British troops were ousted but they 
resumed power after Japan lost the war.8  
Lee Kuan Yew was elected as the first Singaporean Prime Minister in 1959. He 
had always wanted Singapore to unite with Malaysia because of the economic 
advantages. His dream came true in 1963 when the Federation of Malaysia was formed. 
North Borneo (now Sabah), Sarawak and Singapore joined the Federation of Malaya and 
                                                 
7 Philippine History, ‘Philippine Independence from the Americans’ <http://www.philippine-
history.org/independence-from-americans.htm> accessed 14 May 2015; Tim Lambert, ‘A Brief  
History of  the Philippines’ <http://www.localhistories.org/philippines.html> accessed 14 May 
2015; US Department of  State Office of  the Historian, ‘The Philippine-American  War, 1899-
1902’ <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/war> accessed 14 May 2015 
8 The Commonwealth, ‘Malaysia History’ <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-
countries/malaysia/history> accessed date 18 May 2015; Tim Lambert, ‘A brief  History of  
Malaysia’ <http://www.localhistories.org/malaysia.html> accessed 18 May 2015; BBC, ‘Malaysia 
Profile – Timeline’ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15391762> accessed 18 
May 2015; ‘History and Historical Facts of  Malaysia’ 
<http://www.wonderfulmalaysia.com/malaysia-history-and-historical-facts.htm> accessed 18 
May 2015 
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formed the Federation of Malaysia. Then, Lee declared the independence of Singapore 
from the British government on 31st August, 1963. But his dream was short-lived. 
Singapore was forced to separate from the Federation in 1965 due to the ethnic and 
racial differences as well as discrimination. Rioting against Chinese and Malay people had 
led to political unrest and finally driven Singapore out of the Federation. It was a bitter 
ending for Lee who sought prosperity and economic progress for his country.9 
Thailand has escaped colonisation while other nations in the region did not, at 
the cost of losing its territories in Cambodia, Laos and Malaya to France and Britain. 
During WWII, the country was led by a military government who granted access to the 
country to the Japanese troops to invade Burma and Malaya. The government, under 
pressure from Japan, wanted to declare war against the US and the Britain, but the Thai 
Ambassador to Washington refused to deliver such declaration to the US government. 
Therefore, the US has never declared war on Thailand, and supported underground 
activities of the anti-Japanese movement in Thailand.10  
After the end of the WWII, the enemy of Thailand was not its neighbours or 
Western Powers, but the threat of communism. Changing from absolute monarchy to 
constitutional monarchy had been in the agenda of Kings Rama V, VI and VII, but to 
become a communist country was not an option. Therefore, one can surmise that for the 
                                                 
9 Your Singapore, ‘Our History’ <http://www.yoursingapore.com/about-singapore/singapore-
history.html?cmp=brandlaunch_UK_googleSEM_%28UK%29-
SG_History+Generic_Singapore+Independence_singapore%20independence%20history&mkwi
d=sKjWivdmv_pcrid_52981987825_pdv_c> accessed 18 May 2015; BBC, ‘Singapore Profile – 
Timeline’ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15971013> accessed 18 May 2015; History 
of  Singapore <http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/History/Singapore-history.htm> 
accessed 18 May 2015; Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Singapore’ 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/545725/Singapore/214573/History> accessed 
18 May 2015; Tim Lambert, ‘Brief  History of  Singapore’ 
<http://www.localhistories.org/singapore.html> accessed 18 May 2015;  
10 Barbara Leitch LePoer (ed), Thailand: A Country Study, (GPO for the Library of  Congress September 
1987) <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/thtoc.html> accessed 18 May 2015 
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sake of peace and the stability of the country, it was necessary for Thailand to seek and 
promote security, peace and stability in the region to avoid the influence and threats of 
communism.  
The idea of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia came from three major 
reasons.11 First, the fear of a power vacuum after the withdrawal of the colonisers could 
have attracted outsiders to step in for political gains. Second, the idea that cooperation is 
easier to achieve among closer nations than disparate nations. Last, the necessity to be 
heard in world politics is easier when you have a unified voice. Hence, Thailand initiated 
the cooperation. However, the idea was not welcomed as expected. Thailand could only 
initiate the cooperation among three countries – Philippines, Federation of Malaya and 
Thailand. The organisation was called Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and was 
founded in 1961. Disappointedly, ASA collapsed after the territorial conflicts between 
Philippines and Indonesia on one hand and Malaysia on the other.  
In 1966, the attempt to cooperate was reignited again with a larger number of 
Member States. This time the cooperation was with East Asian nations like Japan and 
South Korea as well as Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia, Taiwan, New Zealand, South 
Viet Nam and Thailand. It was known as Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). But this 
attempt failed again because of international politics. According to Dr Thanat Khoman, 
one of the founding fathers of ASEAN, ‘[t]he admission of the People's Republic of 
China and the eviction of the Republic of China or Taiwan made it impossible for some 
                                                 
11 Thanat Khoman, ‘ASEAN Conception and Evolution’ (ASEAN 1 September 1992) 
<http://www.asean.org/?static_post=asean-conception-and-evolution-by-thanat-khoman> 
accessed 18 April 2016 
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of the Council's members to sit at the same conference table.’ ASPAC consequently 
collapsed in 1975, marking another failure in regional co-operation.12 
The definite attempt came after Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia finally 
reached conciliation over their territorial dispute with the help of Thailand. Although the 
new organisation would originally consist of only the existing ASA members and 
Indonesia, Singapore was keen to join and its request to do so was accepted.13 Mr Lee’s 
dream of joining Singapore with other nations in the region for greater economic 
progress was realised. It is clear that Singapore has always been very keen to integrate 
with other countries for economic reasons, which is understandable. Given the size and 
the limited natural resources of the country, without such integration, Singapore could 
have ended up playing a marginal role in the world trade.  
Finally, ASEAN was established by the Bangkok Declaration on 8 August 1967 
in Bangkok. The Declaration is a two-page document that contains the intention of the 
founding Member States to cooperate for the stability and peace of the region. The 
Declaration is the constituent of ASEAN, but it has no legal binding effect. It did not 
establish any supranational body or compliance authorities or even a dispute settlement 
mechanism. It is merely the expression of the founding Member States’ determination 
not to allow their disputes to develop into conflicts.14 Given that most AMSs were 
colonised for a long period, it is highly unlikely that any of them will surrender their 
sovereignty to any supranational body. 
                                                 
12 ibid 
13 ASEAN, ‘History: the Founding of  ASEAN’ <http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/history> 
accessed 18 May 2015 
14 Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of  ASEAN Community: Insight from the Former ASEAN 
Secretary-General (Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies 2006), 3 
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At the time of the establishment in 1967, the idea of ASEAN as a single market 
was not yet in the scope. Besides, the machinery necessary to carry out the aims and 
purposes of ASEAN, which were Annual Meeting, Committee and National Secretariat, 
were not equipped with the legal authority to make any binding decisions.15  
ASEAN has gradually expanded over the years since its first enlargement with 
Brunei in 1984. Brunei’s membership of ASEAN was a straightforward process and a 
matter of good timing. It gained independence from Britain on 1st January, 1984 and 
joined ASEAN just a week after on 7th January, 1984. Then Viet Nam joined ASEAN in 
1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. Now ASEAN consists of ten 
Member States. Through the enlargement ASEAN now has more than 600 million total 
population, more than the EU (second to China and India). It is believed that a market 
this size should attract more FDI into the region. 
For Viet Nam, joining ASEAN gives some degree of international acceptance 
and the prospect of more investment into the country as well as counter-balancing 
China’s influence. In the same year of its accession to ASEAN, Viet Nam and the US 
resumed formal diplomatic relations.16 For Laos, it is considered a logical step to take in 
order to develop its economy after the Cold War period.  
The case of Myanmar was controversial. There was much disagreement from 
both inside and outside ASEAN due to human rights problems in Myanmar. However, 
pushing Myanmar aside was seen as pushing it in China’s sphere of influence. Hence, 
ASEAN leaders opted to include Myanmar instead of pushing it away even though it 
                                                 
15 Mark Beeson, Institutions of  the Asia Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond (Routledge 2009) 20 
16 Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Vietnam War: 1954 - 1975’ <http://www.britannica.com/event/Vietnam-War> 
accessed 3 June 2016 
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could hinder ASEAN Free Trade Agreements.17 Moreover, the ASEAN leaders seem to 
agree that to isolate Myanmar is not the answer for the long term well-being of the 
Association.18 The CLMV19 also fear being marginalised in the ASEAN. They also fear 
that the development gap between them and the existing ASEAN 6 would become 
wider.20 Some commentators viewed the enlargement as a major drawback for 
ASEAN.21 
As explained earlier, it can be argued that the main reason for enlargement for all 
ten member states was rather political and for security considerations.22 ASEAN has 
gained more ‘weight’ in representing Southeast Asia by including all ten member states.23 
However, one must admit that inclusion of CLMV has brought more challenges to 
ASEAN’s attempt to converge their competition law and policy due to the disparities in 
levels of development of these countries compared with the rest of ASEAN. 
Southeast Asia is extremely diverse in terms of ethnics, religions, cultural, 
political regime, legal system, economics, languages, value, and historical experience. 
Take Singapore and Cambodia, for example, there are clearly many differences between 
the two countries. For instance, Cambodia’s GDP per capita based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP) was US$ 3,262.6, while Singapore’s GDP per capita PPP was US$82,763 in 
                                                 
17 Frank Frost, ‘ASEAN at 30: Enlargement, Consolidation and the Problems of  Cambodia’ (Parliament 
of  Australia, 25 August 1998) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Librar
y/Publications_Archive/CIB/CIB9798/98cib02> accessed 7 March 2013. 
18 ibid  
19 Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Viet Nam 
20 Vo Tri Thanh, ‘Perspective from ASEAN’s Transitional Economies’ in Denis Hew (ed), Roadmap to an 
ASEAN Economic Community (Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies 2005) 
21 Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘ASEAN Economic Community: Political and Security Implications’ in Denis 
Hew (ed), Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community (Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies 2005) 
22 Ramses Amer, ‘Conflict Management and Constructive Engagement in ASEAN’s Expansion’ (1999) 20 
Third World Quarterly 1031 
23 Frost, ‘ASEAN at 30: Enlargement, Consolidation and the Problems of  Cambodia’ (n 16) 
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2014.24 And Cambodia’s Gross National Income (GNI) per capita based on PPP was 
US$ 3,080, while Singapore’s GNI per capita PPP was US$ 80,270 in 2014.25 ASEAN is 
a region of disparities.  
Through China’s accession to the WTO, the emerging market of India, the 
establishment of economic regions such as NAFTA, and the establishment of a single 
market such as the European Economic Community, the AMS came to realise that 
deeper integration was needed to gain more weigh in international trade. Despite their 
disparities, they agreed to establish the ASEAN Community which comprises of three 
pillars, namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. In this thesis, the 
emphasis is solely on the AEC.  
The AEC was established on 31 December 2015 as a single market and 
production base and as a competitive economic region that upholds equitable economic 
development and which integrates into the global economy.26 However, it should be 
clarified here that ASEAN’s single market is not the same as the European single 
market. Because, ASEAN’s single market means intra-ASEAN single market. It provides 
market access to intra-regional trade among the AMS. There is a freer flow of goods, 
skilled labour, and capitals within ASEAN for intra-regional trade only. This is different 
from the EU’s single market. The EU’s single market includes common external tariffs 
imposed on goods imported into the region regardless of the point of entry of the 
                                                 
24 World Bank, ‘GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)’ 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD> accessed 20 April 2016 
25 World Bank, ‘GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)’ 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD> accessed 20 April 2016 
26 ASEAN, AEC Blueprint (ASEAN Secretariat 2007) paras 9, 41, 60 – 64  
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goods. ASEAN does not have such rules yet. This point is examined in more detail in 
chapter 3.2 STAGES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATIONS. 
1.3 THESIS MOTIVATION 
The motivation behinds this thesis is the concern that ASEAN’s ambitious plan 
of deeper economic integration to transform ASEAN into a highly competitive single 
market, production based economic region may not be achievable. One may presume 
that ASEAN will take the EU approach of single market, because the ASEAN 
Community 2015 does not only embrace the AEC which aims at creating a single 
market, free movement of goods, capitals, and skilled labour, but also the Political-
Security and Socio-Cultural aspects, all of which mirror the establishment of the EU. 
But ASEAN is not the EU. ASEAN operates under the ASEAN way, the norm 
which has been embedded in ASEAN since the very beginning. The principle of 
supremacy and direct effect of the EU law upon its member states have been upheld by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The functioning of the EU is based on 
supranational organisations such as the EU Commission, especially, in the area of 
competition law. The Commission and the ECJ play a vital role in overseeing the 
uniformity of enforcement and interpretation of the EU competition law in member 
states. The EU member states have committed to such a supranational approach since its 
establishment. ASEAN has never applied that approach to any of its cooperative 
endeavours since 1967.  
This thesis concerns only the deeper economic integration of ASEAN, and 
specifically in competition policy and law. The AEC Blueprints aim at creating the AEC 
as a competitive, innovative, and dynamic ASEAN. The strategies planned in both 
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Blueprints and the Regional Guidelines clearly state the importance of competition law 
and policy as one of the key elements which can help ASEAN become a highly 
competitive region. But how much impact does an effective competition law and policy 
really have on the competitiveness of a country, or a region?  
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
With the view to achieve the research objective, the following questions will be 
studied throughout the thesis: 
1. What does competitiveness mean and entail? What must be taken into 
consideration when measuring a nation’s competitiveness? Does the 
effectiveness of competition law and policy correlate with a country’s 
competitiveness? How competitive are the AMSs and what factors underline 
their competitiveness?  
2. What has been done internationally in terms of harmonisation and convergence 
of competition law and policy? Has any attempt to harmonise and converge 
competition laws succeeded?   
3. What is the ASEAN way? How does it work with the competition policy-
related commitments stated in the AEC Blueprints and the Regional Guidelines 
2010? Will the ASEAN way hinder or assist AMSs achieving their 
aforementioned commitments? Is the EU’s approach to competition law and 
policy through the supranationality of the Commission suitable to the ASEAN 
way and the ASEAN Charter? 
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4. What are the approaches concerning competition policy which ASEAN plans 
to accomplish in order to become a highly competitive single market and 
production based region as stated in the AEC Blueprints and the Regional 
Guidelines 2010? What have the AMSs done thus far in order to achieve their 
commitments under the aforementioned frameworks? After adoption of the 
AEC Blueprint 2015 and the Regional Guidelines 2010, has the AMSs’ 
competitiveness improved? 
5. What are the objectives of ASEAN’s or the selected AMSs’ national 
competition laws? What are the differences in competition laws of Thailand and 
Singapore regarding abuse of dominance provisions? What are the power and 
structure of their national competition authorities (NCAs)? How effective is 
their enforcement? Can their differences be reconciled or harmonised? Has 
their competitiveness been enhanced by their national competition law 
enforcement? 
 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATION 
This thesis applies a qualitative case study approach. It explores the process of 
becoming a highly competitive economic region within the context of the ASEAN way, 
its historical background, and ASEAN’s competition policy frameworks by using data 
available from various sources such as the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) of the 
AMSs as measured by World Economic Forum (WEF), primary sources such as 
legislations and cases; and secondary sources such as journal articles, news reports, 
websites, encyclopaedia, and commentaries. 
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The case which is being scrutinized and analysed in this thesis is the process of 
becoming a highly competitive region under the aforementioned context. The period of 
analysing the competitiveness in ASEAN is limited from 1999 to 2016. Because 
Thailand’s Trade Competition Act entered into force in 1999, Singapore’s Competition 
Act entered into force on a phased basis from 2005, and publication of the AEC 
Blueprint 2015 was in 2007, the publication of the Regional Guidelines was in 2010, and 
the publication of the AEC Blueprint 2025 was in November 2015. Therefore, the 17 
years of data of competitiveness in ASEAN should be able to demonstrate the impact 
the national competition laws and the aforementioned competition policy frameworks 
have on the competitiveness of the AMSs.  
This thesis uses abuse of dominance as example to demonstrate the application 
and enforcement of competition law in Singapore and Thailand because market access is 
at the core of economic regional integration. The market access which economic 
integration can offer will be hindered by barriers to entry and domestic incumbents’ 
abuse of dominance.   
Although anticompetitive agreements such as cartels, exclusive dealing, resale 
price maintenance, and market concentration such as mergers and acquisitions are also 
crucial for the functioning of an efficient market, this thesis concentrates on the the 
competitiveness of ASEAN as a region, not on consumer protections and market 
efficiency. Besides, most AMSs domestic businesses have not yet reached the level where 
they start to merge at a regional scale. Thus, this thesis will not address these issues. 
More importantly, the example of abuse of dominance is not used to propose 
amendments to national competition laws of the AMSs. It is used as an example of the 
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difficulties and challenges the AMSs will face when attempting to harmonise and 
converge their competition laws. 
One major limitation in conducting this research is the lack of access to certain 
sources which require membership or payment such as a report on the Handbook of 
Competition Enforcement Agencies 2015 Thailand published by the Global 
Competition Review and the World Competitiveness Yearbooks published by the IMD. 
The handbook costs €180 to purchase and it is neither accessible through the university 
library website nor available through interlibrary loan, while the IMD’s yearbook costs 
CHF 1,200 to purchase to gain an online access for academia.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPT OF COMPETITIVENESS 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the concept of 
competitiveness as used in this thesis. This chapter is divided into five sections. First, it 
discusses whether it is possible to define the competitiveness of a nation and the 
different definitions of competitiveness at different stages will be explored. Second, it 
seeks to answer what is taken into account when measuring a nation’s competitiveness. 
The findings will indicate whether competition law has any impact on competitiveness or 
not. If yes, to what extent? Third, the competitiveness of ASEAN member states from 
1999 – 2016 will be discussed by looking at the available data on competitiveness and the 
efficiency of their antimonopoly policy and market efficiency.27 This is done with the aim 
to prove the connection between competition law and policy and competitiveness. The 
fourth section studies how political economy helps countries develop their competition 
law and become highly competitive countries. It specifically looks into the experience of 
two East Asian Economies: South Korea and Taiwan. The fifth section concludes on the 
earlier sections.  
Becoming a highly competitive economic region is a goal of the AEC, but it does 
not clarify what is meant by being a ‘highly competitive’ economic region. And it did not 
declare in which market it competes and with whom. Is AEC competing with China in 
the manufacturing sector? Is AEC competing with the Common Market of the Southern 
                                                 
27 However, the data from 2003-2004 is not available both online and in print. Attempts to get hold of  a 
copy from the interlibrary loan were not successful. The library that has this book was unwilling 
to loan it to the interlibrary loan. 
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Cone (MERCOSUR) in attracting more inward FDI? In any case, the concept of 
competitiveness in international trade must be used with caution.  
 
2.1 DEFINITION OF COMPETITIVENESS 
There are various definitions of competitiveness at various levels. It is not the 
purpose of this thesis to study the history of the concept, find the most appropriate 
meaning, or to redefine the term. This section will explore different definitions of 
competitiveness within different settings.28 This chapter starts with a contemplation of 
the concept of competition as used in this thesis. 
2.1.1 What is Competition? 
For economists, it is difficult to find an agreed definition of competition.29 
Hayek considered competition as ‘a process of the formation of opinion’. This in turn 
created a ‘unity and coherence’ economic system.30 The simplest and boldest definition 
of competition is that it is regarded as the opposite of monopoly.31 Stigler suggested that 
a more appropriate word than just competition would be ‘market competition’ and 
                                                 
28 For Historical development on concept of  competitiveness See Andreas Mitschke, The Influence of  
National Competition Policy on the International Competitiveness of  Nations: A Contribution to the Debate on 
International Competition Rules (Physica-Verlag 2008) 92-102; Razan Voinescu and Christian 
Moisoiu, ‘Competitiveness, theoretical and Policy Approaches. Towards a More Competitive EU’, 
(2015) 22 Procedia Economics and Finance 512, 513-517 
29Anca Daniela Chirita, ‘The    EC Commission’s Guidance Paper on the Application of  Article 82 EC: An 
Efficient Means of  Compliance for Germany? (2009) 5 European Competition Journal 677, 681 
30 Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD 1949) 106 
31 Paul J. McNulty, ‘Economic Theory and the Meaning of  Competition’ (1968) 82 Quarterly Journal of  
Economics 639, 639-640 
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added that its meaning should be restricted to ‘absence of monopoly power’.32 But that is 
probably too simple. 
Friedman clearly explained the two meanings of competition. The first meaning 
– in the ordinary discourse – competition means ‘personal rivalry’; the second meaning – 
in the economic world – is the opposite as it is impersonal. He explained that in a 
competitive market no individual participant could determine the other participants’ 
access to the goods or jobs, nor determine the price, because price was determined by 
the accumulative effect of their separate actions.33 
It is reported that Adam Smith viewed competition ‘as a process stimulating 
rivalry among agents (to improve their performances) by reacting and counter-reacting 
behaviours’.34Along with Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen, David Ricardo, Karl Marx and 
Austrian economists viewed competition as ‘a dynamic process of rivalry and contention, 
not a market structure’.35 
In modern times, the world renowned Harvard economist, Michael E. Porter,36 
considers that there are two types of competition; a zero-sum game and a positive-sum 
game. According to him, a zero-sum game is where firms compete to be the best,37 while 
                                                 
32 George J. Stigler, ‘Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated’ (1957) 65 Journal of  Political 
Economy 1, 14 
33 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (40th Anniversary ed, University of  Chicago Press 2002) 119-120 
34 Massimiliano Vatiero, ‘The Ordoliberal Notion of  Market Power: An Institutionalist Reassessment’ 
(2010) 6 European Competition Journal 689, 692 
35 Tuna Baskoy, ‘Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of  Business Competition’ (2003) 37 Journal of  Economic 
Issues 1121, 1122 
36 According to the Institute for Strategy & Competitiveness, ‘Michael Porter is the founder of  the modern 
strategy field and one of  the work’s most influential thinkers on management and 
competitiveness.’ ‘He is the Bishop William Lawrence University Professor at Harvard Business 
School.’ Geoff  Colvin, Senior Editor-at-large at Fortune Magazine referred to him as ‘having 
influenced more executives – and more nations – than any other business professor on earth.’ 
Harvard Business School, ‘About Michael Porter’ <http://www.isc.hbs.edu/about-michael-
porter/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 23 May 2016 
37 When firms compete to be the best, they tend to cuts cost to win the competition or they engage in 
predatory pricing to drive competitors out of  the markets. There is a very interesting example 
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a positive-sum game is to compete to be unique. To Porter, competition should not be a 
zero-sum game because it is not a competition to be the best, but it is a competition to 
be unique. Therefore, there is no reason to chase after the same customers and to offer 
the same products only to arrive at competitive convergence.38 In fact, Porter suggested 
that firms should compete in a positive-sum game. The more firms create their own 
customers, the more productivity, innovativeness, and variety of products there will be.39 
He also opines that in international markets, it is firms that compete, not countries.40 
2.1.2 Competitiveness of a Firm  
Economists appear to mutually agree on the concept of competitiveness of a 
firm, in other words, the microeconomic level of competitiveness. It is understandable 
why economists can roughly agree on this matter because it is apparent that firms do 
compete. The competition among firms is equal to rivalry and the struggle for 
superiority. In certain conditions firms do co-operate, such as in a joint-venture for 
research and development of a new product. The more a firm becomes superior to its 
rivals, the more competitive it becomes.  
                                                                                                                                           
given by Joan Magretta. It is the Hotel Bed Wars between leading hotel chains to provide superior 
quality beds to their customers. It began with Westin Hotels and Resorts’ introduction of  
Heavenly Bed. Then Hilton, Marriot, Hyatt, Radisson, and the Crowne Plaza each introduced its 
own brand of  custom-design beds. Within seven years after Westin introduced its beds, the war 
has come to an end. That was after they made large investments in research and development, 
installed and promoted their own brands. Magretta observed that ‘one company’s attempt to be 
“the best” ended up raising the bar for everyone. It’s not surprising that, with this approach to 
competing, that long-term profitability in the hotel industry has been chronically low. See Joan 
Magretta, Understanding Michael Porter: The Essential Guide to Competition and Strategy (Harvard 
Business Review Press 2012) 25 
38 Competitive convergence refers to ‘what happens when companies imitate and match each other’s 
moves, when they compete to be the best. Over time all companies begin to look alike as one 
difference after another erodes. When rivals converge around a standard offering, customers 
must choose on price alone. Mainstream economics has always highlighted the way in which this 
kind of  “perfect” competition benefits customers by lowering prices. But Porter sees it 
differently. Convergence can actually hurt customers because it limits their choices.’ ibid 212 - 213 
39 ibid 19 - 31 
40 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of  Nations: With a New Introduction (Macmillan Business 1998) 
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A firm’s competitiveness entails the firms’ ability to produce goods and services 
more efficiently than its rivals;41 the ability to be superior to their competitors in every 
aspect of their business whether in design, skills, price or non-price qualities;42 the ability 
to profitably produce goods that correspond to the market requirements;43 the ability to 
grow, to compete, and to be profitable.44 The focus of a firm’s competitiveness is on the 
firm itself, its choice of strategy, its performance, and its business decisions. There is not 
a strong connection with competition law in this regard. 
Competition law cannot bring firms profit or make them grow. But competition 
law can indirectly affect the way firms compete. If anticompetitive practices are curbed 
properly, it can signal to firms that the authorities do not tolerate collusion, cartels, and 
concerted practices. Firms cannot, therefore, cooperate to distort market competition at 
the expense of the market structure and consumers. Either in a zero-sum or positive-
sum game where competition law is effectively enforced, one can surmise that 
oligopolistic markets will operate through true competition among firms rather than 
firms colluding to share the market.  
However, if competition law and policy is not effectively enforced, firms can be 
prone to collusion and cartelisation. Firms from advanced economies have more 
                                                 
41 Đula Borozan, ‘Regional Competitiveness: Some Conceptual Issues and Policy Implications’ (2008) 4 
Interdisciplinary Management Research, Faculty of  Economics in Osijek 50 
42 Ajitabh Ambastha and K Momaya, ‘Competitiveness of  Firms: Review of  Theory, Frameworks, and 
Models’ (2004) 26 Singapore Management Review 45 
43 Hațegan D.B. Anca, ‘Literature Review of  the Evolution of  Competitiveness Concept’ (2012) 1 Journal 
of  the Faculty of  Economics, University of  Oradea 41 
<https://ideas.repec.org/a/ora/journl/v1y2012i1p41-46.html#biblio> accessed 10 February 
2016 
44 Ronald L. Martin, ‘A Study on the Factors of  Regional Competitiveness’ (A Draft Final Report for the 
European Commission Directorate-General Regional Policy, Cambridge Econometrics, 
University of  Cambridge) 2 - 1   
<http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/3cr/competitiveness.pdf> 
accessed 2 February 2016> 
33 
 
potential to engage in international cartels.45 They tends to cartelise in developing 
countries’ markets because these firms know that developing countries either do not 
have sufficient resources to effectively enforce cartel law or do not have effective cartel 
laws.46 Empirical research reveals that on average the cartel overcharges are significantly 
larger than the fines imposed on hard core cartels in the US and the EU47 and that the 
illicit gains that firms made considerably outweigh the fines that are imposed,48 thus 
firms would continue to engage in cartel, despite awareness of the illegality of the cartel 
activities and the fines imposed on them.49 
If the authorities regularly investigate and prosecute dominant firms that exploit 
the consumers, exclude their potential rivals from entering the market, or drive their 
rivals out of the market, then the market structure and competition process will be 
preserved. Rivals can keep incumbents under pressure to improve their performance in 
order to keep their market positions. Merger and acquisition procedures can signal firms 
which type of cooperation is acceptable and if used properly can enhance firms’ 
efficiency and competitiveness in the long term. Thus, the contribution of competition 
law to firms’ competitiveness levels appears to be indirect.   
                                                 
45 The data taken from a sample of  80 EU cartel decisions from 1974 to 2010 shows that these firms are 
based in Japan, Germany, the UK, France, the US, Netherlands, South Korea, Italy and other EU 
countries which are OECD countries. See D. Daniel Sokol and Andreas Stephan, ‘Prioritizing 
Cartel Enforcement in Developing World Competition Agencies’ in D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. 
Cheng, and Ioannis Lianos (eds) Competition Law and Development (Stanford University Press 2013) 
46 Sokol and Stephan, ‘Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in Developing World Competition Agencies’ (n 44) 
47 A study of  hard core cartel cases in the US and the EU. See John M. Connor and Robert H. Lande, ‘The 
Size of  Cartel Overcharges: Implication for EU and U.S. Fining Policies’ (2006) 51 Antitrust 
Bulletin 983, 984 
48 A study of  EU fine on 64 cartel cases from 1975 – 2009. See Emmanuel Combe and Constance 
Monnier, ‘Fines Against Hard Core Cartels in Europe: The Myth of  Over Enforcement’ (2009) 
Cahiers de Recherche PRISM-Sorbonne Working Paper, 31 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431644> accessed 1 August 2016 
49 A study of  four major cartel cases in Australia. See Christine Parker, Paul Ainsworth and Natalie 
Stepanenko, ‘ACCC Enforcement and Compliance Project: The Impact of  ACCC Enforcement 
Activity in Cartel Cases’ (2004) Centre for Competition and Consumer Policy, The Australian 
National University Working Paper, 60 - 61 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=583521> accessed 1 August 2016 
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2.1.3 Competitiveness of a Nation  
The concept of competitiveness of a nation has received much more criticism 
and is highly debatable.50 A leading economist who opposes the application of 
competitiveness to national economies is Krugman.51 This thesis agrees with Krugman 
that the tendency to overuse the concept of competitiveness to promote the 
governments’ trade policy is dangerous.52 He argued that ‘the concept of national 
competitiveness is elusive’.53 Because a company’s competitiveness can be measured with 
its bottom line – which is the ability to pay its employees, suppliers, and bondholders, 
while a country, such as Greece, may or may not be happy with its economic 
performance, but will not go out of business. A country will still exist even if it is not 
able to repay its debt, albeit Greece could leave the EURO zone and potentially the EU, 
the country would still exist. 
His view has received much criticism from academia.54 However, his view does 
not seem to have a significant effect on government policy or measurements of 
                                                 
50 Michael E. Porter, On Competition: Updated and Expanded Edition, (Harvard Business School Publishing 
2008) 174; Mitschke, The Influence of  National Competition Policy on the International Competitiveness of  
Nations: A Contribution to the Debate on International Competition Rules (n 28) 102-103; Borozan, 
‘Regional Competitiveness: Some Conceptual Issues and Policy Implication (n 41) 53; Anca, 
‘Literature Review of  the Evolution of  Competitiveness Concept’ (n 43) 41 - 46 
51 He categorically asserts that ‘competitiveness is a meaningless word when applied to national 
economies.’ He opposes the excessive use of  the term in such a way that it becomes an obsession 
which is dangerous. In his opinion, the rhetoric of  competitiveness is widespread because; (1) 
The concept of  competitiveness sounds exciting and can attract a wider audience. Businessmen 
are more familiar with competitiveness than with comparative advantage. Because of  this reason, 
Krugman claimed that some economists, although knowing that the benefits of  higher 
productivity does not relate to international competition, would maintain that improving 
productivity will increase competitiveness and use competitiveness as a means to attract and 
persuade wider audiences that their proposed policy is sound. (2) Blaming the US economic 
difficulties on its failures in international competition somehow perplexingly appears to make 
them seem easier to solve. (3) The Competitive metaphor is extremely useful for world’s leaders 
as a political device. See Paul Krugman, ‘Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession’ (1994) 73 
Foreign Affairs 28 
52 ibid  
53 ibid 31 
54 Some scholars disagreed with his stance that competitiveness does not matter. See John H. Dunning, 
‘Think Again Professor Krugman: Competitiveness Does Matter’ (1995) 37 The International 
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competitiveness of a country, because governments continue to promote 
competitiveness along with the enactment of competition law. Many academics and 
organisations defined the concept of competitiveness of a nation. The most influential 
definition is developed by Porter.  
A) Porter’s Definition 
According to Porter, if firms are competitive, a country is likely to be 
competitive too.55 He disagreed with the classical notion of competitiveness of a nation 
as derived from inhibited resources, achieving trade surplus or a balanced trade per se.56 
He asserted that competitiveness did not mean just jobs, but what types of jobs. It is not 
good enough for a nation to have a lower standard of living due to cheap labour because 
even if it can balance its trade surplus of importing expensive and sophisticated products 
it cannot produce competitively with the export of its cheap products worldwide.  
                                                                                                                                           
Executive 315. Dunning opined that Krugman disapproved of  the usefulness of  competitiveness 
completely, and suggested that competitiveness was ‘a helpful basis for guiding actions and 
policies that determine the future productivity of  a country’s resources and capabilities.’ Dunning 
claimed that Krugman appeared to ignore the role of  the national government in influencing the 
competitiveness of  a country. He claimed that national governments could learn from the 
experiences of  other countries to upgrade the quality of  their resources. Hence, measuring 
competitiveness of  countries is useful when domestic firms are not using their resources and 
capabilities efficiently, or are not upgrading their assets at an optimum rate, when governments 
want to attract FDI or discourage their firms from locating their business activities outside their 
countries.; See Colin Hay, ‘The ‘Dangerous Obsession’ with Cost competitiveness . . . and the 
Not So Dangerous Obsession with Competitiveness’ (2012) 36 Cambridge Journal of  Economics 
463. Hay argued that Krugman’s misdiagnose of  the competitiveness problem has led to the 
wrong conclusion. Hay argued that it was not the obsession with competitiveness or with 
analogies between competition among nations and among companies, but the obsession of  cost 
competitiveness that has led the EU policy-makers to assume that all product and service markets 
are analogous to the cheap consumer goods product markets. 
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Porter opined that it is less important to define what a nation’s competitiveness 
is as long as one can determine what creates productivity and what the rate of 
productivity growth is. Because, he claimed, ‘the only meaningful concept of 
competitiveness at the national level is productivity’. He also claimed that ensuring a 
high and rising standard of living for its citizens is the principal goal of a nation, and ‘a 
nation’s standard of living depends on the capacity of its companies to achieve high 
levels of productivity – and to increase productivity over time’. He also asserted that in 
order to achieve high productivity, it is important to look at each industry separately and 
improve them individually. It is not possible for a nation to attain a high competitiveness 
in all sectors.57  
For developing countries, Porter emphasised that the quality of the business 
environment is crucial for competitiveness. A good business environment entails good 
infrastructure which supports advanced technology, developed logistics, good research 
and an education system which produces highly competent labour that can use 
sophisticated strategies, a good legal system with minimum amount of red tape, and an 
enforcement regime which is quick and fair.58  
At present, Porter’s work on the competitive advantage of nations is undeniably 
influential. His theory on competition and competitiveness has been well received 
globally although his theory is criticised for lacking a sufficient theoretical basis and not 
being ‘empirically rigorous’59 and his diamond theory was criticised as irrelevant to small 
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open economies.60 Not only his work on global competitiveness reports has had a 
positive reception, but he is also invited to present his view on Singapore’s competitive 
advantage and it appears that Singapore has followed his theory.61  
In order to determine what makes a nation more competitive than others in 
international markets, Porter has developed the Diamond theory to analyse a nation’s 
competitiveness. According to Porter, the classical theory on comparative advantage 
which argues that the abundance of endowments of factors of production such as 
natural resources, cheap labour cost, land, and capital can bring comparative advantage 
to a nation is no longer relevant because they are ‘nothing more than the basic inputs 
necessary for production’,62 and ‘insufficient to explain the pattern of trade’.63 Thailand 
has an abundance of these factors of production compared with Singapore, yet its 
competitiveness is much further behind. There are certainly more attributions to the 
competitiveness of nations than these inherited endowments. This thesis is interested in 
the role of competition law in those areas. 
Porter’s Diamond Theory 
The Diamond theory explains the relation and interdependence between four 
elements which contribute to a nation’s competitiveness. They are: 1. Factor 
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Conditions,64 2. Demand Conditions,65 3. Related and Supporting Industries,66 and 4. 
Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry.67  
Porter gave the most weight to rivalry because it ‘puts more pressure on firms to 
invest and innovate’.68 It is possible for firms to gain competitiveness with only one or 
two of these determinants in national resource-dependent industries. However, it is not 
sustainable in the long run because foreign firms can easily avoid resource-dependent 
industries.69  
Porter asserted that competitive advantages can be attained even when there is 
lack of some (basic) factors.  The lack of natural resources and labour does not always 
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lead to a negative result in competitiveness as it could pressure firms to innovate around 
these limitations.70 However, this lack must be balanced with advantages in some other 
areas in order to yield the best result in innovation as too many disadvantages can result 
in paralysis.71 
Home demand conditions can help increase the competitiveness of an industry. 
If the home demand is sophisticated, it can pressure firms to innovate to create or 
provide a better product or service to support the needs of domestic consumers. In 
Japan, consumers’ sophisticated demands for high performance, energy saving, and quiet 
air-conditioners pressured firms to develop air-conditioners suitable to their needs. The 
result is that Japan is leading in the global market for intelligent compact air-
conditioners.72   
In Thailand, consumers have high and sophisticated demands for pick-up trucks. 
The Thais prefer their pick-up trucks to be suitable for all-purposes: carriers of large 
families and agricultural products, and durable to poor road conditions.73  It is reported 
that Thailand’s one-ton pick-up trucks market is the world’s second largest after the 
US.74 In 2011, it was reported that Thailand is the world’s largest exporter of pick-up 
trucks and the quality of automotive parts is rated as the best among AMSs by the Japan 
Automobile Manufacturers Association.75  
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However, without strong domestic rivalry, firms may become complacent and be 
slow to respond to domestic demands. Without appropriate supporting industries, firms 
may not be able to respond appropriately to sophisticated demands.76 A rigorous 
enforcement of competition law can help maintaining rivalry in the markets by ensuring 
market access to all potential competitors. Rivalry keeps firms motivated, but it cannot 
replace or create strong and sophisticated demands. 
Relating and supporting industries impact competitiveness, not only in access to 
capitals, machinery or availability of input, but most importantly in the ‘process of 
innovation and upgrading, close working relationships between world-class suppliers and 
the industry’.77 Japan is a good example of close working relationships between industry 
and suppliers. Its keiretsu (business group) is the closed ‘intricate web of relationships 
among banks, suppliers, and companies in related fields’. This structure ‘created a built-
in network of suppliers and customers that was seen as highly beneficial to collaboration 
and competitive success’.78 This allows frequent exchanges of information from the very 
beginning of the product development process between the suppliers and the industry, 
personnel rotation, long-term relationships with a small number of first-tier suppliers, 
and incentives to suppliers for improvements in efficiency. All of these aspects are part 
of Japan’s success in achieving high global competitiveness.79  
However, securing global relating and supporting industries may provide little 
advantage if industries are faced with lack of other diamond determinants such as lack of 
access to advanced factors, lack of sophisticated and strong home demand which signals 
                                                 
76 Porter The Competitive Advantage of  Nations: With a New Introduction (n 40) 99 
77  ibid 100 - 103 
78 Michael E. Porter, Hirotaka Takeuchi and Mariko Sakakibara, Can Japan Compete? (Macmillan 2000) 74 
79 ibid 71 
41 
 
an appropriate product change, and lack of active rivalry.80 The contribution of effective 
enforcement of competition law and policy to this determinant in the diamond is 
indirect, because competition law cannot create world-class related and supporting 
industry. But effective enforcement of competition law can ensure the competition 
process is not distorted. As a consequence, it can maintain active rivalry in the industry. 
The nature of domestic rivalry is part of the last determinant in the diamond 
theory: Firm strategy, Structure, and Rivalry. It is not merely the existence of rivalry, but 
also its pattern.81 There is no one size fits all for the structures and strategy of domestic 
firms that leads to a competitive advantage. Each country and each industry has its own 
approach that works best in a given period of time. According to Porter, domestic rivalry 
can create more sense of competition among firms and their managers. Firms are 
competing domestically for customers, human resources, and technology. Therefore, 
domestic firms can pressure each other to be more efficient and innovative.  
Foreign rivals, on the other hand, are not seen as immediate rivals because their 
success is considered distant, and often related to unfair advantages. The more firms are 
pressured by domestic active rivals, the more competitive they become internationally.82 
The study of Japanese competitive and uncompetitive industries revealed that industries 
where there is no government involvement and domestic rivals are strongly present are 
more competitive than industries where government’s policy and legalised cartels are 
allowed.83 
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Other than the four elements of the diamond theory, Porter emphasised that 
there were two other elements which could influence the nation’s policy and that 
complete the theory: chance and government.  
Chance represents events and development outside firms’ control which can 
change the course of development or impact the firms’ competitiveness, such as war, 
technological breakthrough, and major shifts in foreign market demands. Government is 
the key to this theory. The government’s strategy can hinder or enhance any of the 
diamond elements effectively. The government’s antitrust policy can affect domestic 
rivalry. Laws can alter home demand conditions. Government spending can increase 
domestic volume of consumption and create jobs which can encourage related and 
supporting industries. The government’s education policy can produce a highly skilled 
workforce that corresponds to the needs of more advanced business activities and 
changes factor conditions.84 Thus, the true role of government according to this theory 
lies in its influence on the four determinants.85  
One can surmise that if rivalry is important for encouraging firms to compete 
and if the government’s antitrust policy can affect that, and if a nation’s antitrust policy 
and competition law is subject to regulatory capture, then it is not very difficult for 
powerful firms to distort the competition process in a market for their own benefit 
through weak competition law enforcement. Hence, the role of the government in 
designing and enforcing competition law and policy is crucial to a nation’s 
competitiveness. The independence and capacity of the national competition authorities 
are essential elements for effective competition enforcement aimed at increasing firms’ 
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competitiveness. If firms are not competitive domestically, it is unlikely that they are 
competitive internationally.  
Criticisms of Porter’s Theories  
However, his competitive advantage theory also receives many criticisms over 
the years. Considering it was developed in the 1980s. Since then new business models 
and practices have developed such as Uber, GrabTaxi, Facebook, Massive Open Online 
Course are changing how people do business or provide services. Communication 
technology clearly is essential to this phenomenon. Is this theory still relevant?  
In establishing the competitive advantage of a nation, he has developed many 
new concepts and models. One of them is the Five Forces which help to determine the 
industry’s structure through analysis of threats, bargaining power, and rivalry from all 
five forces.86 Although this thesis does not apply his Five Forces in its analysis because 
the WEF does not take it into account when measuring the competitiveness of a 
country, it can be used as an evidence as to whether his theory is still relevant.  
According to Recklies, critiques opine that Porter’s Five Forces does not match 
today’s dynamic market. It is best applied to the analysis of simple market structure and 
that it was developed when the world market was a static market structure, which is very 
much different to the VUCA-world87we are living in today. Recklies claims that the Five 
Forces is a good starting point for managers to analyse the market, but it does not 
provide a comprehensive aspect to the current market structure anymore. Recklies also 
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asserts that the Five Force assumes a classic perfect market.88 Besides, Recklies also 
mentioned that in 1997, Larry Downes has suggested additional three forces into the 
Five Forces analysis to meet today’s market structure: digitalization, globalisation, and 
deregulation.89 Downes’s additional three forces appear to be well received by 
academics.90  
This seems to suggest that Porter’s Five Forces does not have the significance it 
once did. But it is not so. Many have criticised his theory, but do they understand it 
correctly? Magretta explains that the reason there are only five forces because these are 
the structural forces which are applicable to all industries. They ‘systematically impact 
profitability in a predictable direction.’91 Although government regulation and technology are 
among those proposed new forces, they affect profitability and competitiveness of a firm 
through their impact on the five forces. But they are not structural.92 Hence, it is not 
advisable to add more forces merely because they could affect competitiveness and 
profitability. Moreover, ‘Porter’s five forces framework offers a way to think 
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systematically about imperfect markets.’93 As a result, any claim that this theory assumes 
a classical perfect market is simply a misunderstanding of Porter’s Five Forces.   
The Diamond theory has received as much criticism. A thorough and solid 
research on the summary of the critique of this theory was conducted by Risto Penttinen 
in 1994. The author categorized these criticisms into nine issues on 1) where the 
competitive advantage is created 2) whether the Diamond theory appropriately view the 
impact of FDI on multinational corporations 3) whether Diamond theory is applicable 
to small open economies 4) whether the Diamond theory suits resource-based industry 
5) impact of national culture 6) whether Porter’s methodology is valid 7) Role of macro 
variables 8) whether Diamond theory is dynamic or static and 9) whether Porter’s theory 
is rigorous enough.94  
Penttinen has thoroughly researched and analysed criticisms on Porter’s 
Diamond theory and compiled a brilliant summary table of all nine main points of 
critique. This thesis found that the table is an effective way to easily understand both 
Porter’s point of views and the critics’ points of view on the Diamond theory. Penttinen 
also provides Porter’s replies to this critique where possible. It is the most 
comprehensive compilation of these issues in one document thus far. Hence, this thesis 
presents Penttinen’s summary table below.95 
As one can surmise from the table below that Porter’s Diamond theory was 
heavily criticised. But some of the commentators, in Porter’s own word, did not 
understand the concept, therefore, made the wrong assertion.  
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Issue Porter’s view The core of the critique Porter’s answer 
1. Where is 
competitive 
advantage created? 
- Competitive advantage is created in a 
geographically limited area within the 
nation, where the determinants of the 
diamond are present. 
- The multinational enterprise (MNE) 
needs a home base. Innovation takes 
place in the home base and coordination 
of subsidiaries requires central control. 
- In many industries competitive advantage is 
no longer created in the nation state but in a 
transnational environment where the 
determinants of the Diamond are sourced all 
over the world. The world can be seen either 
as one large Diamond or a system of 
interlinking Diamonds. 
- The MNE does not need a home base. 
Innovations take place all over the world and 
coordination of a network is possible without 
strong central control. 
- The geographic scope of competition is global, 
but the geographic locus of competitive 
advantage is the home base, as reflected by 
the Diamond. These two concepts must be 
understood as separate. 
- As an exception the Diamond can cross a 
national border where culture and 
institutions on both sides are similar and 
physical distances short. 
2. FDI - Outward FDI is more valuable than 
inward FDI in creating competitive 
advantage. 
- Local ownership and a local home base 
create greater benefits than foreign 
ownership and a foreign home base. 
- Inward FDI is as valuable as outward FDI 
and foreign owned firms are as important to 
a nation as domestically owned firms. 
- There is no capital which is loyal to the 
home base. 
- In the case of weak and not anymore so 
attractive Diamond, foreign subsidiaries can 
more easily be drawn out of a country than 
domestically owned firms. 
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3. Small open 
economies 
- The home base Diamond applies to all 
nations. Competitive advantage is created 
in a geographically limited area also in a 
small nation. 
- Demand and rivalry have to be present 
in the home base Diamond. The 
sophistication of home demand is more 
important than the size of it. 
- Mergers and acquisitions are a threat to 
tough domestic rivalry and therefore bad. 
- Economies of scale is not a true sources 
of sustainable competitive advantage. 
- The Diamond model may suit the 
situation of a large country but it does not 
suit small nations who are highly dependent 
on the Diamonds of other countries. 
- Home demand is too small in small 
nations in order to gain economies of scale. 
- Small nations cannot support local rivalry 
and still achieve economies of scale. 
- In small nations mergers are needed e.g. 
to be able to finance R&D projects. 
- Even in large countries, e.g. the USA, the 
creation of competitive advantage is 
geographically concentrated to a small area. 
- Sophistication of home demand is more 
important than size of home demand. 
- Even in smaller countries the successful 
industries usually have significant local 
rivalry. 
4. Resource-based 
industries 
- The importance of basic factors such as 
natural resources as sources of 
competitive advantage has been 
undermined by their diminishing 
necessity, widening availability and ready 
access on global markets. 
- The returns to natural resources are low. 
- Competitive advantage based on natural 
resources is unsustainable. 
- Resource-based industries can also have 
substantial competitive advantage when the 
resource product is differentiated and 
contains intangible value added e.g. in the 
form of managerial and marketing skills. 
- Returns on natural resources are not 
uniformly low. 
- Also resource-based industries have 
sustainable competitive advantage thanks to 
- There are significant firm-specific 
advantages in resource industries. 
- Cost positions are poor and productivity is 
lagging in many natural resources industries. 
- Competitive advantage based on natural 
resources can sometimes be sustained for a 
time but natural resource advantages alone 
are unstable and vulnerable. 
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- Industries highly dependent on natural 
resources were avoided in the selection of 
industries. 
value added. 
- The Diamond model does not suit 
resource-based industries because of the 
methodology used in the selection of 
industries. 
5. National culture - Competitive advantage grows out of 
national and even local circumstances in 
the Diamond, one circumstance being 
culture. 
- Firms should draw on and reinforce 
their unique national cultures 
- National culture is the base on which the 
national Diamond rests. 
- Culture is exogenous to firms and cannot 
be changed. 
- National culture works through the four 
determinants of the Diamond model. 
- Culture is not necessarily exogenous to 
firms and it can be changed. 
6. Methodology - The best indicator of competitive 
advantage are substantial and sustained 
exports and/or significant outward FDI 
based on skills and assets created in the 
home country. 
- In the methodology industries were 
defined narrowly and based as closely as 
possible on strategically distinct 
businesses. Relevant industries were at the 
lowest level of aggregation for which data 
- Productivity would have been a better 
measure of international competitiveness 
than export data. 
- The FDI activities of MNEs are not 
covered by the methodology. 
- The use of the SITC classification causes 
problems, e.g. services and many other 
industries are not covered by this data. 
- Porter’s model is only valid for studying 
successful industries since these are the 
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was available. For this purpose, the SITC 
classification was used. 
- To avoid the risk of generalising when 
this is not appropriate, a wide range of 
nations and industries with widely 
differing characteristics and institutions 
were studied. 
 
ones his model is based on. 
- The generalizability of a study based on a 
few cases is questionable. 
- Because no uniform measures exist to 
evaluate the Diamond, comparison between 
countries is impossible. 
- The predictive power of the model is 
weak. 
7. Macro Variables - Studying macroeconomic variables like 
exchange rates, interest rates, and 
government deficits is not enough to 
explain the competitive advantage of 
industries or nations. 
- Unit labour costs can be achieve 
through low wages and because this is not 
an attractive industrial model, unit labour 
cost is not a good measure of 
competitiveness. 
 
- Unit labour cost is a measure which is 
better in assessing competitiveness than 
only output per hour emphasised by Porter. 
- Unit labour cost consists of output per 
hour (which is emphasised by Porter and by 
him named productivity) and compensation 
per hour (which is downplayed by Porter). 
Also exchange rates affect unit labour cost. 
- The increasing value of currency and high 
interest rates may exacerbate 
competitiveness problems but they are not 
the cause of them. 
8. Dynamism - The points of the Diamond are self-
enforcing and they create a system. The 
- Porter’s study concentrates on existing 
clusters and does not explain how to create 
- Competitive advantage is most easily 
established in industries with established 
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Diamond promotes industry clusters. 
Domestic rivalry and geographical 
proximity are especially important in 
promoting the creation of clusters. 
- The nature of competitive advantage of 
many of a nation’s industries tends to 
evolve together. 
- The four stages of economic 
development relate to the attributes in the 
nation’s industry most important to rising 
economic prosperity. The stages do not 
explain everything of the nation’s industry 
but provide a way of thinking about how 
nations progress in competitive terms. 
a new Diamond. 
- It is not logical that countries move from 
stage to stage in the four stage model. 
There are likely to be industries and 
companies in all major economies at each 
of the stages. 
- Porter does not explain what causes the 
transition from stage to stage. 
strength, or entering related fields, rather 
than creating de novo industries. 
9. Rigour  - Porter’s definitions lack precision and 
they are inconsistent e.g. when the analysis 
moves from the industry to the national 
level. 
- The structure of the Diamond lacks 
precision and the Diamond cannot be 
operationalised, i.e. objectively measured. 
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- Porter’s argumentation is sloppy and he 
uses generalisations. 
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B) IMD’s Definition 
The International Institute for Management Development (IMD) explained that 
the competitiveness of a nation is measured and analysed by ‘the ability of a nation to 
create and maintain an environment that sustains more value creation for its enterprises 
and more prosperity for its people’.96  It does not only emphasise the firms’ ability to 
compete, but also emphasises the role of the nations to create such an environment and 
to provide a better quality of living to their citizens. Although, it appears to omit whether 
it is the firm or the nation that competes, in fact, it is quite clear that the IMD considers 
that the firms are competing in the market while the nation provides and fosters the 
environment which enables them to compete. This notion is very similar to the 
definition given by Porter.  
Unfortunately, public access to the detailed IMD’s World Competitiveness 
Yearbook is not available. Had it been available, a more thorough analysis on what 
constitute competitiveness of a nation would have been done in comparison to those 
criteria used by the WEF and Porter. 
C) The WEF’s Definition 
Porter’s definition and approach to the competitiveness of a nation was well 
received. It is used and followed by many organisations. One of them is the world 
leading organisation on competitiveness, the WEF. The WEF defined competitiveness 
as ‘the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of 
a country.’97 WEF works closely with Porter and applies his concept on competitiveness 
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or competitive advantage, Diamond theory, and stages of development in its Global 
Competitiveness Reports which are examined in section 2.2.1.  
2.1.4 Competitiveness of a Region 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
describes the characteristics of a competitive region as ‘one that can attract and maintain 
successful firms and maintain or increase standards of living for the region’s inhabitants. 
Skilled labour and investment gravitate away from “uncompetitive” regions towards 
more competitive ones’.98 
ASEAN, although it aims at creating the AEC as a highly competitive economic 
region, has not defined what it means by that. The EU, on the other hand, defined its 
version of regional competitiveness as ‘the ability to offer an attractive and sustainable 
environment for firms and residents to live and work in’.99 As a result, the 
competitiveness of a region, according to the EU, ‘depends on its ability to anticipate 
and successfully adapt to internal and external economic and social challenges, by 
providing new economic opportunities, including higher quality jobs’.100  
In this regard, the EU reinvents itself by emphasising ‘knowledge, innovation 
and the optimisation of human capital’.101 It also views that ‘competitiveness involves 
upgrading the economic development of all regions together . . . competitiveness is not a 
zero-sum game. . .’102 The EU envisions to strive for ‘knowledge economy 
                                                 
98 OECD, ‘Regional Competitiveness’ <http://www.oecd.org/gov/regional-
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99 Eurostat Statistics Explained, ‘Regional Competitiveness Statistics’ <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
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competitiveness’.103 Undoubtedly, the EU’s definition of competitiveness is very much 
influenced by the work of Porter. 
Clearly, the OECD and the EU view regional competitiveness quite similarly. 
Both extend beyond the pure economic competitiveness of firms within the region to 
include the wellbeing of their citizens. Both focus on attracting firms and citizens, albeit 
the OECD’s preference is on attracting successful firms and skilled labour, while the EU 
aims to create an attractive environment for any type of firm and for all citizens to work 
and live in. However, it should be noted that both definitions correspond to the concept 
provided by Porter that a nation’s goal is to create a high standard of living for its 
citizens. 
It can be concluded that there is a consensus among economic integration 
entities/organisations that the competitiveness of a region derives from the nation’s 
competitiveness. Providing an environment that fosters the competitiveness of firms and 
promotes a high standard of living is the key to the OECD’s and the EU’s approach to 
competitiveness. Their views on competitiveness of the region correspond with Porter’s 
view on the competitiveness of nations. Although Krugman warned of obsessive use of 
the term competitiveness, it appears that policy makers and academia do not listen to his 
warning at all. The next section shall demonstrate how the OECD and the EU as well as 
other organisations measure competitiveness. Although they may share a very similar 
view, their approach in measuring it differs somewhat. 
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2.2 MEASUREMENTS OF COMPETITIVENESS  
This section explores the indicators and variables used by the world’s leading 
organisations to determine competitiveness. The central idea is not to explain each and 
every variable, but to see whether competition law and policy plays any role in measuring 
competitiveness. 
There are a number of institutions which publish international competitive 
reports; such as the WEF which publishes the Global Competitiveness Report since 
1979,104 the IMD which has published the World Competitiveness Yearbook since 1989, 
first under the name of World Competitiveness Report and since 1996 under the name 
World Competitiveness Yearbook,105 the Centre for International Competitiveness 
(founded in 2007) which publishes three competitiveness indexes: the World Knowledge 
Competitiveness Index, the European Competitiveness Index, and the UK 
Competitiveness Index,106 and finally the OECD’s indicators of international 
competitiveness. 
This thesis excludes data on competitiveness from IMD because the data which 
are publicly accessible are limited. It only provides data for 5 AMSs (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). Moreover, the data only shows overall ranking, 
economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency, and infrastructure 
                                                 
104 WEF, ‘FAQs’ <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/faqs/> accessed 
22 February 2016 
105 IMD, ‘History – World Economy Ranking’ <http://www.imd.org/wcc/history-of-world-economy-
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membership restriction, this thesis cannot include data from IMD. Because IMD’s publicly 
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106 Centre for International Competitiveness, ‘About the Centre for International Competitiveness’ 
<http://www.cforic.org/pages/about-us.php> accessed 22 February 2016 
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without breaking down in details, which is not enough for analysis for this research. In 
order to be able to view more details, one needs a subscription.  
The competitiveness indexes published by Centre for International 
Competitiveness are also excluded because they are not useful to this thesis and not up-
to-date. 
2.2.1 Global Competitiveness Index by the WEF 
The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) developed by WEF appears to have 
received more acceptance than other competitiveness measurements.107 It collects hard 
data from reliable sources such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and conducts its own 
executive opinion surveys (EOS).108 The GCI is influenced by Porter’s definition of 
competitiveness. Albeit WEF does not specifically publish reports on competitiveness of 
particular regions with regularity and the Global Competitiveness Report represents 
individual country’s competitiveness, the significance of this report is not compromised 
by this. 
A) The Indicators and Indexes 
It should be noted that before 2004, the WEF used two indexes to demonstrate 
the competitiveness of a country: the Growth Competitiveness Index and the Business 
Competitiveness Index (or also known as the Microeconomic Competitiveness Index). 
                                                 
107 It was modelled after by the European Regional Competitiveness Index (RCI) because it is ‘the most 
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The Growth Competitiveness Index indicated the macroeconomic determinants of 
productivity, while the Business Competitiveness Index indicated the microeconomic 
determinants of productivity.109  
In 2004, the WEF introduced a new index called the GCI. The GCI was 
designed to capture both macro- and microeconomic aspects of productivity.110 Since 
then, the Growth Competitiveness Index, the Business Competitiveness Index, and the 
GCI have been published in the Global Competitiveness Reports.  From 2008, the GCI 
is the only index published in the Global Competitiveness Report and replaces the dual 
indexes.111  
In the latest Global Competitiveness Report of 2015 -2016, the WEF divides the 
GCI into three subindexes: Basic Requirements, Efficiency Enhancers, and Innovation 
and Sophistication Factors.  
Firstly, the Basic Requirements subindex is measured through four pillars: 
Institutions, Infrastructure, Macroeconomic Environment, and Health and Primary 
Education. Secondly, the Efficiency Enhancers subindex is measured through six pillars: 
Higher Education and Training, Goods Market Efficiency, Labour Market Efficiency, 
Financial Market Development, Technological Readiness, and Market Size. Thirdly, the 
Innovation and Sophistication Factors subindex is measured through two pillars: 
Business Sophistication and Innovation. The WEF gives different weight for each 
subindex to countries in different stages of development (see Annex 2: table 1 for 
                                                 
109 Xavier Sala-I-Martin and Elsa V. Artadi, ‘The global Competitiveness Index’ in Augusto Lopez-Claros 
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different weight given for Basic Requirements subindex, table 2 for Efficiency 
Enhancers subindex, and table 3 for Innovation and Sophistication Factors subindex) 
Each pillar is measured by various indicators. In total there are 114 indicators 
across all 12 pillars. 112 Annex 2 of this chapter provides details of all indicators and 
subindexes used in 2015 – 2016 Global Competitiveness Report. 
It is clear that the WEF takes into account Porter’s Diamond theory when 
determining which subindexes are to be applied. Porter’s Factor Conditions of the 
Diamond theory are reflected in pillar 2 – Infrastructure, pillar 4 – Health and Primary 
Education, pillar 5 – Higher Education and Training, and in pillar 7 – Labour Market 
Efficiency.  
Porter’s Demand Conditions of the Diamond theory are reflected in pillar 6 – 
Goods Market Efficiency (under quality of demand conditions). Porter’s third facet of 
the Diamond, Related and Supporting Industries are reflected in pillar 8 – Financial 
Market Development, pillar 9 – Technological Readiness, pillar 11 – Business 
Sophistication, and pillar 12 – R&D Innovation.  
Porter’s last facet of the Diamond, Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry are 
reflected in pillar 1 – Institutions (under private institutions), pillar 6 – Goods Market 
Efficiency (under competition), pillar 10 – Market Size, pillar 11 – Business 
Sophistication, and pillar 12 – R&D Innovation. 
                                                 
112 Before 2004, the WEF did not categorise indicators into Pillars. The Pillars have been regularly 
modified and updated. In 2004, there were 12 Pillars with slightly different names from the 
current ones. However, in 2005, there were only 9 Pillars. But it was added back to 12 Pillars 
again in 2006.  
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As Porter firmly asserted that the government’s impact on a nation’s 
competitiveness is undeniable, the WEF also takes this into account in pillar 1 – 
Institutions, pillar 3 – Macroeconomic Environment, pillar 8 – Financial Market 
Development (under trustworthiness and confidence), pillar 12 – R&D Innovation 
(under government procurement of advanced technology products and intellectual 
property protection) 
At a glance, the role of competition law and policy under the WEF’s 
methodology is only one of the 114 indicators. It is placed in the competition indicator 
under the Goods Market Efficiency pillar, of the Efficiency Enhancers subindex. 
However, this does not suggest that a competitive goods market does not have much 
influence on the overall competitiveness of a country. Competition law and policy still 
matter, but to what extent? Is it as important as lawyers and leaders who often link it to 
the increase in competitiveness think it is? Section 2.3 will provide the answers to these 
questions in relation to the statistics from the AMSs from 1999 – 2016. 
B) Stages of Development 
The 12 pillars mentioned above matter to a certain extent for competitiveness in 
all economies, but they affect different economies in different ways.113 From 2004, the 
WEF has categorised countries into different stages of development in order to calculate 
the competitiveness as accurately as possible through calibrating the exact weight given 
to each indicator. This is evidently influenced by Porter’s four stages of national 
competitive development namely Factor-Driven, Investment-Driven, Innovation-Drive, 
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and Wealth-Driven economies.114 The WEF based its stages of development on Porter’s 
definition, although they do not adopt it entirely.115 The effect of stages of development 
on competitiveness is that countries in different stages can improve their 
competitiveness differently.  
The WEF categorises countries into different stages of development based on 
GDP per capita at market exchange rates116 and the share of exports of mineral goods in 
total exports (goods and services).117  
There are 5 stages of development. The 5 stages were given names in 2007 as 
Stage 1: Factor-Driven, Transition from stage 1 to 2, Stage 2: Efficiency-Driven, 
Transition from stage 2 to 3, and Stage 3: Innovation-Driven.  
Stage 1 Factor-Driven Economy:  
Countries within the Factor-Driven development stage are competing based on 
their factor endowments i.e. unskilled labour and natural resources. In order to become 
competitive and maintain competiveness at this stage, countries which fall into this stage 
of development have to focus primarily on basic factors such as well functioning public 
and private institutions (pillar 1), well developed infrastructures (pillar 2), a stable 
                                                 
114 Porter The Competitive Advantage of  Nations: With a New Introduction (n 40) 543 - 560 
115 Xavier Sala-I-Martin (et al), ‘The Global Competitiveness Index: Measuring the Productive Potential of  
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macroeconomic environment (pillar 3), and a primary level educated workforce (pillar 
4).118 Therefore, the Basic Requirements subindex accounts for 60% of their 
competitiveness, while the Efficiency Enhancers and Innovation and Sophistication 
Factors subindexes account for 35% and 5% respectively. This means that for countries 
in this stage, improving their competitiveness must focus on improving pillar 1-4 under 
the Basic Factors subindex because it is more relevant to them.  
Their GDP is less than 2,000 US$. In ASEAN, as at the end of 2015, Laos, 
Cambodia, and Myanmar are at this stage. It is quite clear that countries at this stage are 
production based. They produce and rely on cheap products and have low levels of 
technology in production. Although an effective competition law regime can be useful to 
proscribe cartels, anticompetitive agreements, and abuse of dominance in their market, 
the core of their competitiveness lies in the fundamental Basic Factors. Hence, these 
countries will not reap the full benefit of an effective competition policy as they should if 
they fail to improve their basic factors. 
Transition from Factor-Driven Economy to Efficiency-Driven Economy:  
These countries’ GDP is between US$ 2,000 – 2,999.119 From 2008 – 2014, 
Brunei was categorised in this stage of development even though its GDP considerably 
exceeded this threshold120 due to its reliance on exports of crude oil. At the end of 2015, 
Philippines and Viet Nam are at this stage.  
                                                 
118 Xavier Sala-I-Martin et al, ‘Reaching Beyond the New Normal: Findings from the Global 
Competitiveness Index 2015 – 2016’ (n 113) 37 
119 see n 117 for more details on how the WEF categorises countries which largely depend on exports of  
minerals 
120 Brunei’s GDP per capita from 2008 – 2014 are: US$32,167.3, US$37,053, US$26,325, US$31,239, 
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Countries in this transition stage still rely on the basic factors, but they are 
progressing towards Efficiency-Driven. Therefore, the WEF varies the weights given on 
each subindex – depending on their GDP. For example, in 2012, Philippines’ GDP was 
US$ 2,223; the WEF gave 55.5% of weigh in Basic Requirements, 38.4% in Efficiency 
Enhancers, and 6.1% in Innovation and Sophistication Factors.121 In 2013, Philippines’ 
GDP was US$ 2,614; the WEF gave 47.7%, 44.2%, and 8.1% to Basic Requirements, 
Efficiency Enhancers, and Innovation and Sophistication Factors subindexes 
respectively.122 In 2015, the Philippines’ GDP was US$ 2,865; the WEF gave 42.7%, 
48%, and 9.3% to Basic Requirements, Efficiency Enhancers, and Innovation and 
Sophistication Factors subindexes respectively.123 As it clearly shows that the more GDP 
a country at this transition stage has, the lesser weight is given to basic factors, and the 
more weight is accorded to efficiency enhancers. Thus, it is possible that the 
effectiveness of competition policy can influence the competitiveness of these countries 
provided that their GDP increases towards the Efficiency-Driven stage. 
Stage 2 Efficiency-Driven Economies: 
This stage is, despite its different name, comparable to Porter’s Investment-
Driven stage of national competitive development. The substances of subindexes which 
are relevant and influential to them are roughly the same. According to Porter, the 
government’s role in improving the competitiveness of firms in these countries is 
substantial. One of the key roles is to provide temporary protection to encourage the 
entry of domestic rivals, while resisting powerful corporate interests to ensure adequate 
domestic rivalry. Such protection must be strictly temporarily despite inevitable pressure 
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to make it permanent to incentivise innovation and improvement. The key to the 
government’s success lies in a ‘politically secure government, continuity in government 
officials, and the ability to counteract special interests seeking favours. . .’124 
The GDP of countries in this stage is US$ 3,000 – 8,999. In this stage of 
development, countries become more competitive, their productivity increases, and 
wages will rise with advancing development. These countries begin to develop more-
efficient production processes and to increase product quality. Consequently, they gain 
and maintain their competitiveness through higher education and training which 
produces high skilled labour to serve the economy (pillar 5), efficient goods markets 
(pillar 6), well-functioning labour markets (pillar 7), developed financial markets (pillar 
8), the ability to reap the benefits of existing technologies (pillar 9), and a large domestic 
or foreign market (pillar 10).125 Thus, the WEF gives respectively 40%, 50%, and 10% to 
Basic Requirements, Efficiency Enhancers, and Innovation and Sophistication Factors to 
countries at this stage of development. In ASEAN, as of the end of 2015, Thailand and 
Indonesia are at this stage. 
It clearly shows that countries which are in Efficiency-Driven stage will engage 
and focus on efficiency, and that they use more advance technology to produce, so they 
are undoubtedly more exposed to competition both in domestic and international 
markets. Efficient enforcement of competition law and policy can help them maintain 
goods market efficiency and to remain competitive. However, goods market efficiency is 
only one of the 12 pillars that affect competitiveness. Its impact on the overall 
competitiveness of a country can easily be compromised by ineffectiveness in other 
pillars. 
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Transition from Efficiency-Driven to Innovation-Driven Economies:  
In ASEAN, only Malaysia is at this stage. It has entered this transitional stage in 
2012 when its competition law came into force. The GDP of countries in this stage is 
US$ 9,000 – 17,000 annually. Again, the WEF varies the weights given to each subindex. 
This depends on the GDP. However, it only fluctuates between the Basic Requirements 
and Innovation and Sophistication Factors subindexes. The WEF fixes the weight given 
to the Efficiency Enhancers subindex at 50%. The importance of Efficiency Enhancers 
on competitiveness for countries at this transitional stage is clearly seen as the WEF puts 
the most weight on it.   
For example, in 2012, Malaysia’s GDP was US$ 9,700; the WEF gave 38.3%, 
50%, and 11.7% respectively to Basic Requirements, Efficiency Enhancers, and 
Innovation and Sophistication Factors.126 In 2013, its GDP was US$ 10,304; the WEF 
gave 36.7%, 50%, and 13.3% respectively to Basic Requirements, Efficiency Enhancers, 
and Innovation and Sophistication Factors subindexes.127 The higher the GDP, the more 
weight is given to Innovation and Sophistication Factors compared to the Basic 
Requirements subindex. Thus, the effectiveness of competition law and policy 
undoubtedly affects the competitiveness of countries that are at this stage of 
development. 
Stage 3 Innovation-Driven Economies:  
Wages in countries that have moved into the innovation-driven stage have risen 
so much that the only way they can be sustained is by enabling businesses to become 
more innovative and to compete using the most advanced and sophisticated production 
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processes. According to Porter, the government’s role in this stage of development is 
distinct from that in the previous stages. The government’s direct intervention is not as 
relevant as it used to be. The innovation must come from the private sector.128 It is best 
for governments to indirectly influence by, inter alia, preserving domestic rivalry and 
improving the quality of domestic demand.129  
Countries which are at this stage remain competitive if their businesses are able 
to compete using the most sophisticated production processes (pillar 11) and by 
innovating new ones (pillar 12).130 Their GDP is more than US$ 17,000 per year. 
Singapore has been at the Innovation-Driven stage since 2004.  It is the only country in 
ASEAN which is at this stage.  
Regarding competitiveness of these countries, the WEF gives the most weight to 
Efficiency Enhancers (50%), then Innovation and Sophistication Factors (30%), and the 
least to Basic Requirements (20%). It is clear that Efficiency Enhancers play an 
important role in determining the competitiveness to a different degree in each stage of 
development.  
In this chapter, particular attention is given to the Goods Market Efficiency pillar 
and the Efficiency Enhancers subindex, because the 16 indicators used to determine the 
goods market efficiency are relevant to competitiveness (see Annex 2 of this chapter for 
details on the 16 indicators). One can conjecture that an efficient market is also a 
competitive market.  
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The AEC Blueprints strategies on creating efficient competition policy are 
coherent with the Goods Market Efficiency because they introduce competition law to 
AMSs, build capacity in developing national competition law, establish a platform for 
competition agencies to exchange best practices, publish regional guidelines on 
competition policy, develop a regional strategy on convergence, establish effective 
competition regimes, and strengthen the capacities of NCAs for an effective 
enforcement of national competition laws. 
Mateus and Lianos found the connection between competition law and policy 
and development level. They argued that the level of development of a country 
determines the types of competition law it adopts as well as the competition policy 
strategy. They applied Glaeser and Shliefer’s regulatory state theory on 101 countries 
samples from all over the world and found that in countries where the check and balance 
system of legislature, administration, and judiciary is strengthened, and is largely immune 
to regulatory capture by private interests; high fines have a high dissuasive effect and 
private litigation can function as the main instrument of competition law enforcement. 
They concluded that this regime enables societies to reap all the benefits of modern 
competition law enforcement. 131 They also found that out of 101 countries, there is no 
country with a GDP per capita of less than US$ 13,570 that has a well-resourced 
NCA.132 
Although Mateus and Lianos did not specifically examine the relationship 
between competitiveness and competition law and policy, or the relationship between 
                                                 
131 Abel Mateus and Ioannis Lianos, “Cosi fan tutte”?: Linking Levels of  Development and Competition 
Law Regimes” (2011) CLES Working Paper Series 4/2011, 7 - 10 
<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles_4_2011> accessed 14 
June 2016 
132 ibid 13 
67 
 
this and the stage of economic development, their findings are useful to this thesis 
because they address the impact of the government and of the effectiveness of 
institutions on competition law enforcement. Pillar 1 on Institutions is one of the 
determinants for measuring competitiveness. Well-resourced NCAs are more likely to 
cope with anticompetitive practices more effectively. This can improve the goods market 
efficiency pillar, and hence the Efficiency Enhancers subindex. If their findings on the 
GDP are applied to the AMSs, then Singapore is the only country in ASEAN which has 
an NCA that is well resourced and hence is likely to be able to cope with anticompetitive 
behaviours.  
2.2.2 The European Union Competitiveness 
Thus far, there are two publications on European competitiveness. The first is 
the EU Regional Competitiveness Index which was developed largely based on the GCI. 
It was first published in 2010.133 There are three groups of competitiveness: Basic, 
Efficiency, and Innovation. Under each group there are altogether 11 pillars describing 
inputs and outputs of territorial competitiveness134 similar to those of the GCI. The 
Basic group consists of 5 pillars: Institutions, Macroeconomic Stability, Infrastructure, 
Health, and Basic Education. The Efficiency group consists of 3 pillars: Higher 
Education/ Training and Lifelong Learning, Labour Market Efficiency, and Market Size. 
The Innovation group consists of 3 pillars: Technological Readiness, Business 
Sophistication, and Innovation.135  
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The EU RCI does not include competition law or the effectiveness of antitrust 
policy in any of the determinants. Competition in the EU market and dominance in the 
EU market are also not considered. However, the efficiency of the legal framework in 
settling disputes and in challenging regulations are among the determinants under the 
Institution pillar at country level. They are taken from the GCI.136 
The second is the Europe 2020 Competitiveness Report which is published in 
cooperation with the WEF. This report is published biannually, and came out in 2012 
and 2014. The EU has initiated Europe 2020. Its strategy for Europe 2020 is to attain 
growth that is Sustainable, Inclusive, and Smart.137 Therefore, the indexes in this report are 
in accordance with the WEF. 
There are seven pillars for the three strategies in the Europe 2020 
Competitiveness report. For Sustainable growth, the pillar is Environmental Sustainability; 
for Inclusive growth, the pillars are Social Inclusion and Labour Market and Employment, 
and for Smart growth, the pillars are Education and Training, Innovative Europe, Digital 
Agenda, and Enterprise Environment.138 The report compliments the EU’s endeavour to 
measure progress by offering an assessment based on the results of the WEF’s EOS.139 
Under the Enterprise environment pillar of Smart growth, the four variables used 
to assess the enterprise environment are competition, clusters, entrepreneurship, and 
availability of financing. The competition variable is measured in accordance with the 
GCI. It is measured by; inter alia, intensity of local competition, effectiveness of antitrust 
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policy, extent of market dominance, distortive effect on competition of taxes and 
subsidies, and the impact of rules on FDI.140 However, the distortive effect on 
competition of taxes and subsidies is a new variable and is not yet used in the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2015 -2016. 
2.2.3 The OECD’s Indicators of International Trade and 
Competitiveness 
In 1987, Durand and Giorno suggested that the ideal measurement of 
competitiveness should encompass three basic characteristics: first, cover all traded and 
tradeable goods which are subject to competition; second, cover all markets which are 
open to competition; and, third, should be constructed from data which is fully 
comparable internationally.141 But they also submitted that none of the indicators can 
fulfil these criteria due to various limitations.142 These indicators are often affected by the 
location and the structure of the markets for which they are assessed.143 The calculation 
of these indicators is a matter of compromising with the available data, even if it is done 
under a well-defined conceptual framework.144 The OECD measured the following 
indicators to determine the competitiveness: import competitiveness, export 
competitiveness, overall competitiveness, and competitiveness in the INTERLINK 
model.145 
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In 1992, the OECD’s approach to measuring competitiveness was mainly 
through price competitiveness and other indicators such as real effective exchange rates, 
unit labour costs, and consumer price indices.146 In 1998, the OECD appeared to opine 
that competitiveness was basically a concept for firms, but at the same time accepted that 
is was possible to use this concept to determine a country’s ability to sell its products in 
world markets. However, measuring competitiveness still emphasised quantifiable data 
such as cost and price differentials. Less attention was given to non-price factors such as 
innovation or quality of products or services because these are more difficult to 
compare.147  
In 2005, the OECD published Building Competitive Regions: Strategies and 
Governance based on Porter’s competitiveness of nations and diamond theory. 
However, the direction seems to go towards building clusters, developing estate based 
projects and linking research and industry rather than towards creating rivalry and 
ensuring the efficient enforcement of competition law.148 
In 2015, the OECD’s approach to measuring international competitiveness has 
not changed. The indicators of international competitiveness consisted of total unit 
labour costs, manufacturing unit labour costs, real effective exchange rates, market share, 
and export performance.149 
                                                 
146 Martine Durand, Jacques Simon, and Colin Webb, ‘OECD’s Indicators of  International Trade and 
Competitiveness’ (1992) OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 120, 6 
<http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5lgsjhvj88nr.pdf?expires=1470412474&id=id&accname=guest&ch
ecksum=81FF82D2161451FBBC9E2E3319BF9424> accessed 5 August 2016 
147 Martine Durand, Christophe Madaschi, and Flavia Terribile, ‘Trend in OECD Countries’ International 
Competitiveness: The Influence of  Emerging Market Economies’ (1998) Economics Department 
Working Papers No. 195 ECO/WKP(98)8, 4 - 5 <http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/1864948.pdf> 
accessed 18 February 2016 
148 OECD, Building Competitive Regions: Strategies and Governance (OECD Publishing 2005) 26 - 28 
149 OECD, OECD Compendium of  Productivity Indicators 2015 (OECD Publishing 2015) 48 
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This does not infer that the OECD does not pay attention to competition law 
and policy. In fact, the OECD has extensively published and promoted best practices in 
competition law enforcement in developing countries to protect the investors’ benefit 
when investing in developing countries and to ensure market access to foreign countries, 
as was mentioned in chapter 1. But it does not take effectiveness of competition law and 
enforcement into consideration when measuring competitiveness. The OECD’s 
approach to measuring competitiveness differs from Porter’s, which emphasised 
increasing productivity as a means to increase competitiveness with the goal to bring 
about a high quality of living. The OECD appears to prefer to measure mainly 
quantifiable indicators which are less complicated than non-price indicators. But this 
approach is too narrow and does not provide as well as an assessed result as the GCI. 
 
2.3 COMPETITIVENESS OF THE AMSs 
The aim of this section is to provide evidence that enactment of competition law 
and the efficiency of competition policy do not significantly contribute to the 
competitiveness of the AMSs. In order to prove this, this thesis uses data on the 
competitiveness of the AMSs as measured by WEF from 1999 – 2016.150 
This thesis uses the approach developed by the WEF to analyse the AMSs’ 
competitiveness, because the GCI is carefully designed and is regularly updated and 
                                                 
150 This thesis divides it into 3 periods. The first is from 1999 – 2004 because it was the period from the 
time Thailand and Indonesia enacted their competition laws until before Singapore and Viet Nam 
enacted theirs. Also, the WEF used the old methodology in measuring competitiveness. The 
second period is from 2004-2008 because the WEF has improved its methodology and begun to 
categorise countries into different stages of  development. And it is also the period that Singapore 
and Viet Nam enacted their competition laws. The last period is from 2008 – 2016 because it was 
the beginning of  the adoption of  the AEC Blueprint 2015, the ASEAN Charter, and the 
Regional Guidelines. 
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improved to ensure the results represent the competitiveness as close to reality as 
possible. It takes into account many aspects of a country’s ability to compete efficiently. 
It does not consider only economic statistics, but also considers health, education, and 
the environment for sustainable growth, which is compatible to the approaches 
prescribed in the AEC Blueprint 2025 on competition policy. The GCI has been widely 
accepted and is globally recognised.  
This section analyses the AMSs’ competitiveness by looking into the selected 
indicators which are directly relevant to competition law and policy. The selected 
indicators are: overall competitiveness rankings, effectiveness of antimonopoly policy, 
intensity of local market competition, extent of market dominance, and overall goods 
market efficiency.  
2.3.1 The AMSs’ Competitiveness from 1999 to 2004151 
When the Asian financial crisis started in Thailand in 1997, this spurred AMSs 
leaders to accelerate their economic cooperation and integration. Although they had 
begun the elimination of trade barriers amongst member states, this did not seem to be 
sufficient for the AMSs to cope with losing on their inward FDI.  
The top three among the AMSs remained the same throughout the period. 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand occupied the top three of the list respectively. 
However, only Singapore was actually in the top ten of the overall rankings among all 
countries which were surveyed throughout the period. Singapore outranked the other 
AMSs both in the effectiveness of its antimonopoly policy and in intensity of its local 
competition without having enacted comprehensive competition law.  
                                                 
151 Please see Tables 1 to 4 in ANNEX 1: TABLES 1 – 16: COMPETITIVENESS OF AMSs FROM 
1999 – 2016 
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During this period, the WEF had not yet divided countries into different stages 
of development. Therefore, this thesis divides the AMSs into two categories; countries 
which enacted comprehensive competition laws (Indonesia and Thailand), and countries 
which did not enact comprehensive competition laws (Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
and Viet Nam). 
Between Thailand and Indonesia, Thailand’s antimonopoly policy was more 
effective at promoting competition. Consequently, Thai local competition was more 
intense than Indonesia’s. Except in 2001 – 2002 when Thailand’s local competition was 
slightly less intense than Indonesia’s. Overall, Thailand’s microeconomic competitiveness 
was ahead of Indonesia’s throughout this period. 
Among countries which did not enact competition laws (Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Viet Nam), the data reveals mixed results. With the exception of 
Singapore, countries which had more effective antimonopoly policy and more intense 
local competition did not always have better overall microeconomic competitiveness as 
can be seen from the comparative data on Malaysia and Philippines from 2000 – 2002, 
and between Viet Nam and Malaysia in 2001 – 2002. 
Interestingly, both of the countries with competition law (Thailand and 
Indonesia) were outranked by the countries without it (Singapore and Malaysia). 
Singapore and Malaysia have been the top two among the AMSs since 1999. Thus, 
observations for this period can be drawn as follows: 
1. Enacting competition law did not necessarily correlate to the effectiveness of 
antimonopoly policy and the intensity of local competition, hence, the overall 
microeconomic competitiveness. 
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2. Countries without competition laws could have better microeconomic 
competitiveness than countries with competition law. 
3. Among countries without competition law, it was possible to have a better 
overall microeconomic competitiveness even if the antimonopoly policy was 
less effective and local competition was less intense. 
4. Having a more effective antimonopoly policy did not always result in a more 
intense local market competition and in better overall competitiveness. 
2.3.2 The AMSs’ Competitiveness from 2004 – 2008152 
In this period, The WEF grouped countries into five different stages of 
economic development as described in on page 59. Additionally, the WEF introduced a 
new indicator into the Goods Market Efficiency Pillar namely ‘extent of market 
dominance’. Please see section 2.2.1 Global Competitiveness Index by the WEF for 
more details on these changes.  
From 2004 onwards, the WEF introduced the GCI as a single index which 
combines the macroeconomic competitiveness and microeconomic competitiveness 
indexes. Therefore, the tables for 2004 – 2016 will use the GCI instead of the Business 
Competitiveness Index, Microeconomic Competitiveness Index, and Current 
Competitiveness Index.  
Singapore and Viet Nam enacted their national competition laws. However, the 
Singapore Competition Act was not yet fully in force in 2004. Its enforcement was 
                                                 
152 Please see Tables 6 – 8 in ANNEX 1: TABLES 1 – 16: COMPETITIVENESS OF AMSs FROM 1999 
– 2016 
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phased in over a period of 3 years.153 It is also the period before the publication of the 
AEC Blueprints and the Regional Guidelines. 
When dividing the AMSs into two categories: countries which have enacted 
competition laws (Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Viet Nam), and countries which 
did not enact competition laws (Cambodia, Malaysia, and Philippines) the data of this 
period indicates the following: 
1. Having enacted competition law did not necessarily correlate to a more efficient 
goods market, effectiveness of antimonopoly policy, intensity of local 
competition, and lesser extent of market dominance;  
2. Countries which did not enact competition laws might be ranked at a higher 
GCI than countries which have enacted competition law;  
3. Among countries which did not enact competition law, the overall goods 
market efficiency correlated to their GCI. However, it was not necessarily so 
that a more efficient goods market equates to more effective antimonopoly 
policies, more intense local competition, and lesser extent of market dominance 
(in the case of Cambodia and Philippines); 
4. Among countries which enacted competition laws, their goods market 
efficiency does not reflect their GCI. Besides, it is possible for countries whose 
goods market are more efficient to have less effective antimonopoly policy, less 
intense local competition, or more extent of market dominance. 
                                                 
153 It begins with the enforcement of  the Preliminary provisions and the provisions on the Competition 
Commission of  Singapore and its appointment and power on 1 January 2005. Then provisions 
on Appeals came into force on 1 September 2005, followed with enforcement of  provisions on 
anticompetitive agreements and abuse of  dominance on 1 January 2006. Provisions on merger 
came into force on 1 July 2007. 
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From the above conclusions on enactment of competition law, it suggests that 
enacting competition law does not necessarily result in a more efficient goods market 
and antimonopoly policy, lesser extent of market dominance, more intense local 
competition, and higher GCI. Additionally, it appears to ultimately suggest that 
competition law had no effect until countries had implemented other policies which 
enhance their competitiveness, as there are over a 100 indicators which the WEF uses to 
determine competitiveness. 
However, the significance of competition law to competitiveness become clearer 
when the AMSs are divided into different categories according to their stage of 
development namely Factor-Driven (Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Viet Nam), 
transition from Factor-Driven to Efficiency-Driven (Thailand), Efficiency-Driven 
(Malaysia), and Innovation-Driven (Singapore). This leads to the following conclusions:  
1. Among countries which were in the Factor-Driven stage (Indonesia, 
Philippines, and Viet Nam), having enacted competition law and a more 
efficient goods market did not always result in higher GCI than countries which 
did not enact competition law (as in the case of Philippines and Viet Nam from 
2004 – 2006).  
2. Countries at Factor-Driven stage had lower GCI than countries in higher 
development stage albeit having a more efficient goods market (as in the case of 
Thailand and Indonesia from 2006 – 2008). Moreover, when comparing 
Indonesia (Factor-Driven) with Malaysia (Efficiency-Driven), the data shows 
that despite having more effective antimonopoly policy, more intense local 
competition, and lesser extent of market dominance, Indonesia’s overall goods 
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market efficiency was behind that of Malaysia. (as is the case in Malaysia and 
Indonesia from 2006 – 2008) 
3. Although countries in Factor-Driven stage that enacted competition law 
(Indonesia and Viet Nam) improved their goods market efficiency considerably 
compared with their performance between1999 – 2004, they could not reap the 
full potential of competition law on their overall competitiveness. For example, 
Indonesia improved the effectiveness of its antimonopoly policy in 2006 – 
2008, but it could not outrank Thailand’s GCI and other indicators which 
slightly fluctuated over the period.154  
4. On the other hand, Singapore’s antimonopoly policy has been very effective at 
promoting competition even before the enactment of its Competition Act in 
2004. After the enactment, Singapore continues to top the list and its overall 
goods market efficiency has dominated among the AMSs since 2004. When the 
Singapore Competition Act was fully enforced in 2007, Singapore’s overall 
goods market efficiency was improved and ranked 2nd in the world. Since 1999, 
Singapore overall goods market efficiency has always been higher in rank than 
that of Malaysia even though not all of the indicators under this Pillar were 
higher in Singapore than in Malaysia.155  
From the conclusions above, one can surmise that countries in higher stages of 
development are highly likely to benefit more and quicker from the effect of competition 
law on market efficiency and competitiveness, provided that they effectively enforce this 
                                                 
154 In 1999, Thailand’s effectiveness of  antimonopoly policy was at 43rd among 59 countries (3.64/7.00), 
and Indonesia was at 59th (2.59/7.00). But in 2007 – 2008, the effectiveness of  Thai 
antimonopoly policy has improved slightly at 55th among 131 countries (4.1/7.00), while 
Indonesia shows a significant improvement in this aspect at 25th (5.1/7.00). 
155 For example, Singapore’s antimonopoly policy was generally more effective at promoting competition 
than Malaysia’s, but the extent of  market dominance and intensity of  local competition shifted 
between the two countries. Despite the fluctuation in some of  the indicators, Singapore has 
always ranked better than Malaysia both at the GCI and at overall goods market efficiency. 
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competition law. The contrary is true for countries in lower stages of development, 
especially those in the Factor-Driven stage.  
2.3.3 The AMSs’ Competitiveness from 2008 - 2016156 
The conclusions above on the connection between the effect of competition law 
and the country’s stage of development on competitiveness from 2004 – 2008 are 
affirmed in this period. 
In this period Viet Nam (Factor-Driven) begun to outrank the Philippines 
(Factor-Driven) on the GCI after four years of enforcement of competition law. This 
indicates that among Factor-Driven countries, countries which have enacted and 
enforced competition law can enhance their goods market efficiency to a certain extent 
and, hence, its GCI. Although the Philippines gained its position back in 2012, its goods 
market efficiency has not always been higher ranked than that of Viet Nam.  The 
Philippines’ competitiveness has overtaken that of Viet Nam’s because the Philippines 
moved into the transition stage from Factor-Driven to Efficiency-Driven in 2011. As a 
result, Viet Nam (Factor-Driven) could not reap the full benefits of its competition law 
in the same way that the Philippines could.  
Data from 2013 – 2016 of CLMV countries indicates that Viet Nam has led the 
GCI rankings despite its market efficiency not always being the highest ranking among 
the CLMV. Moreover, Viet Nam has moved from the Factor-Driven stage to the 
transition to Efficiency-Driven stage in 2015, ten years after the enactment of its 
competition law. The data also shows that CLMV countries which did not have 
                                                 
156 Please see Tables 9 – 16 in ANNEX 1: TABLES 1 – 16: COMPETITIVENESS OF AMSs FROM 
1999 – 2016 
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competition laws could have a more effective antimonopoly policy, and hence, better 
GCI. 
In 2008 – 2009, Brunei (transition from Factor-Driven to Efficiency-Driven) 
entered the Global Competitiveness Report for the first time and outranked Indonesia 
(Factor-Driven) despite Brunei’s overall goods market efficiency and all other indicators 
being much lower than those of Indonesia and its lack of competition laws. Thailand 
(Efficiency-Driven) continued to lead above Indonesia (Factor-Driven) despite its goods 
market efficiency and other indicators being much lower than those of Indonesia. The 
reason that Brunei and Thailand were leading over Indonesia is that Indonesia could not 
fully reap the benefits of its competition law due to its lower stage of development. The 
same applied to Brunei, Thailand, and Indonesia in 2009 – 2010. 
In 2009 – 2010, Brunei (transition from Factor-Driven to Efficiency-Driven) did 
not only outrank Indonesia’s GCI, but also Thailand’s (Efficiency-Driven) despite 
having the least market efficiency, the least effective antimonopoly policy, the least 
intense local competition, and the worst extent of market dominance between the three. 
It is clear that Thailand’s stage of development and enactment of competition law could 
not guarantee that Thailand’s GCI would be higher than that of Brunei. In fact, Brunei 
outranked Thailand and Indonesia in 2009 – 2014.  
This proves that in order to gain overall competitiveness, a country does not 
depend only on the enactment of competition law or on its stage of development. There 
are many other indicators which can improve a country’s competitiveness. This strongly 
supports the thesis that competition law and policy is not the only key to 
competitiveness. Brunei’s overall competitiveness is higher than Thailand’s because of its 
strong macroeconomic stability (1st) and good labour market efficiency (10th). Its 
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Institutions and Health and Primary education were also much better than Thailand’s. 
However, if Thailand had enforced its competition law more effectively, its overall 
competitiveness could have increased.  
When comparing Thailand with Indonesia from 2011 – 2016, it is easy to jump 
to the conclusion that Indonesia is less competitive than Thailand because the GCI 
indicates this is so. However, one should not take for granted Indonesia’s economic 
developmental progress over the years 2004 – 2016. In 2004, Indonesia was at the 
Factor-Driven stage. It moved to transition to Efficiency-Driven stage in 2009, which is 
10 years after its competition law came into force. Then in 2011, it moved up to 
Efficiency-Driven. Thailand, on the other hand, had been in the transition to Efficiency-
Driven stage since 2004. In 2007, Thailand moved into the Efficiency-Driven stage. And 
it has stagnated at this stage. This means that over a period of 12 years, Indonesia has 
moved two steps up from Factor-Driven to Efficiency-Driven, while Thailand has only 
moved one step up to Efficiency-Driven. In terms of developmental progress, Indonesia 
is more successful than Thailand.  
When comparing Brunei to Viet Nam from 2009 – 2011, the result shows that 
Viet Nam’s overall goods market efficiency and all other selected indicators in Tables 11 
and 12 of Annex 1 were much better than Brunei’s. However, Viet Nam’s GCI was at 
respectively 75th and 59th in 2009 and 2010, while Brunei’s was respectively at 32nd and 
28th in 2009 and 2010. Viet Nam was at the Factor-Driven stage, while Brunei was in the 
transition from Factor-Driven to Efficiency-Driven stage. This indicates that countries 
which are in the Factor-Driven stage do not fully reap the benefits from having an 
efficient market and competition policy as much as countries in the transition to 
Efficiency-Driven stage and Innovation-Driven stage do. This is a result of the weight 
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accorded to the Efficiency Enhancers as explained earlier. Additionally, if the countries 
in the Factor-Driven stage do not have an effective antimonopoly policy and an efficient 
market at all, they could be left behind as is the case of Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. 
Data on Malaysia’s competitiveness suggest that Malaysia was competitive 
throughout 1999 - 2016, even before the enactment of its Competition Act in 2010. 
Considering Malaysia’s performance from 2008 -2012 when it was at the Efficiency-
Driven stage of development, the data reveals that Malaysia has consistently had efficient 
antimonopoly policy, intense local competition, less market dominance, and an efficient 
goods market. After the Competition Act entered into force in 2012, Malaysia has 
moved up to the transition stage of development from Efficiency-Driven to Innovation-
Driven. And its overall goods market efficiency has consistently improved ever since. In 
fact, Malaysia’s goods market efficiency has been in the top ten since 2013. 
On the other hand, Thailand’s GCI and its overall goods market efficiency have 
not significantly improved. The country’s GCI has shifted between 4.60 – 4.64 out of 
7.00. Its effectiveness of antimonopoly policy has fluctuated from 3.8 – 4.2 out of 7.00. 
When comparing Thailand with Malaysia from 2008 -2012 when they were both at the 
Efficiency-Driven stage of development, the data reveals that Malaysia has consistently 
performed better than Thailand in its effectiveness of antimonopoly policy, intensity of 
local competition, extent of market dominance, and overall goods market efficiency 
albeit its enactment of the competition law was only in 2010 and the law did not come 
into force until 2012. This confirms that for countries in the same stage of development, 
having enacted competition law or not does not always correlate to their GCI, because 
there are many other factors and variables that need to be included. 
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Since the full enforcement of its Competition Act in 2007, Singapore continues 
to top the list in all indicators shown in this chapter. Its overall goods market efficiency 
has ranked at 1st since 2008 and its GCI has ranked at 2nd since 2011. Singapore’s 
competitiveness clearly does not depend on the enactment of its Competition Act. It has 
been an advanced economy and it has been in the top ten of the global competitiveness 
ranking long before the enactment of the law. In 2004, when the WEF started to 
categorise countries into 5 stages of development, Singapore was categorised in the 
Innovation-Driven stage right from the start. Having said that, the data shows that after 
the full enforcement of the law, Singapore’s goods market efficiency has become more 
efficient and stayed at the top of the GCI since 2008. 
The progress of Singapore and Malaysia indicates that a country which is at least 
at the Efficiency-Driven stage of development can reap the benefits of having a 
competition law in enhancing its market efficiency more quickly than countries in the 
Factor-Driven stage, although their competitiveness does not depend on enactment of 
the competition law due to the weight attributed to the Efficiency Enhancers. However, 
Thailand has shown different results. Thailand has not reaped any benefit from the 
enactment of its Trade Competition Act, because its enforcement has been lax and 
entirely inefficient. Thailand should have had better GCI than it does, because it is in the 
Efficiency-Driven stage, in which the WEF attributes the most weight to Efficiency 
Enhancers and Thailand has enacted and enforced its competition law for 10 years 
before it reached the Efficiency-Driven stage of development. Had Thailand been 
effectively enforcing its competition law and policy, its GCI could have been higher than 
it is.  
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However, when considering data on the AMSs’ progress on the stages of 
development, there appears to be a connection between the effect of competition law 
and development. Singapore has been at Innovation-Driven stage since 2004. After it 
enacted its competition law in 2004 and the law became wholly in force in 2007, 
Singapore’s goods market efficiency reached the 1st on the Global Competitive Report in 
the following year. Malaysia had been at the Efficiency-Driven stage since 2004. When 
its competition law entered into force in 2012, Malaysia moved to the transition to 
innovation stage in the same year. Viet Nam had been at the Factor-Driven stage since 
the enactment of its competition law. It took Viet Nam 11 years to move into the 
transition to Efficiency-Driven stage. Indonesia had been in Factor-Driven stage since 
2004. But it moved into the transition stage in 2009 which is 10 years after the enactment 
of its competition law. Just two years later, Indonesia moved into the Efficiency-Driven 
stage. Thailand, although it had been in the transition to Efficiency-Driven stage since 
2004, moved into the Efficiency-Driven stage in 2007 which is almost 10 years after 
enactment of its competition law. And Thailand has not progressed further than that 
since then.  
The above paragraph demonstrates that countries in the Factor-Driven stage 
(Viet Nam and Indonesia) take a longer time to progress to the next stage even if they 
have enacted competition laws. Countries at the transition to Innovation-Driven stage 
(Malaysia) and in the Innovation-Driven stage (Singapore) did not take as long as those 
in the Factor-Driven stage to reap benefits from their competition laws or to progress to 
the next stage (in case of Malaysia).  
The Philippines (Factor-Driven) took seven years to progress into the transition 
to Efficiency-Driven stage in 2011 under the sectoral competition law approach. It 
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passed a comprehensive competition law in 2015. Although Brunei has not been on the 
Global Competitive Report since 2014 its stage of development can be assumed to be at 
least, at the transition to Efficiency-Driven stage. Brunei passed its competition act in 
2015 as well. It is highly likely that Brunei and the Philippines can progress to the 
Efficiency-Driven stage within 10 years after the enactment of their competition laws if 
these are properly enforced.  
If Thailand continues not to enforce its competition law, it is likely that Brunei 
can surpass Thailand in the not too distant future. Cambodia and Myanmar are still at 
the Factor-Driven stage. Myanmar passed a competition law in 2015, but Cambodia has 
yet to pass the law. This suggests that both countries still have many years until they will 
develop into the transition to Efficiency-Driven stage and will benefit from the full 
potential of competition law. 
The data on AMSs’ competitiveness from 2008 – 2016 can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. It confirms the finding that the enactment of competition law does not 
correlate to the effectiveness of antimonopoly policy and market efficiency 
when comparing countries which are in the same stage of development. 
However, effective enforcement of competition law and effective 
antimonopoly policy correlate with market efficiency and GCI. 
2. Countries which have not enacted competition law can have a more efficient 
market, more intense local competition, and less extent of market dominance 
than countries which have enacted competition law. They can hence be more 
competitive if they are either at a higher stage of development, or if they are 
85 
 
measured against countries which do have competition laws, but do not 
effectively enforce these. 
3. The effectiveness of competition law and policy is not the determining factor of 
competitiveness. There are many more factors that influence competitiveness 
due to the differences in weight attributed at the particular stages of 
development.  
4. Countries which are at the Factor-Driven stage do not seem to reap the benefit 
of effective competition law and policy and market efficiency as much as, and 
as quick as countries which are at higher stages of development.  
 
 
2.4 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EAST ASIAN 
ECONOMIES 
This section provides political economy of two East Asian Economies as 
examples of how they develop their competition law. It takes into account their political 
economy, political stability, government ideology, and influence of private sectors on the 
government competition law and policy. Taiwan and South Korea are chosen to 
represent the once aid-recipient countries turned advanced and highly competitive 
economies. 
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2.4.1 Taiwan  
The historical background of Taiwan is very similar to many of the AMSs. It was 
colonised by the Dutch and the Japanese.157 But it was mainly dominated and ruled by 
mainland China. According to Williams, the beginning of the Chinese administration 
after the Japanese ruling was not a smooth transition. It began with ‘economic 
mismanagement’, followed by ‘a reign of terror’.158 There was only one political party 
back then, Kuo Ming Tang (KMT) which is considered ‘an alien political force on 
Taiwan.’159 Until in 1986, Democratic Progress Party (DPP), a political party which 
represents indigenous Taiwanese was established.160 The country has moved towed 
democratisation as part of the reason to maintain long-term stability of the KMT in 
Taiwan in 1987. Press freedom, opposition political parties and civil society are allowed 
to consolidated through the lifting of the Martial law which had been in force in Taiwan 
for almost 40 years during Lee Teng Hui administration.161 Taiwan had the first 
democratic Presidential election in 1996.162 Although democracy in Taiwan is quite 
recent compared with many AMSs and military threat from mainland China is not new, 
Taiwan has dealt with corruption issues quite well. 
In Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 shows that 
Taiwan was ranked 31st out of 176 countries with no. 1 being the least corrupted (score 
                                                 
157 Worldatlas, Taiwan History Timeline 
<http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/taiwan/twtimeln.htm> accessed 14 
April 2017 
158 Mark Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge University Press 
2005) 367 
159 ibid 368 
160 ibid  
161 ibid 369 - 370 
162 Worldatlas (n 157) 
87 
 
of 100 being very clean and Taiwan received 61 out of 100).163 Taiwan’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index has always been stagnant at 60 – 61 (or 6.1 in the report until 2012). It 
could have been better if the judicial corruption is dealt with effectively. In 2004 when 
Williams wrote his book, Taiwanese judicial system was corrupt. Judges were involved in 
illegal business and wrongdoing.164 Now in 2017, the situation is not getting much better. 
Chang Ching, a former prosecutor and judge, claimed that 5 – 10 percent of the judiciary 
is corrupt.165 Back in 2010, three senior judges were detained on an allegation that they 
took bribes.166 
Regarding economic development and structure, many of Taiwan’s strategic 
industries were monopolised by the State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) for example 
petroleum industry was monopolised by The Chinese Petroleum Corporation, Taiwan 
(CPC) since 1946. However, as part of the effort to improve Taiwan’s international 
competitiveness, the petroleum market was liberalised in 1987, then the Formosa 
Petrochemical Corporation (FPCC) entered the market.167 Taiwan has opened its market 
to more competition from foreign investors. According to Wiliams, its political economy 
was a mixed economy. It is called ‘The Principle of Social Welfare’ and it somehow 
mirrored the German Ordoliberalism.168 
                                                 
163 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2016’ 
<http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016> accessed 14 
April 2017 
164 Williams Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (n 158) 373 – 374  
165 Jason Pan, ‘Former judge’s claim on corruption sparks debate’ Taipei Time (Taipei 1 March 2017) 
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/03/01/2003665916> accessed 14 
April 2017  
166 ‘Corruption in Taiwan: Confirming the worst suspicions’ The Economist 
<http://www.economist.com/node/16647375> accessed 14 April 2017 
167 Yun-Hsun Huang and Jung-Hua Wu, ‘Energy Policy in Taiwan: Historical Developments, Current 
Status and Potential Improvements’ (2009) 2 Energies 
<file:///C:/Users/LAW/Downloads/energies-02-00623.pdf> accessed 14 April 2017 
168 Williams Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (n 158) 376 – 377  
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The Ordoliberal ideology has much influence on Taiwan’s adoption of 
competition law and policy especially on the legal-academic side, although the academic 
economists preferred the US antitrust system.169 The result is the Fair Trade Act 1992 
(FTA 1992) resembles the EU approach.170 
The history of the effort of the adoption of the FTA 1992 started six years 
earlier. It started with the political will to liberalise the economy in 1985. According to 
Williams, there are two main reasons for such adoption. First, as a result of market 
liberalisation, some market forces could potentially lead to monopoly, oligopoly and 
cartels. Second, unfair trade practices might ensue and the government was under 
constant pressure from trading partners.171 The opponent party, DPP, also welcome the 
FTA 1992 because they saw it as the chance to break up ties between big conglomerates 
and the KMT.172 
The performance of the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) which is an independent 
organisation173overseeing the enforcement and application of the FTA 1992 in regard to 
abuse of dominance is very impressive. According to Williams, the FTC succeeded in 
ending the exclusionary abusive conduct engaged by CPC in the Liquefied Petroleum 
Gas (LPG) market. The CPC was instructed by the government to grant an exclusive 
dealership to the Veterans Affairs Commission hence foreclose market access to other 
undertakings in relation to bottled LPG for household consumption. After the 
investigation, the FTC concluded that CPC abused its dominances and ordered such 
exclusive agreements shall not be renewed after the expiration. As a result, CPC allowed 
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retail dealership based on qualification. This has shown that FTC could impose and 
discipline undertakings which violate the FTA 1992 even in the area where it was under 
other governmental department’s supervision. This is very much different from the case 
of Thailand which will be dealt later in chapter 5. 
When considering Taiwan and Thailand, there is some common characteristic. 
Taiwan used to be governed under the authoritarian regime influenced by the mainland 
China and KMT. Thailand is under constant military administration every now and then. 
But Taiwan’s corruption perceptions index has always been much better than Thailand. 
Political will in enforcing the FTA 1992 is evident. The FTC is not shy in enforcing the 
law even in the area where there is a regulator.  
 2.4.2 South Korea 
South Korea was not colonised by Western countries like Taiwan, but 36 years of 
colonisation by Japan has left South Korea with a deep mental scar.174 After Japan left, 
the country was divided into North and South. Then a brutal civil war began when 
North Korea invaded the South. The war lasted for 3 years and South Korea was 
devastated as a result.175 After that, the country was ruled by authoritarian military 
governments for decades. During this period, the governments used the government-led 
development paradigm or static approach to restoring the country. General Park Chung-
Hee was the first General to govern the country with this approach.176  
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General Park government assumed total autonomy and divide economic 
development plan into stages of the 5-year period. He aimed at export-oriented 
industrialisation and import substitution policy. Along the administration, the 
government and the powerful big business is known as the chaebol cooperated closely to 
improve the country’s economy. The chaebol needed to ensure that government policy 
would benefit their business, while the government needed to cooperate with the 
chaebol to ensure economic progress to compensate the lack of legitimacy in their 
power. This resulted in the business’ tie with the government deepened.177 
After General Park was assassinated in 1979, another general took over the 
power and disappointed the hope of democracy for the people. General Chun Doo-Wan 
inherited the tie between the government and the chaebol, which created a lot of 
problems on economic structure and unequal distribution of wealth. The gap between 
the rich and the poor enhanced. Finally, General Chun government curbed the problem 
caused by the chaebol and provided more support to small and medium enterprises.178 
Democratisation movement had become stronger. Finally, the first direct 
election of the President came in 1992 and the first civilian President was elected. The 
constitution only permits one term of Presidency of 5 years. President Kim Young-Sam 
had to solve many political and human rights issues and decentralise the administration. 
He also began economy liberalisation. Although the country has been democratised for 
some years, when the financial crisis hit in 1997 a severe institutional problem was found 
to have caused such crisis. The immature institutionalisation of political and economic 
organisation contributed to the crisis. This is because, during the authoritarian 
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governments, the chaebol received preference in seeking bank loans when they should 
not have received.179 
The democratisation does not automatically lead to economic growth. The 
political and economic institutions must be mature enough to be able to cope with the 
dynamic of world trade. If the government continues to use protectionism, favouritism, 
and nepotism approach in administrating the country, institutions will not be able to deal 
with the problem effectively.  
South Korea passed the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) in 
1980 and the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) was established in 1981. At the 
beginning of its establishment, the KFTC was still under the political influence. Its policy 
priority was not to curb anticompetitive conducts, but industry-promoting policy.180 
However, according to Heo, in 1994, the KFTC became an independent body.181 The 
authority and status of the KFTC expanded considerably in the 1990s. Not only the 
status of Chairman of the KFTC was elevated to ministerial level, but the KFTC 
assumed jurisdiction over Adhesion Contract Act, Door-to-door sales, etc. Act and 
Instalment Transactions Act. In 2007, the KFTC became the sole competent authority 
on consumer protection in South Korea.182 
When the economic crisis occurred in 1997, the importance of curbing 
anticompetitive conducts was clear and the KFTC has shifted its focus to that effect.183 
Then in 2005, when the KFTC investigated and prosecuted Microsoft action on abuse of 
dominance, the public gained confidence in the capacity of the KFTC. This resulted in 
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the role of the KFTC expanded. The KFTC is not merely a national competition agency, 
but the advisor to other government agencies when they enact laws that could affect 
undistorted competition in South Korea.184 Some commentator positively asserts that 
South Korea’s economic success is partly because of the democratisation of the country 
and enforcement of competition law.185 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Although economists may not agree on the exact definition of competitiveness 
of nations, regions, or on whether a nation competes, at least they agree that firms 
compete. There appear to be two types of competition, zero-sum game and positive-sum 
game. Certainly the competitiveness of firms that compete in a zero-sum game will be 
measured against their rivals’ competitiveness. There will be a winner at the expense of 
the losers. Competition law is necessary to establish the rules of the game. 
Competitiveness of firms in a zero-sum game refers to superior over rivals, more 
efficient, more productive, more market share, and more revenue.  
Firms, therefore, need to implement relevant strategies which enable them to be 
more efficient, more productive, gain more market share and more revenue. 
Competition law can be enforced to ensure that firms do not engage in anticompetitive 
practices, that incumbents will not abuse their dominance, that mergers and acquisitions 
will take place for the sake of efficiency. Firms in general respond more to pressure from 
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new entrants and rivals than to pressure from customers, so as long as the market 
remains highly competitive and rivalry is high, firms will strive for more competitiveness. 
For firms that compete in positive-sum games, their competitiveness is in their 
ability to upgrade constantly. They create their own markets. They do not compete 
merely by offering the same products and services as their competitors only to eventually 
arrive at competitive convergence. They compete to be unique, not to be the best. These 
firms tend to innovate and upgrade. Therefore, protection of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) is crucial to keep them motivated enough to create or invent new technology or 
products. Competition law can ensure that firms that hold patents will not abuse their 
dominance in IPRs and exclude other new entrants from access to essential facilities. 
These are only some examples of the role of competition law.  
However, competition law does not have a direct effect on firms’ productivity, 
creativity, innovation, or efficiency. But competition law can ensure rivalry which is the 
most important incentive for firms to be competitive and to remain competitive. 
The competitiveness of a nation is not that straightforward, because a nation 
does not consist only of firms and consumers. Certainly all citizens are consumers one 
way or another. But police and army cannot be treated as security service firms because 
citizens are not their customers. Public education may not create revenue because it is 
the service a government should provide to the people. Without access to public 
education, children cannot progress to more advanced education and cannot become 
high-skilled labour in the future. No government can treat public schools as firms that 
strive for profit. Therefore, in a nation, even if competition law is effectively enforced, 
competition policy is carefully planned, and rivalry is high, but if at the same time access 
to education, police services, and access to basic infrastructure are inadequate, it is hard 
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for a nation to prosper as it should, and hence its competitiveness may not be as high as 
it could be. 
A firm’s primary goal is to make profit. A nation’s prime purpose is not the 
same. Each society may aim for different goals. Porter asserted that a nation’s goal is to 
provide a high standard of living to its people. But a high standard of living is not as 
easily defined as it may seem. Measuring high standard of living by income, quality of 
infrastructure and other pecuniary aspects is convenient for economists. But is it the 
right approach? None of the economists mentions the happiness of the people in the 
nation as a goal. Happiness is when one is contented with what one owns and who one 
is. Of course this is even more complicated to measure than standard of living and very 
subjective. It is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss what should be the appropriate 
goal of a nation. This thesis assumes that high quality of living, as measured by 
economists, is the goal of the nation. 
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that a nation does not engage in international 
trade as a zero-sum game, but as a positive-sum game, as a member of the world that 
naturally interacts, exchanges, and communicates with other members. Each country is 
unique because of its history, inherited endowments, location, and people etc. Each 
offers different products and services to the international trade. There are no identical 
countries which offer identical or interchangeable products or services. Therefore, 
competitiveness of a country does not necessary come at the expense of another as in 
the case of firms in a zero-sum game.  
Because of the uniqueness of countries, it is hard to define what the 
competitiveness of a nation is. The WEF defines competitiveness of a country as ‘the set 
of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country’. 
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As Porter suggested, the definition of competitiveness of a nation is not essential as long 
as what constitutes competitiveness is identified. Porter used the word competitive 
advantage of a nation. If it is accepted that the aim of a nation is to increase living 
standards, then a country which is susceptible to the prosperity of its citizens is certainly 
competitive. 
Porter’s competitive advantage has received much criticism. some. However, 
many of which are raised because the commentators misunderstand the concept. 
Nevertheless, his theory is still relevant and very much followed globally. Porter’s 
Diamond theory helps to identify that competitive advantage. However, it can be used 
only to determine one industry in a country at a time. It is not designed to find each 
country’s all-sector competitive advantage because Porter opined that it was not possible 
for a country to be competitive in each and every industry. Approaching competitiveness 
on an individual industry basis seems logical.  
In this regard, the diamond theory suggested that there are four determinants186 
which are interrelated and interdependent that will impact each industry’s competitive 
advantage at a given period. Although competition law is among one of the variables in 
one of the determinants, it is crucial because it keeps rivalry going.  And Porter asserted 
that rivalry is the most important factor that incentivises firms to be competitive and that 
this will also impact other determinants. 
However, the role of governments undoubtedly can influence any of the 
determinants. Government’s policy and spending have a direct impact on any of the 
determinants. Since the four determinants are directly affected by governments, the 
effectiveness of the government’s competition law enforcement or the government’s 
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competition policy is more important than just having the law or the policy itself. What 
matters is not whether competition law and policy exist, but whether these are effectively 
applied and enforced.  
It is clear that even if competition law is crucial; its importance and impact on 
competitiveness can be countermanded easily by the acts of the government. This is 
evidenced by for instance Thailand’s experience with its Trade Competition Act which 
entered into force in 1999, but the lack of enforcement of this Act results in Thailand’s 
inability to reap the benefit from it. And Singapore has been a high income country since 
1987 and reached the top of the Global Competitiveness Report in 1998 despite the 
Asian financial crisis and without the enactment of a competition Act.   
At a regional level, academia appears to reach a consensus that a competitive 
region is a region that attracts and maintains competitive firms and people to live or 
work in this region. A region in this thesis refers to an economic integration region, not a 
geographical region in a country. It is a region such as ASEAN and the EU. The EU has 
planned for Europe 2020 and set itself a target of attaining a sustainable, inclusive, and 
smart growth. One of its measurements is Enterprise Environment which takes into 
account, inter alia, the intensity of local competition, the effectiveness of antitrust policy, 
the extent of market dominance, and the distortive effect on competition of taxes and 
subsidies. On the other hand, ASEAN has planned in the AEC Blueprint 2015 that by 
the end of 2015 the AEC will be established as a highly competitive single market and 
production base. But in reality, it resulted in the emergence of a highly competitive 
region rather than that this has been accomplished fully.  
In this regard, ASEAN is doing well in planning for a competitive region. 
ASEAN aims at implementing various strategies such as an effective competition law 
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and policy in all AMSs, establishing a common ASEAN consumer protection 
framework, strengthening Intellectual Property Rights, and developing ASEAN system 
of E-Commerce and taxation cooperation,187encouraging good Governance, fostering 
sustainable economic development, engendering in industrial upgrading and investing in 
workers and firms to keep up with the global megatrends and emerging trade-related 
issues. 188 However, in terms of the legal system, Porter emphasised on the enforcement 
system in competition policy because it enhances rivalry.189 This is the area that ASEAN 
needs to pay attention to. 
Now ASEAN has implemented the new AEC Blueprint 2025 aiming at creating 
a competitive, innovative and dynamic ASEAN by the end of 2025. ASEAN has 
employed nine measures to achieve this goal. One of the measures is effective 
competition policy. It seems ASEAN is using the right approach to becoming a highly 
competitive region. Some of the strategic measures to achieve an effective competition 
policy in ASEAN are through achieving greater harmonisation of competition policy and 
law by developing a regional strategy on convergence; and by establishing Regional 
Cooperation Arrangements on competition policy and law to effectively deal with cross-
border commercial transactions.190 But what does ASEAN mean by harmonisation and 
convergence? To what extent competition policy and law need to be harmonised and 
converged to help ASEAN become competitive? 
This thesis argues that the effectiveness of competition law and policy does not 
have a direct effect on the competitiveness of a country, because a country’s 
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competitiveness depends on various factors and especially on the stage of development 
they are at. Nevertheless, this does not compromise the importance of effective 
competition law and policy for market efficiency and competitiveness in any way. But 
the benefits of having an effective competition law and policy and an efficient market 
will be more prominent in more developed countries.  
The data from 1999 – 2016 clearly supports this point as, despite having enacted 
competition law, some AMSs’ competitiveness still fall behind. Having enacted the law 
does not necessarily result in more competitiveness. This is because when measuring 
competitiveness, there are many more indicators than just the effectiveness of 
antimonopoly policy.  
The data of the AMSs, reveals that the AMSs will reap benefits from competition 
laws for competitiveness more fully when they are at least at the transition from Factor-
Driven to Efficiency-Driven stage, and even more so at the Efficiency-Driven stage, 
because the WEF accords more weight to Efficiency Enhancers subindex when 
countries are at this transition stage. Also, countries which are at this transition stage are 
more exposed to competition from domestic and international trade. They still compete 
with countries that have competitive advantage in factor conditions such as cheap labour 
and an abundance of natural resources. And they also compete with countries which are 
already at the Efficiency-Driven stage to gain more market share. 
Therefore, competition law and policy is still crucial, although not the sole 
determinant of the competitiveness of a country. The impact of government’s policy is 
crucial to their competitiveness. Governments can implement policies that enable firms 
to be more efficient and more productive or to accomplish the opposite. Research by 
Mateus and Lianos as referred to on page 67 emphasises this point. Countries that 
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effectively exercise check and balance between legislature, administrative, and judiciary 
powers tend to reap the benefits that competition law can offer more fully. They also 
found that GDP per capita correlates with well-resourced NCAs which can impact the 
enforcement of competition law and policy.  
The political economy of a country is also relevant to the efficiency of 
competition law enforcement. In this regard, this thesis provides two examples from 
East Asian economies namely Taiwan and South Korea. They are chosen because of 
their similarity in culture and history, and proximity to the AMSs. 
Taiwan was also colonised for a very long period of time and it was under 
military administration before it is democratised. This is similar to many AMSs. The 
difference is the political will of the government to pursue competitiveness and 
economic progress through the promotion and enforcement of competition law. This 
thesis opines that although democracy might have played an important role in 
competition law enforcement, the true determinant factor of Taiwan’s success in curbing 
anticompetitive conducts lies in the political willingness. This distinguishes the success of 
Taiwan’s competition authority to those of many AMSs. 
South Korea also has suffered from civil war, colonisation, and authoritarian 
military administrations for decades. The MRFTA was enacted during the military 
government. And the enforcement of the law was seen as crucial to the South Korean 
economy in the event of the financial crisis in 1997. The KFTC is entrusted with 
expanded power. It is well staff and resources. Its independence and significant role as 
advisor to other government agencies lead to efficient enforcement of the law. The 
government considers the organisation as a very important body. The chairman of the 
KFTC holds a ministerial position in the government. This is the evidence of political 
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will toward the enforcement of competition law in South Korea. Thus, this thesis 
concludes that for a country with certain economic development to reap the benefit of 
competition law, political will must be present. Without political will, competition law 
will not be effectively enforced.  
This chapter has analysed the concept of competitiveness and relevant theory as 
well as the political economy which has an impact on enforcement. The next chapter will 
explore and examine the attempts to harmonise competition law and policy in the 
international arena and the approaches to the competition chapter or provisions in trade 
agreements.   
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CHAPTER 3 
ATTEMPTS TO HARMONISE 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY  
 
The previous chapter provides evidence that although competition law is 
important and can have significant impact on a country’s competitiveness, it is not the 
sole determinant factor for establishing competitiveness. Political will also play a crucial 
role in competition law enforcement which in turn has a significant impact on the 
benefit that countries will reap from the merit of competition law on their 
competitiveness. ASEAN decided to engage in the harmonisation and convergence of 
the AMSs’ competition law to achieve efficient competition law enforcement in the 
region. This chapter aims at providing evidence on the attempts countries made when 
they entered into different stages of integration to bring harmonisation to their 
competition law and policy. It also aims to demonstrate that not all attempts to institute 
a supranational approach in competition law and policy will yield a positive result. 
However, Majone opined that harmonisation and unification of law do not 
necessarily need be the only way to achieve a satisfactory level of economic integration. 
Cooperation among regulators and ex post harmonisation induced by regulatory 
competition among the member states can also be used to achieve it.191 Additionally, he 
suggested that positive integration appears to be overrated, and negative integration 
might not be sufficiently appreciated. Negative integration such as removing national 
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restrictions to the free movement of production factors, limiting monopoly power and 
market dominance, and protecting consumer interests are also useful tools to realise 
harmonisation.192 
Many scholars share the opinion that the mere existence of competition law in a 
country does not necessarily means that there will be growth, efficiency and 
competitiveness. This was analysed in the previous chapter. Some have suggested that 
for a country to fully enjoy the benefits competition law has to offer, it needs the 
political will to fully embrace the law, with the necessary enforcement and reform to 
support it.193 Others point to that socio-economy, political-economy, and the 
organisation of the competition authorities also play a vital role in the eventual success 
of competition law. Further suggestions were made that financial and human resources, 
the creation of a competition culture and judicial competence should be taken into 
account.194 
On the international platform, harmonisation of competition law and policy is 
hardly a new subject for discussion. Much has been done in this regard. The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) initiated a Working Group on the Interaction between Trade 
and Competition Policy (WGTCP) in 1996 but has ended its operation since 2004.195 
After eight years of cooperation and negotiations between member states, the WTO 
could not take the initiative any further.  According to Hufbauer and Kim, it was the 
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developing countries that opposed the cooperation.196 They added that difficulties in 
harmonising national competition policies also played an important role in the 
developing countries’ objection of the WTO approach to harmonise international 
competition law.197 
The use of hard law approach has proved to be very difficult. This thesis 
considers a piece of legislation as hard (or harder) law when it requires a higher degree of 
legal obligation, more precision in the language used, and delegation of interpretation of 
the law to the independent third party.198 And the WTO approach falls into this category. 
To date, there is no success in realising an international competition law. The only hard 
law approach on competition law and policy which is generally agreed as successful is 
that of the EU. But the EU approach is unique which will be dealt with in details in 
chapter 4. 
On the other hand, a lot of success stories in bringing competition law and 
policy issues into a smaller platform such as bilateral treaties, regional trade agreements, 
and free trade agreements is evident. This is a soft(er) approach compared with the 
ambition of the WTO. Soft law approach in converging competition law and policy can 
be very beneficial to developing and least-developed countries. Because it is easier and 
less costly to negotiate; it imposes lower sovereignty costs on states in sensitive issues; it 
is more flexible which allows states to cope with uncertainty and learn over time; its 
flexibility renders it cope better with diversity; and it is available to nonstate actors such 
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as international secretariats, and business associations and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs).199 
At the level of regional integration, ASEAN established the ASEAN Expert 
Group on Competition (AEGC) in 2007 which published the non-legally binding 
Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy, AEC Blueprint 2015 and 2025, ASEAN 
Handbook for Business and ASEAN Core Competencies Guidelines in 2010, 2012, and 
2013 respectively.  
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) established the Competition 
Policy and Law Group in 1996 which issued Principles for Guiding the Development of 
a Competition-Driven Policy Framework for APEC Economies and APEC Principles to 
Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reform which are also not legally binding. The 
Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL) also approved the 
Protocol for the Defense of Competition within MERCOSUR (Decision No. 18/96) in 
1996. However, Decision No. 18/96 is de facto unenforced because it is not yet ratified by 
all MERCOSUR member states.200 Also, the EU established the supranational body, the 
Directorate-General for Competition (DGCOM), overseeing competition law and policy 
enforcement within the EU. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. First, international attempts to 
harmonise and converge competition law and policy by OECD, UNCTAD, and ICN are 
analysed. Secondly, a brief definition of economic integration is provided to create a 
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preliminary understanding of the different stages of economic integration. Thirdly, 
attempts in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements are scrutinised. The focus is on 
trade agreements that ASEAN, Thailand, and Singapore have concluded. Fourthly, the 
development of competition law on a regional integration level such as MERCOSUR 
and in Free Trade Area such as APEC is examined. Fifthly, an analysis and conclusion 
are provided.  
 
 
3.1 ATTEMPTS BY INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
As mentioned earlier there are a number of significant forums for the discussion 
of competition law in a global setting. The first organisation that initiated discussions on 
international competition law and policy cooperation was the UN, through the work of 
UNCTAD, followed by the OECD, and then the ICN. This demonstrates the effort at 
the level of international organisations, whether in formal or informal frameworks, to 
promote harmonisation and convergence of competition law. 
3.1.1 The UNCTAD 
The UN’s attempt to address competition law at the international level can be 
traced back to 1948 and the drafting of the Havana Charter, which was the first major 
attempt at creating a multilateral framework on trade and competition. The Charter was 
never enforced. But the UN continued to urge member states to deal with 
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anticompetitive practices committed by private and public sectors. UNCTAD is a UN 
body which is governed by its 194 member states.201 UNCTAD is a forum for 
governments to discuss how to improve the world’s macroeconomics, especially how to 
solve inequalities and promote sustainable development.202 UNCTAD first met in 1964 
in Geneva.203 
Success finally arrived in 1976 at the fourth UNCTAD conference where the 
members agreed to formulate the Set of Multilaterally agreed Equitable Principles and 
Rules for the Control of Restricted Business Practices204 which is now renamed as the 
UN Set of Principles and Rules on Competition.205.  It concerns international trade and 
pays attention particularly to the development of developing countries. The UN Set of 
Principles and Rules on Competition was unanimously approved and adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 1980.206 This is considered the crucial starting point of UNCTAD’s 
work on promoting competition law and policy. 
The UN Set of Principles and Rules on Competition has three main objectives; 
to ensure that restrictive business practices do not impede or negate the realisation of 
benefits that should arise from the liberalisation of world trade; to attain greater 
efficiency in international trade and development; and to protect and promote social 
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welfare and the interests of consumers.207 In order to achieve these goals, UNCTAD has 
established the Intergovernmental Group of Experts (IGE) to meet, on yearly and five 
yearly bases at the UNCTAD Conference, to discuss ways of improving worldwide 
cooperation on competition policy implementation and ways of enhancing convergence.  
UNCTAD also provides technical assistance to developing countries on 
implementing competition law and policy. In this regard, UNCTAD published its Model 
Law on Competition (UNCTAD Model Law), in 2010, and Handbook on Competition 
Legislation (UNCTAD Handbook), in 2012, to serve as a guide to members, especially 
developing countries, on implementation of their national competition law. Because of 
these characteristics, the UNCTAD approach is considered a soft law approach. 
UNCTAD’s stance on the link between FDI and competition law was made at 
the Global Forum on Competition held by the OECD.208 UNCTAD stated that without 
an effective competition law in place, liberalisation of FDI could lead to foreign firms 
engaging in anticompetitive practices and abuse of dominant positions in host 
countries.209 UNCTAD also added that a country with an effective competition law and 
policy is in a better position to attract FDI than one without it because many 
transnational enterprises are familiar with the law in their home countries and therefore 
are aware and know how to deal with competition-related problems. UNCTAD also 
claimed that these enterprises expect the competition agencies in the host countries to 
provide a level playing field for domestic and foreign enterprises. They further added 
that for developing countries to attract large FDI, sometimes it is necessary to offer 
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these corporations exclusive rights or privileges, which are clearly anticompetitive.210 
However, from UNCTAD’s own documents,211 no country refers to attracting FDI as 
the objective of their competition laws and policies. Nevertheless, considering that 
ASEAN created AEC partly to attract FDI into the region,212this is a good start. 
There is evidence that the National Reform Council on Competition took the 
UNCTAD Model Law into consideration when proposing an amendment of the Trade 
Competition Act of Thailand on the structure of the Thai Trade Competition 
Commission.213  
3.1.2 The OECD  
At present, there are 34 member countries globally, more than half of which are 
from Europe, eight of which are from APEC member economies and none of which are 
from ASEAN.214 Although the EU Commission is not a member, it is a key contributor 
to the works of the OECD and its involvement is well beyond that of an observer.215 
The OECD is not an economic integration. It is a forum for member countries to 
identify, discuss and analyse economic issues. The aim of the OECD is to promote 
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policies that will enhance the economic and social well-being of people around the 
world.216 
Although no ASEAN member states are members of OECD, and none of the 
OECD work on competition law and policy is legally binding, this thesis argues that 
developed countries such as the US use the OECD as a platform to transmit and 
advocate the importance of harmonisation and convergence of competition law and 
policy in the world trade. Through this platform vigorous attempts are made to find a 
consensus on the goals and objectives of competition law and policy as well as best 
practices in competition enforcement.  
Since 1990, the OECD has been cooperating mainly with competition authorities 
from both OECD countries and non-OECD economies in capacity building activities. It 
launched the Global Forum on Competition (GFC) in 2001 as a platform for discussion 
for high level authorities. The GFC issues ‘best practices’ which are voluntarily adopted 
by its participants. According to the GFC, there are about 103 economies regularly 
participating in the forum from all continents, eight of which are AMSs.217 
In 1999, the OECD cooperated with the World Bank to publish the Framework 
for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy (OECD-World 
Bank Framework).218 This book aims at assisting countries when enacting the 
competition law on selected issues such as market definitions, abuse of dominance, 
mergers, and anticompetitive agreements. It provides suggested provisions for countries 
to use to suit their conditions.  
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In June 2000, OECD and APEC agreed on an APEC-OECD Co-operative 
Initiative on Regulatory Reform, which was endorsed in the APEC Ministerial Meeting 
in November 2000. This agreement resulted in an APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist on 
Regulatory Reform (APEC-OECD Checklist), which is an integrated self-assessed list. 
This APEC-OECD Checklist integrates the APEC and OECD principles of reform on 
good governance such as transparency, accountability and performance, competition 
policy, rule-making, and market openness policy.219 It is right to conclude that the 
OECD approach to competition law and policy is a soft law approach. 
APEC and the OECD share the same view which is that competition law and 
policy promotes economic growth and efficiency, and that the whole regime should 
move towards promoting efficiency. They object to the promotion of national 
champions but accept protectionist measures, such as on consumer welfare, innovation, 
international competitiveness and the efficiency and adaptability of the economy.220 The 
fact that APEC and OECD share the same view on competition law and policy is 
understandable because both organisations are led by major economies such as the US, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Korea, and Japan who invested in many foreign 
countries.  
It is reported that the OECD countries are interested in introducing competition 
law at international level because of their domestic export interest groups. These groups 
argue that anticompetitive conduct hampers their ability to sell goods and services in 
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foreign markets.221 The US is said to have originally stimulated the support of 
international competition law because it perceived international cartels and the absence, 
or non-enforcement, of competition law as an obstacle to the ability of US firms to 
compete in markets.222 Market access is said to be the predominant agenda driving US 
and EU support for international competition rules. Their main interests are in using 
competition policy to promote exports and to reduce the conflict of interest in approvals 
by foreign governments of mergers of large firms. They are less concerned in regulating 
the behaviour of their own firms in foreign markets according with international 
disciplines that will benefit foreign consumers.223 It is clear that the drive behind the 
effort to address competition related issues in the WTO was mainly the classic producer 
interests in major OECD countries with an export-promotion objective pursued by their 
governments, not consumer welfare or market efficiency.224   
3.1.3 The ICN 
The ICN was established in 2001 at the initiation of the US.225 It aims at 
‘addressing practical antitrust enforcement and policy issues’. Its main goal is ‘to improve 
competition law enforcement and competition advocacy across the global antitrust 
community, for the benefit of business and consumers’.226 Its founding members were 
Australia, Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South 
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Africa, the UK, the US, and Zambia.227 Now it has 337 members, including national 
competition authorities from six AMSs (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam). Its members are not exclusively governmental authorities or 
international organisations, but also non-governmental advisers and private practitioners.  
Unlike the OECD and UNCTAD, the ICN is devoted solely to work related to 
competition law and policy. It has an informal and flexible approach and it has no legally 
binding power over its members. The ICN publishes guidance, manuals and 
recommended practices and proposes these to their members on a voluntary basis. The 
aim of the ICN is to promote “greater convergence of competition law and analysis, 
common understanding, and common culture.”228 Clearly, the ICN approach is a soft 
law approach. 
The ICN operates through various Working Groups. The current Working 
Groups are Advocacy, Agency Effectiveness, Cartel, Merger, and Unilateral Conduct. 
The works done by all the Working Groups are too many to mention here. There are 
report papers, conference materials, questionnaires, practical tools such as workbooks or 
toolkits, recommended practices, member submissions etc.  
The Unilateral Conduct Working Group (UCWG) has published several useful 
materials such as the UCWG Workbook which is comprised of chapters on objectives 
and principles of unilateral conduct laws, assessing dominance, predatory pricing 
analysis, tying and bundling, and exclusive dealing; Recommended Practices on key 
topics such as dominance/substantial market power analysis, state created monopolies, 
and predatory pricing analysis pursuant to unilateral conduct laws; and multiple reports 
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on refusal to deal with a rival under unilateral conduct laws, on loyalty discounts & 
rebates, on tying & bundled discounting, single branding/exclusive dealing, on predatory 
pricing, and on the objectives of unilateral conduct laws, assessment of 
dominance/substantial market power, and state-created monopolies. 
Members submit their views and best practices and share knowledge. There is 
evidence that Singapore used ICN Merger materials, namely the Guiding Principles for 
Merger Notification and Review Procedures, Recommended Practices for Merger 
Notification Procedures, Merger Notification and Procedures Template, Merger 
Notification Filing Fee, ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook, and Merger Remedies 
Review Project, in preparation of its new Merger enforcement.229 Brazil submitted that it 
implemented ICN’s recommended Practices for Cartel Enforcement, Merger, and 
Leniency.230  These are evidence that ICN’s works appears to receive positive responses 
from its members and that they adopt its suggestions when amending their competition 
laws. 
According to Toh Han Li, Chief Executive, Competition Commission of 
Singapore, the ICN’s approach to the introduction of competition law and 
recommendations are suitable for ASEAN to follow because of its non-legal binding, 
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consultation, and cooperation approach.231 At the minimum Singapore and Brazil have 
taken into account its recommendations and guidance when modifying their laws.  
In conclusion, it appears that no attempts by developed countries and their 
forums to negotiate with developing countries on unified international competition law 
have been successful. The most promising approach is using informal, non-legally 
binding measures based on consensus, and sharing best practices such as the ICN 
promotes. This suggests that countries prefer to approach the issues on anticompetitive 
conducts in a tailor-made fashion to suit their own economy, society, and development 
which is a rational approach because it is generally accepted that there is no one-size-fit-
all competition law. 
 
 
3.2 STAGES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATIONS 
Before examining how members of trade agreements or regional integration 
agreements deal with harmonisation and convergence of competition law and policy, this 
section will provide brief explanations of the characteristics of the different stages of 
economic integration. The meaning of economic integration, in general, is the agreement 
between countries to lower trade barriers between or among themselves in order to 
increase trade in the trading bloc. The cooperation could be solely economic or include 
other dimensions of integration such as social and political, depending on the level of 
integration.  
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There are many levels, stages or forms of such integration, ranging from loose 
cooperation to unified integration. They are commonly divided into four stages, namely 
1) free trade area 2) custom union 3) common market and 4) economic union. However, 
some economists break these further down in more detailed stages and some may refer 
to some of the stages by a different name. 
3.2.1 Free Trade Area 
A free trade area is a form of loose cooperation among member states. It could 
be done through signing a bilateral or multilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Under 
this arrangement, tariffs between members are substantially reduced or completely 
removed. The key to this form of integration is to reduce trade barriers among members 
and increase trade intra-region as much as possible without having common external 
trade policies with external trading partners. This practice requires the implementation of 
Rule of Origins (ROO) because goods from a third party are taxed differently from 
goods originating within the trading area.232 Some scholars divided this stage further into 
simple and second-generation free trade areas. The difference between the two is that a 
simple free trade area emphasises reduction or removal of tariffs on trade in goods, while 
a second-generation free trade area also covers trade in services. Therefore, in the 
second-generation type, a certain level of convergence and harmonisation in regulations 
concerning professional qualifications and skilled labour are required.233  
ASEAN falls into this category. All member states cooperate through multi trade 
agreements. ASEAN created the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1993 which 
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enables free intra-region trade. ROO has been implemented under ASEAN Trade in 
Goods Agreement (ATIGA) which entered into force on 30th April 2010. ASEAN 
signed the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) on 15th December 1995. 
ASEAN does not have a Common External Tariff (CET) imposed on products 
imported from outside the region, although it has signed the Agreement on the 
Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (CEPT) 
on 16th December 1998. But CEPT applies to goods originating from AMSs only.234 
Therefore, it can be concluded that ASEAN’s stage of economic integration is a second-
generation free trade area. Although ASEAN aims to establish AEC as a single market, 
all action plans to realise a single market target abolishing trade barriers for intra-regional 
trade. 235  Therefore, the realisation of AEC as a single market and production-based 
region should not be confused with the EU single market.  
3.2.2 Custom Union 
A custom union represents a further level of integration within a free trade area 
or trading bloc. In a custom union, the trading bloc has common trade policies toward 
external trading partners, such as establishing a CET, which implies not only a common 
customs policy but also a common foreign trade policy.236 The implementation of ROO 
is not necessary because goods entering the trading bloc are subject to the same tariff 
and import quotas wherever the point of entry is.237 This level of integration requires 
deeper harmonisation and convergence of national rules and regulations. Thus, it means 
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member states have a less independent trade policy toward external trading partners 
which consequently could limit their foreign policy.238 It can be considered as the very 
early stages of member states lessening direct control over their sovereignty. 
3.2.3 Common Market 
A common market requires greater and deeper integration. Not only is a CET 
established, but border controls among member states are significantly minimized to 
allow free movement of goods and labour intra-region. The rules on transportation of 
goods and people intra-region are alleviated to reduce transaction costs. The expected 
gain from this level of integration is economic efficiency.239 The convergence and 
harmonisation of trade policies are far deeper than in the first two stages. Consequently, 
the economic policy of member states is more interdependent within the trading bloc.240 
The effective implementation of proper labour policy concerning immigrants within the 
region could be difficult, as in the case of the U.K's opposition to EU policy on free 
movement of labour, which contributes to the decision to leave the EU or Brexit on 23rd 
June 2016. It is claimed that the founders of the EU envisioned the EU as a common 
market from the start241 and that it was fundamental to the Treaty of Rome.242 This 
differs considerably from other trading blocs such as NAFTA, APEC, and ASEAN. 
Some terms should be clarified here: 'single market' and 'internal market'. These 
phrases are used by the EU in different ways. Moussis explained that 'common market' is 
the term referring to a stage of international economic integration, while, in the 
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judgment of the Court of Justice, the term 'single market' is used to refer to the ultimate 
outcome of the common market. 'Internal market' is used in the TFEU, and refers to 
“an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties”.243 
Therefore, any reference to a 'single market’, means the same as a 'common market' in 
the EU context. As mentioned earlier, ‘ASEAN single market’ means single intra-
regional market. This differs considerably from the ‘EU single market’ as explained 
above. 
3.2.4 Economic Union 
The last type of economic integration is an economic union. Some believe that 
this includes having a common monetary policy and possibly a common currency.244 
Some places a monetary union before an economic union.245 Some consider economic 
and monetary union as the same stage.246 Whichever approach is taken, it represents the 
ultimate integration of not only common external trade policy, but also common 
monetary policy or common currency to save transaction costs, industrial policy and 
competition policy. It is a political union.  
This stage differs greatly from previous stages in that it requires genuine political 
will to enforce it and enable harmonisation in macroeconomic trade policy. Giving up 
some economic sovereignty is necessary to accomplish this. Common legal procedures 
and laws that are enforceable equally and harmoniously throughout the region are 
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essential to ensure equal treatment and the integrity of the region. Thus, supranational 
institutions are the key to achieve this.247  
At this stage, the region is presenting itself as one region, one jurisdiction toward 
external trading partners, rather than an association of many countries. Disparities and 
gaps in economic development and growth, cultural differences, political economy, the 
interdependency in economics and foreign policies, as well as giving up some sovereignty 
could deter integration and instigate resistance from citizens in the region.  
As this section explained the definitions of economic integration and the stages 
of integration, the next section will examine the approaches countries employ to address 
competition law and policy issues when they integrate for economic purposes.  
 
 
3.3 BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 
Bilateral and multilateral trade cooperation is mostly undertaken in the form of 
free trade areas. Countries are allowed under the WTO principles to form trading blocs 
which enables them to trade freely with their trading partners. Free trade areas do not 
have to consist of only neighbouring countries. Countries which are in different 
continents can form a free trade area by concluding FTA. Concluding a FTA 
undoubtedly allows market access between member states. The most common form of 
FTAs involves trade in goods. This section compares chapters or provisions on 
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competition in selected FTAs in order to attest of the awareness of competition law and 
policy in international trade and how this is incorporated.    
3.3.1 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)  
At the level of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, competition law and policy 
is included in the majority of trade agreements. NAFTA was signed by Canada, Mexico 
and the US and came into effect in 1994. NAFTA does not impose common tariffs on 
products from outside the trading bloc. It does not have a common policy on free 
movement of goods, people and capital. It is clear that NAFTA is only a free trade area. 
There is no evidence that the leaders intend to establish a closer and deeper integration 
among the member states.  
Chapter 15 of NAFTA, 'Competition Policy, Monopolies and State Enterprises', 
recognises the importance of curbing anticompetitive practices because it will enhance 
the fulfilment of NAFTA’s objectives.248 Interestingly, disputes relating to competition 
among parties cannot be resolved through NAFTA dispute settlement measures. The 
Agreement calls for cooperation among the members and establishes a Working Group 
on Trade and Competition.249 NAFTA’s chapter on competition does not provide 
substantive provisions, but obligates the parties to adopt such rules without providing 
details about what these rules should address.250 The Working Group on Trade and 
Competition had several meetings, resulting in no changes, or none of significance, at 
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either national or NAFTA level. Moreover, the Working Group itself was defunct and 
expired without making any substantial impact on the competition laws of the Parties.251  
Although it can be said that NAFTA approach to competition law and policy 
among its members is a hard law approach, but little achievement or impact on 
competition policy of the group is done as a result of the Agreement. To opt for a hard 
law approach does not guarantee an effective enforcement, especially when the member 
states opt out the chapter on competition policy to be subject to the Treaty’s dispute 
settlement mechanism. 
It should be noted that by the time NAFTA was signed, all the parties to it had 
competition law already, especially, the US and Canada, whose competition laws (or 
antitrust in the US terminology) had been in force for over a 100 years. In Mexico, the 
modernised competition law was adopted in December 1992 and came into force in June 
1993.  
The inapplicability of the dispute resolution chapter to the competition chapter 
of NAFTA has had a contradictory result in anticompetitive conduct disputes among 
NAFTA parties. In UPS v Canada, United Parcel Service (UPS), a US Company, 
complained that Canada Post, a Crown Corporation, engaged in anticompetitive 
practices – predatory pricing and cross-subsidising its rapid letter packet service with 
revenues from its monopolistic postal service. An independent investigation committee 
concluded that Canada Post did indeed engage in such business conducts, but Canada 
decided not to take any action. UPS then claimed damages from the Government of 
                                                 
251 Clifford A. Jones, ‘Competition Dimensions of  NAFTA and the European Union: Semi-Common 
Competition Policy, Uncommon Rules, and No Common Institutions’ (2006) 6 Jean 
Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series No. 18 (The V International Symposium on Comparative 
Regionalism and the European Union. “The European Union in Comparative Perspective: A 
Model and Reference for the Americas”, Florida, 4 November 2005) 7 - 10 
122 
 
Canada under NAFTA through an arbitration tribunal. However, the tribunal ruled that 
it did not have jurisdiction over the dispute, as any disputes arising from the competition 
chapter are excluded from dispute settlement measures under NAFTA.252  The tribunal 
concluded that Canada’s failure to protect a foreign investor (UPS) under NAFTA 
against the anticompetitive conduct of its national monopoly did not violate the 
minimum standard of treatment, since there was no customary international law to that 
effect.253   
In Mexico – Telecoms, the US complained that Mexico unfairly treated its 
telecommunication companies in the provision of long distance calls from the US to 
Mexico. The US filed the complaint to the WTO dispute settlement procedures instead 
of to NAFTA, which does not provide remedies for competition disputes. The US 
claimed, inter alia, that Mexico’s failure to maintain measures to prevent its incumbent, 
Telmex, from engaging in anticompetitive practices resulted in breach of its obligation 
under Mexico’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Schedule of Specific 
Commitments by enabling Telmext to engage in a cartel dominated by itself to fix rates 
for international connections and to restrict the supply of scheduled basic 
telecommunications services.254 The Dispute Resolution Body Panel finally ruled in 
favour of the US as follows: 1. Telmex was a major supplier;255 2. Practices required 
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under Mexico’s law can be anticompetitive practices;256 and 3. Mexico has failed to 
maintain appropriate measures to prevent anticompetitive practices.257 
3.3.2 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
The EFTA is an intergovernmental organisation established to promote free 
trade and economic integration to the benefit of its four Member States.258 Objectives of 
the EFTA are set out in Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA Convention) and focuses specifically on cooperation in trade 
and investment.  
The Association aims at providing fair conditions of competition.259 Competition 
rules incorporated in the Convention are in line with international practices as Article 18 
of the EFTA Convention prohibits anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices 
which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition,260 and abuse of dominance.261  
Dispute arising out of competition nature could be resolved by consultations and 
cooperation to reach mutually satisfactory solutions. The disputes on interpretation or 
application of the EFTA Convention can be submitted to the Council.262 If 
anticompetitive practices arise and cause serious economic, societal or environmental 
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difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature in the member states, the affected member 
state can take safeguard measures necessary to remedy the situation with priority given to 
safeguard measures that will least disturb the functioning of the Convention.263   
However, Article 18 of the EFTA Convention does not create any direct 
obligations, and anticompetitive practices prescribed in this Article shall be interpreted in 
the light of the national competition laws of the member states.264 
In September 1992, seven EFTA Member States265 concluded the European 
Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. But Switzerland remains outside of the EEA 
Agreement due to non-ratification.266 This EEA Agreement provides Norway access to 
European market.  
Hence, Norway is bounded by the EU’s four freedoms – the free movement of 
goods, services, persons and capital.267 In exchange for market access, Norway has to 
apply certain EU laws such as those on competition, without having the right to make 
decisions on any EU laws and policies concerning the four freedoms. The EU is the 
most significant trading partner of Norway because over 80% of Norway’s export is to 
the EU and over 60% of its import is from the EU.268 Access to the international market 
                                                 
263 ibid art 40  
264 EFTA, ‘Joint Declaration on Competition’ <http://www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/efta-
convention/joint-declarations/Declaration-Competition.pdf> accessed 21 January 2016 
265 Seven States were Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
266 Halsbury’s Laws of  England (5th edn, 2009) vol 18, para 36 
267 EFTA, ‘EEA Agreement’ <http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement> accessed 11 November 2015; 
Norway Mission to the EU, ‘Norway and the European Union’ <http://www.eu-
norway.org/eu/norway_and_the_eu/#.VkSGs7fhDcs> (last updated 10/03/15) accessed 12 
November 2015 
268 Norway Mission to the EU, ‘Norway and the European Union’ (n 267) 
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is a very important part of Norwegian trade policy which is made possible via conclusion 
of FTAs.269 
Competition rules to which Norway is bound under the EEA Agreement are the 
same as the competition provisions in the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(EEC Treaty).270 The EEC Treaty has been amended, renumbered and renamed as the 
TFEU.271 The EEA competition rules have direct effect on Norway, and Norwegian 
courts must interpret these rules in accordance with the judgments of the European 
Union Court of Justice prior to September 1992. Undoubtedly, the EEA approach to 
competition law and policy is a hard law approach the same as in the EU. 
Although Switzerland is not part of the EEA, it has concluded numerous 
bilateral trade agreements with the EU in order to gain non-discriminatory market 
access.272 In fact, Switzerland has singed FTAs with Japan, and China outside the 
framework of EFTA.273 Switzerland has been 1st in the overall GCI since 2009274 
although its basic requirements and Efficiency Enhancers sub-indexes are lower than 
Singapore’s (Singapore’s basic requirement index is 1st while Switzerland is 2nd, and 
Singapore’s efficiency enhancer index is 2nd and Switzerland is 4th). But Switzerland’s 
                                                 
269 Ministry of  Trade, Industry and Fisheries, ‘Norway’s Free Trade Agreements’ 
<https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/business-and-industry/frihandelsavtaler/Norways-free-
trade-agreements/id457017/> accessed 20 January 2016 
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272 State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO, ‘Free Trade Agreements’ 
<http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00513/00515/01330/?lang=en> accessed 19 January 2016 
273 SECO, ‘Lists of  Free Trade Agreements of  Switzerland’ 
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Innovation and Sophistication index is 1st while Singapore ranks 11th.275 However, in 
terms of ease of doing business, Singapore has always been 1st since 2011.276 
Switzerland is a small country. It is a member of EFTA which does not have a 
supranational competition law regime. Switzerland is not part of the EEA, but it gains 
access to the EU market through bilateral FTAs signed with the EU. Although 
Switzerland is not bound by the EU competition law, it has amended and revised its 
competition law in 2003 to align this with the EU and other OECD countries.277 The 
Agreement between the EU and Switzerland concerning cooperation on the application 
of their competition laws only concerns the administrative cooperation between the EU 
Commission and the Swiss Competition Commission (Comco).278 Comco is a very 
interesting governmental body. Its members serve part-time. Almost half of them 
represent interest groups, either consumers or businesses. Moreover, its members are 
allowed to have positions on company boards.279     
3.3.3 Some FTAs Signed by Thailand, Singapore, and ASEAN 
This section divides FTAs signed by Thailand, Singapore, and ASEAN into three 
groups; FTAs with no competition chapter or provision, FTAs with competition 
chapters or provisions which can be used as recourse through consultation, but are not 
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278 Email from Holger Dieckmann, EU Commission, DG Competition – International Relations Unit to 
author (3 February 2016) 
279 OECD, ‘Policy Brief: Competition Law and Policy in Switzerland’ (n 277) 3 
127 
 
subject to dispute settlement provisions of the FTAs, and FTAs with competition 
chapters which are subject to the dispute settlement provisions of the FTAs. 
A) FTAs with no competition chapter or provision 
There are the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Agreement between the 
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Thailand on Accelerated Tariff Elimination under the Early Harvest Programme of the 
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN 
and China (China – Thailand FTA), Framework Agreement on ASEAN - China 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation  (ASEAN-China FTA), Agreement on Trade in 
Goods Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
among the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the Member Countries of the 
ASEAN (ASEAN – Korea FTA), Framework Agreement for Establishing Free Trade 
Area between the Kingdom of Thailand and the Republic of India, ASEAN - India Free 
Trade Agreement, ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Trade in Goods 
Agreement (ATIGA), and ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). 
B) FTAs with competition chapters or provisions which are not subject to 
dispute settlement provisions of the FTAs 
There are the Japan - Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement,280 Japan - 
Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement,281 Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Among Japan and Member States of the ASEAN (ASEAN – Japan FTA),282 
                                                 
280 art 105 
281 art 102 
282 There is no competition chapter or provision under this agreement, but Article 53 (l)of  the agreement 
provides that the Parties shall explores and undertake economic cooperation activities in 
competition policy through the establishment of  a Sub-Committee on Economic Cooperation, 
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Singapore - Australia Free Trade Agreement,283 Thailand - Australia Free Trade 
Agreement,284 New Zealand – Thailand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement,285 
Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area,286 The US 
- Singapore Free Trade Agreement,287 Agreement between the EFTA States and 
Singapore,288 Korea - Singapore Free Trade Agreement,289 and Trans - Pacific 
Partnership Agreement.290 
C) FTAs with competition chapters or provisions which are subject to 
dispute settlement provisions of the FTAs 
There are the Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer 
Economic Partnership, Agreement on Trade in Services under the Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments of the 
Member Countries of the ASEAN and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN - Korea 
Agreement on Trade in Services), Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement 
between Republic of India and the Republic of Singapore, the EU - Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement.291 
That FTA’s chapters on competition are not subject to their dispute resolution 
measures is not uncommon. Most Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) signed by 
                                                                                                                                           
which has not begun yet at the time of  writing (May 2015). However, pursuant to Article 58, the 
economic cooperation in Chapter 8 is not subject to dispute settlement provisions in Chapter 9. 
283 Chapter 12 art 8 
284 art 1208 
285 art 11.10(1) 
286 Chapter 14 art 4 
287 Chapter 12 art 12.2 explicitly provides that Singapore shall enact general competition law by January 
2005. And art 12.7 prohibits the Parties to recourse to dispute settlement under the agreement 
for matters on anticompetitive business conduct, cooperation, and consultations 
288 art 50(3) 
289 art 15.8 
290 art 16.9 
291 Only against granted subsidies pursuant to Article 12.6 and against prohibited subsidies pursuant to 
Article 12.7 and 12.14  
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Latin American countries contained such provisions.292 Additionally, the OECD 
conducted research on 86 Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) which were notified to 
the WTO from 2001 to 2005 and found that at least 16 of them excluded competition 
related disputes from the specific dispute resolution measures.293 Another paper 
examines competition related provisions and the competition chapters of 74 RTAs and 
reveals that more than ¾ of them have competition chapters or provisions.294 However, 
out of 55 RTAs with competition provisions, 14 RTAs exclude all of these provisions 
from dispute settlement, and 2 RTAs partially exclude them.295 
This raises the question why countries would exclude competition provisions 
from the dispute settlement measures. This also makes the usefulness of competition 
provisions questionable. Sokol concludes, in the aforementioned research on Latin 
American PTAs, that the importance of competition chapters in these agreements is not 
in their enforceability, but in their symbolic value, the symbolism to foreign investors 
that the Parties intend to commit to the functioning of a competitive market, and the 
symbolism to domestic constituencies that the governments consider competition policy 
important.296  
                                                 
292 D. Daniel Sokol, ‘Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable 
Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements’ (2007) 83 Chicago-Kent Law Review 
231 
293 Oliver Solano and Andreas Sennekamp, ‘Competition Provisions in Regional Reade Agreements’ [2006] 
OECD Trade Policy Papers No 31 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/344843480185> accessed 23 
June 2015 
294 Robert Teh, ‘Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements’ in Antoni Estevadeordal, Kati 
Suominen, and Rebert Teh (eds) Regional Rules in the Global Trading System (Cambridge University 
Press 2009)  
295 ibid 481 
296  Sokol ‘Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition 
Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements’ (n 292) 
130 
 
Teh surmises in his research of 74 RTAs that extraterritorial application of 
competition policies can raise sovereignty concerns; developing countries297are not 
familiar with competition laws and are not sure whether they can successfully and fully 
implement these measures.298 Despite their concerns, 50 of 68 RTAs which developing 
countries have concluded include a competition chapter or provisions.299 Teh concludes 
that these competition chapters are on a ‘best endeavour’ basis300 and asserts that the 
principal objective of the competition provisions in RTAs ‘is to prevent the gains in 
market access arising from the RTA from being eroded by anti-competitive behaviour 
that is condoned or tolerated by RTA partners.’301 These findings confirm that although 
developing countries are reluctant to take hard law approach to the international 
commitment on competition law and policy, they are willing to engage in soft law 
approach. And when it is the right time, a soft law could be legalised into hard law. 
 
 
3.4 REGIONAL INTEGRATION LEVEL 
As examined in the previous section competition chapters or provisions are 
included in bilateral and multilateral trade agreement as symbols of promotion of 
effective competition and to prevent gains in market access from being hindered by 
anticompetitive practices. In a regional integration setting, the approaches vary. There 
                                                 
297 It should be noted that under his research, Teh places Singapore as a developing country. This thesis 
disagrees with him in this regard, but it does not compromise his conclusion that the competition 
provision or chapter in the RTAs is used on the best endeavour basis and as a tool to prevent the 
gains from trade to be hindered by anticompetitive practices.  
298 Teh ‘Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements’ (n 294) 482 
299 ibid 489 
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are a good number of regional integrations and this thesis cannot address all of them.302 
This thesis chooses to demonstrate the different approaches in dealing with competition 
law with the examples of ASEAN, APEC, and MERCOSUR. This is because Thailand 
and Singapore are members of both ASEAN and APEC. Therefore, it is interesting and 
important to scrutinise the different approaches and the impact that these approaches 
may have on both countries.  
It should be made clear at this point that ASEAN and the EU are not to be 
compared in terms of regional integration as they are too different in nature and 
structure for such comparison. But the EU’s approach to regional competition law is 
studied and examined in this thesis as a benchmark and example for ASEAN to learn 
from. Although MERCOSUR cannot be regarded as a leader in competition law, the 
similarities in the structures and economies of its member states with ASEAN’s member 
states make it a good reference when considering the approaches to competition laws for 
ASEAN member states. The EU’s approach is studied in chapter 4, and ASEAN’s 
approach is examined in-depth in chapter 4. 
                                                 
302 See G. Deniz Both, ‘Regionalisation of  Competition Policy: What Lessons Can Be Drawn for ASEAN 
from Other Region’s Experience? (Drafted, the Regionalisation of  Competition Law and Policy: 
Implications for the ASEAN Economic Community, Singapore, 25 April 2016). Both examined 
10 regional blocs’ competition laws and policies. Both found that there is one regional trading 
bloc, which applies soft cooperation to competition law and policy, and that succeeds in the 
enforcement of  competition law and policy among them. That trading bloc is the Trans-Tasman 
cooperation between Australia and New Zealand. This is possible because they have developed 
gradual convergence of  economic laws and policies over 30 years; New Zealand’s competition 
law was modelled after the Australian’s; they have the same legal system, use the same language. 
If  this is the secret to their success, it is highly unlikely that ASEAN can achieve it as AMSs do 
not have the same legal system, languages, and do not model their competition law after other 
AMSs (except Brunei which models its competition law after Singapore’s Competition Act 2004). 
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3.4.1 APEC 
APEC has 21 member economies.303 In terms of competitiveness in 2015 - 2016, 
7 of the APEC member economies were ranked in the top 30, and 4 of them were in the 
top 10. The lowest ranking is Mexico, at 76th.304  
APEC was established in 1989 with twelve founding member economies, six of 
which are ASEAN member states.305 APEC has always focused on, and advocated, 
economic cooperation to enhance prosperity and stability of the region. Only after the 
9/11 attack occurred, did APEC include an antiterrorism agenda.306 It was created, at 
first, merely as a forum or movement, more than as an organisation.307 In 2014, the 
leaders have endorsed 'a roadmap to translate the vision of the Free Trade Area of the 
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) into a reality.'308 This statement is clear evidence that APEC has 
yet to integrate further in order to become a real free trade area.  There is no evidence 
showing that the APEC economies aim at deeper integration such as through a custom 
union. The work of APEC has always been to facilitate trade among member economies 
and to reduce border procedures in order to lower transaction costs for both exporters 
and importers. APEC serves as a forum for international cooperation among its 
                                                 
303 Australia; Brunei; Canada; Chile; People Republic of  China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; 
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members. Commitment is on a voluntary basis; decisions are made through consensus 
and they are not legally binding.309 
In terms of competition law and policy, APEC established its Competition Policy 
and Deregulation Group in 1996. In 2008, the name was changed to APEC's 
Competition Policy and Law Group (CPLG) as a platform for capacity building, 
exchanges of experience and best practice. CPLG is not an intergovernmental body. The 
cooperation is carried out via meetings, at which members update each other on their 
national competition laws and recent developments and cases. What CPLG produces 
can be considered as recommendations.310 Most of the information presented at the 
meetings is contained in the reports prepared by members to provide their view on 
particular subjects or to convey experience and information about national competition 
law and policy development. They are not legally binding. There is no intergovernmental 
body under APEC to oversee the implementation of the recommendations by its 
members, because all commitments are undertaken on a voluntary basis. This clearly 
shows that the APEC approach to competition law and policy is a soft law approach. 
In 1999, APEC Ministers endorsed the APEC Principles to Enhance 
Competition and Regulatory Reform (APEC Principles). From the APEC Principles, it is 
clear that APEC promotes competition law and policy to protect economic efficiency 
and consumer welfare through an open and competitive market. These principles are: 
non-discrimination, comprehensiveness, transparency, accountability, and 
implementation. It is doubtful how much impact these principles have on the actual 
enforcement of member economies' national competition law and policy.  
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Other than the APEC Principles, the CPLG has also published eight reports. 
These provide information on member economies' deregulation and liberalisation 
processes, on competition development, on information exchange regarding competition 
in APEC and on training programmes to promote competition among APEC member 
economies. It can be considered that the attempts to promote competition law under the 
APEC framework promote the least commitment among those frameworks studied in 
this thesis because it only provides an understanding of the different stages of 
competition development and some recommendations.  
From the APEC Principles, it is clear that APEC very much takes into account 
the diversity of economic development of its members and thus flexibility is at the core 
of implementing the APEC Principles. Therefore, the APEC approach on competition is 
moderate. There are no common competition rules and no recommended provisions for 
APEC economies to adopt into their national competition law. There is no necessity to 
create an intergovernmental body to oversee the application of the APEC Principles 
because they are not legally binding and member economies can adopt them voluntarily. 
In terms of enforceability, APEC Principles are not any different from competition 
chapters in the FTAs. Therefore, this thesis argues that the APEC Principles are best 
described as a symbolism of the recognition of the importance of a competitive market.  
Although APEC is not even a Free Trade Area and has no provisions on 
competition that are enforceable, it does not seem to hinder APEC’s member 
economies’ economic growth and competitiveness. China’s economy continues to grow; 
Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s competitiveness have been in the top ten of Global 
Competitiveness Report for many years. Singapore and Hong Kong have been in the top 
five of the Ease of Doing Business Ranking listed by World Bank for many years 
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although they are parties of many FTAs that contain competition chapters which are not 
subject to the dispute resolution mechanism contained in these FTAs.  
In terms of dispute settlement, in 1999, APEC’s Investment Experts’ Group 
published a manual guide on arbitration and dispute resolution in APEC members.311 
This only provides information on dispute resolution in APEC economies. In 2011, 
APEC also revised the APEC Non-Binding Investment Principles (APEC Investment 
Principles).312 According to the APEC Investment Principles, member economies accept 
that disputes related to foreign investment will be settled through consultation and 
negotiation or through international arbitration.313 It is clear that APEC does not have its 
own dispute resolution mechanisms.  
A study based on 14 bilateral and 14 multilateral international investment 
agreements (IIAs), between or involving APEC economies, found that practices in 
investor-States dispute settlement provisions in these IIAs vary greatly. Some follow the 
NAFTA model and some rely on arbitration rules governed by ICSID or the United 
Nations Commission of International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).314 However, the study 
did not report on whether the competition chapters under the selected IIAs are subject 
to the dispute settlement provisions.  
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3.4.2 MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL 
MERCOSUR was established in 1991 as an intergovernmental organisation315 by 
the Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal 
Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay 
(Treaty of Asunción).316 It has five member states, namely Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.317  
The main objectives concern the integration of the economy and enhancing the 
competitiveness of the region, similarly to APEC. The goal of this integration is not a 
complex furthering integration like the EU, but it aims to become more than just a free 
trade area such as NAFTA is.318 In terms of structure, MERCOSUR is an interesting 
regional integration. It is comprised of 6 organs: the Council of the Common Market 
(CCM), the Common Market Group (CMG), the MERCOSUR Trade Commission 
(MTC), the Joint Parliamentary Commission (substituted by the MERCOSUR 
Parliament) (JPC), the Economic-Social Consultative Forum (ESCF), and the 
MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat (MAS).319 Although MERCOSUR has 
established many intergovernmental bodies using the title ‘Common’, this does not mean 
that the region has reached a common market stage of integration. However, 
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MERCOSUR has implemented CET on imported goods into the region.320 From the 
definition given in section 3.2 it is right to conclude that at best, MERCOSUR is a 
custom market at this point.  
It should be noted that the CCM, the CMG and the MTC are inter-governmental 
bodies with powers of decision-making.321 The rulings of the CCM (which is at the top 
of the MERCOSUR hierarchy) are called Decisions. These are binding on all member 
states.322  
The CMG is the executive body of the MERCOSUR.323 It has powers, inter alia, 
to propose drafted rulings to the CCM and take necessary measures to enforce the 
rulings of the CCM.324 Its decisions are called Resolutions and these are also binding 
upon all member states.325  
The MTC oversees the application of the common trade policy instruments 
agreed by member states, and follows up and reviews questions and issues related to 
common trade policies, intra-MERCOSUR and involving third countries.326 Its decisions 
are called Directives or Proposals. Only Directives are binding on the member states.327  
All decisions made by the MERCOSUR organs are made by consensus and in 
the presence of all the member states.328 There is neither community law nor a direct 
effect principle applicable to the member states. All significant decisions by officials 
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must be transferred into the domestic legislation of all member states before they can 
take effect.329 It is therefore questionable whether there is enough delegation of 
sovereignty within the MERCOSUR to constitute a common market.  
Article 1 paragraph 1 of the Treaty of Asunción provides that the States Parties 
decided to establish a common market, which was to be in place by 31 December 1994. 
This clearly shows that the MERCOSUR leaders intend that an ultimate goal of their 
integration will be a common market.  However, that was not achieved in the specified 
time.  What exactly is MERCOSUR now? Some scholars consider MERCOSUR as an 
incomplete Free Trade Area and an imperfect custom union.330 It is said that there is a 
common belief that MERCOSUR has only reached an imperfect custom union.331  
An extensive study on economic freedoms in MERCOSUR reveals that 
MERCOSUR has considerably liberalised its trades in goods, with the exceptions of 
automobile and sugar industries, but the trade in services remains relatively closed. 
However, free movement of goods, capitals and persons are not as free as they should 
be in a common market. The movement of goods is still diminished by double custom 
duty. Free movement of capital is impeded by many restrictions. Free movement of 
labour under the Multilateral Social Law Agreement is not considered a component of 
MERCOSUR acquis communautaire and any states joining MERCOSUR in the future are 
not obliged to enter into this Agreement. Yet, the study concludes that despite these 
imperfections, MERCOSUR is considered a common market in the making.332 This 
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thesis concludes that MERCOSUR aims at creating a common market, but its current 
status is a custom union progressing slowly towards a common market. 
A) MERCOSUR Competition Law 
Provisions on competition law are contained in the Fortaleza Protocol, signed on 
17th December 1996 and approved by the Council of the Common Market (CCM) 
Decision No 18/96. Article 33 of the Protocol states that  
“the present Protocol, as an integral part of the Treaty 
of Asuncion, shall enter into force thirty days after the second 
instrument of ratification has been deposited, with respect to the 
first two States Parties ratifying it and, in the case of the other 
signatories, on the thirtieth day after the respective instrument 
of ratification has been deposited.”333  
 
Unlike the Multilateral Social Law Agreement, any state entering into 
MERCOSUR shall ipso jure adhere to the Fortaleza Protocol.334 As of 2010, only Brazil 
and Paraguay have deposited their respective instruments of ratification of the Protocol 
(Article 33 of Fortaleza Protocol).335 All member states of MERCOSUR have now 
enacted national competition laws.336  
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executive branch. But Argentinean’s current competition law, Law 25.156, repealed the Law 
22.262. Law 25.156/99 was enacted in 1999 and established an independent competition 
authority. See Marco Botta, ‘The Cooperation between the Competition Authorities of  the 
Developing Countries: Why Does It Not Work? Case Study on Argentina and Brazil’ (2009) 5 
The Competition Law Review 153. This new authority is called National Commission for the 
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It should be reiterated that under MERCOSUR’s system, there is neither direct-
effect nor the principle of supremacy as there is in the EU. All Protocols will be 
enforceable as laws of the community only if all member states have incorporated them 
into their national law, in which case they are applicable to member states because they 
are part of national law, not because of direct-effect or the principle of supremacy.337 
Therefore, at present, the Fortaleza Protocol has yet to come into force in the 
MERCOSUR.338 
                                                                                                                                           
Defense of  Competition (CNDC) whose members are appointed by the National Executive. 
(Article 19, Law 25.156/99) The CNDC was created by Law 22.262 in 1980 to oversees the 
application of  the new law.; Brazil’s first competition law was enacted in 1962, but the 
enforcement was active in the beginning of  1990s. In 1994, the Law 8884/94 was passed and 
repealed the old law. This law was amended in 2000 by adding leniency programme to it. See 
Marco Botta, ibid. Finally, in 2011, the Law No 12.529/2011 was enacted and entered into force 
in 29th May 2012. See Barbara Rosenburg, ‘Brazil: The Enactment of  the New Brazilian 
Competition Law: An Important Shift’ Mondaq (26 Aug 2013) 
<http://www.mondaq.com/brazil/x/253956/Antitrust+Competition/The+ 
Enactment+Of+The+New+Brazilian+Competition+Law+An+Important> accessed 1 July 2015; 
Paraguay’s competition law was enacted on 21 June 2013, Law No. 4956/13, but the formal 
establishment of  its enforcement authority, the National Commission for Protection of  
Competition, is expected to take place in September 2015 See MERSAN, ‘Competition 
Legislation in Paraguay: Law No. 4956/13 and Its Regulatory Decree No. 1490/14’ 
<http://mersanlaw.com/2014/09/03/defensa-de-la-competencia-en-paraguay-ley-495613-y-
decreto-reglamentario-no-149014/?lang=en> accessed 1 July 2015; Uruguay’s competition 
law was enacted in 2000, Law No. 170243 and was amended in 2001. The enforcement authority 
is the General Bureau of  Commerce of  the Ministry of  Economy and Finance which is not the 
entity with specific competence in curbing anticompetitive conducts. Uruguay’s competition law 
is claimed to allow a certain degree of  distortion of  competition as long as it does not harm the 
“general interest”. The country is said to lacks competition culture and favours government 
involvements. See Bruce M. Owen, ‘Competition Policy in Latin America’ (Conference on 
Sectoral Reform in Latin America, California,  13 – 15 November 2003) 
<www.standford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/03-
03.pdf> accessed 6 November 2012; See also Uruguay, 
<http://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/antitrust/pdfs/publications/newsviews/axber
g_uruguay.pdf> accessed 1 July 2015; Venezuela’s competition law was passed in late 1991 and 
took effect in January 1992. ProCompetencia was the enforcement agency. Despite small number 
of  full time staff  (20 people), the ProCompetencia has received much compliment of  its 
vigorous enforcement records. However, it was reported that the 1999 Constitution called for a 
revised competition law and the agency resulted in uncertainty in competition enforcement. The 
ProCompetencia was reported to submit various proposals for the new law. See A.E. Rodriguez 
and Mark D. Williams, ‘Recent Decisions by the Venezuelan and Peruvian Agencies: Lessons for 
the Export of  antitrust’ (1998) 43 Antitrust Bulletin 147; Owen, ‘Competition Policy in Latin 
America’ (n 336)  
337 Malcom Rowat, Michele Lubrano and Rafael Porrata, Jr, Competition Policy and MERCOSUR (The World 
Bank 1997)17 - 18 
338 Tomé Feteira ‘Competition Rules in MERCOSUR: the Fortaleza Protocol’ (n 330)  
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Decision No 1/03 of the MTC established the Commission for Defence of 
Competition (CDC), an intergovernmental body consisting of national competition 
agencies from member states, whose task is to ensure the application of the Fortaleza 
Protocol by the member states in collaboration with the MTC.339 
In its preamble, the Fortaleza Protocol recognizes the importance of ‘equal 
condition of free competition’ and ‘increased competitiveness’. The Protocol is used as 
‘an instrument capable of assuring free market access and a balanced distribution of the 
benefits of the process of economic integration’. The purpose of the Protocol is the 
defence of competition in MERCOSUR.340 The Protocol applies to anticompetitive acts 
occurring within MERCOSUR and those affecting competition in MERCOSUR and 
between MERCOSUR member states.341  
Article 6 of the Protocol provides a non-exhaustive list of conducts which are 
considered anticompetitive if they are committed with the purpose, or effect, of 
restricting, limiting, falsifying or distorting competition in, or access to, the market 
within MERCOSUR. They include horizontal and vertical agreements and unilateral 
conduct, such as market division, price fixing, cartels, bid rigging, tying and bundling, 
and denying access to essential facilities. 
The provisions on supposed anticompetitive behaviours are not well structured. 
There is no distinction between anticompetitive agreements and unilateral conduct. 
Economic concentration and abuse of dominance are referred to very briefly in Article 7. 
                                                 
339 Fortaleza Protocol art 8; Tomé Feteira ‘Competition Rules in MERCOSUR: the Fortaleza Protocol’ (n 
330)  
340 Fortaleza Protocol art 1 
341 ibid arts 2 and 4  
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Perhaps the CDC will publish some guidelines to clarify these issues.  Until then, the 
competition rules under the Fortaleza Protocol are confusing and ambiguous.  
B) MERCOSUR Competition Law Enforcement 
The Fortaleza Protocol provides procedural rules on the administration of 
competition cases. The rules appear complicated and it could be presumed that, if there 
is a case under this Protocol, it would require a long time to solve the dispute. The CDC 
and MTC are in charge of overseeing the application of competition rules within the 
MERCOSUR.342 The Protocol requires the CDC to receive confirmation (ad 
referendum) from the MTC in many instances. Also, it appears that the CDC does not 
have the same authority as the Directorate General for Competition (DGCOM) in the 
EU, because the power to investigate the case remains with the national competition 
authority of the country where the defendant resides, while the CDC only establishes 
guidelines for defining the relevant market and analytical criteria of the economic effects 
of the alleged anticompetitive practice.  
However, once the investigation is completed, the national competition authority 
shall present a conclusive ruling to the CDC, who will seek confirmation from the MTC 
to decide the case, taking into consideration the ruling provided by the national 
authority, and eventually impose sanctions. The CDC reaches its decision by consensus 
and, if it fails to reach a consensus, it has to refer to the MTC for an opinion.  
The MTC’s ruling is in the form of a Directive, which will be carried out by the 
national authority of the state where the defendant resides. However, if the MTC cannot 
reach a consensus, the MTC will refer the case to the CMG, which also has to reach a 
                                                 
342 ibid art 8 
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decision by consensus. If the CMG cannot reach a consensus, the interested State Party 
will have to use the procedures under the Brasilia Protocol on the Settlement of 
Disputes.343  
The Fortaleza Protocol provides a framework on competition law enforcement 
to the member states. The MERCOSUR aims at creating a common market with an 
intergovernmental structure. Given that all decisions by the CDC, MTC and CMG must 
be reached by consensus, and given the complicated procedural rules in administering 
and enforcing competition matters, this thesis argues that such complex and lengthy 
procedures may impair the effectiveness of MERCOSUR competition law enforcement. 
Additionally, taking into account the complexity and lengthy dispute settlement process 
under the Olivos Protocol, this thesis argues that the combination of these Protocols 
may not be suitable for the dynamic of international trade. It is highly doubtful whether 
MEROCUR’s investors will benefit from such lengthy and complicated dispute 
settlement mechanisms. Moreover, one scholar expressed concern that the procedural 
rules under the Fortaleza Protocol are prone to regulatory capture.344  
The Fortaleza Protocol requires that the national competition authority of the 
country where the defendant resides investigates the case. But the defendant’s place of 
residence is not necessarily the easiest place for the authority to gather evidence of 
anticompetitive practices. This approach appears to be a distinctive character of 
MERCOSUR’s competition law enforcement.  
                                                 
343 ibid arts 10 – 21  
344 Tomé Feteira ‘Competition Rules in MERCOSUR: the Fortaleza Protocol’ (n 335)  
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Concern was expressed that the lack of supremacy and direct effect and 
disparities in the development of member states can harm the progress of integration.345 
MERCOSUR is ‘the failed intergovernmental approach’346 because of lack of 
cooperation between national competition authorities, although the Fortaleza Protocol 
promotes just such cooperation in Article 30.347 Finally in 2010, MERCOSUR concluded 
the MERCOSUR Agreement for the Protection of Competition, which did not need any 
ratification by the national Parliaments. This agreement strengthens cooperation among 
the NCAs in MERCOSUR.348 It is clear that the MERCOSUR approach is a hard law 
approach. But its impact and significance on increasing competitiveness of MERCOSUR 
remain to be seen. As is the case of NAFTA, opting for a hard law approach to 
competition law and policy is not a guarantee for an effective competition law 
enforcement. It is the actual application and enforcement of the law among member 
states. This is the area where both NAFTA and MERCOSUR lack. 
ASEAN is an intergovernmental organisation with far less formal commitment 
and legally binding instruments than MERCOSUR, because of the ASEAN way. In the 
ASEAN case, the lack of supremacy is obvious as it is a crucial part of the ASEAN way. 
 
 
                                                 
345 ibid 
346 Botta, ‘The Role of  Competition Policy in the Latin American Regional Integration: A Comparative 
Analysis of  CARICOM, ANDEAN Community and MERCOSUR’ (n 200)  
347 Botta, ‘The Cooperation between the Competition Authorities of  the Developing Countries: Why Does 
It Not Work? Case Study on Argentina and Brazil’ (n 336) 
348 Diego Petrecolla et al, ‘Economic Structure and Competition Policy Application in Latin American 
Countries’ in Michal S. Gal et al (eds) The Economic Characteristics of  Developing Jurisdictions: Their 
Implications for Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2015)  
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter established the unavoidable move of the harmonisation and 
convergence of competition law and policy movement in the world trade from the 
national level to the global level. The involvement and influence of the US in 
harmonising competition law and policy should be noted. The US is a founding member 
of the UN, the OECD, UNCTAD, APEC, and the ICN. The US also initiated the 
establishment of the OECD, APEC, and the ICN.  Advocacy of competition law and 
policy, through the establishment of these forums, has always been on the US agenda. 
However, attempts to unify international competition law have never succeeded as 
evidence in the case of the WTO initiative. Perhaps the hard law approach has its 
limitation when it comes to global trade. Objection by developing states will prevent any 
attempt to unify or harmonise international competition law. It seems as if a soft law 
approach is more welcome as it provides flexibility and imposes less sovereign cost on 
developing and the least-develop countries. This is not to say that a hard law approach 
will never work. It can as we shall see in the case of the EU in the next chapter. 
The UNCTAD promotes effective competition law to protect developing 
countries from anticompetitive practices by foreign firms, and as an incentive to attract 
FDI from transnational enterprises, which are familiar with the enforcement of 
competition law in their home countries and expect a level-playing field between them 
and domestic undertakings in host countries.  
The OECD advocates competition law to its member economies as a tool to 
improve market efficiency, which can be suitable for countries whose markets are 
efficiency-driven.  
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The ICN, on the other hand, focuses on addressing competition enforcement 
and policy issues and establishing consensus between members on particular subjects. 
The ICN’s project-oriented and result-based approach in finding agreed best practices 
among members appears more favourable than the OECD’s and the UNCTAD’s 
approach, though all of them produce non-legally binding documents and 
recommendations. Its soft law approach match with the ASEAN way, which is another 
reason why AMSs welcome dialogues and discussions on competition law and policy 
through the ICN. 
But the formality of OECD and UNCTAD as intergovernmental organisations 
produces a certain degree of commitment by governments while the ICN is an entirely 
informal and non-intergovernmental body, and members interact largely via internet, 
telephone, teleseminars, and webinars.349 The result of this approach is that members are 
more willing to incorporate the ICN’s recommendations in their competition law 
amendments, such as when Singapore and Brazil took these recommendations into 
consideration when they amended their competition laws. 
Regarding the practicality of the competition chapter in trade agreements, this 
chapter demonstrates that the vast majority of FTAs and RTAs; whether they are 
bilateral or multi-lateral, include competition chapters or provisions which are not 
subject to the dispute resolution mechanisms under the FTAs. Most FTAs favour co-
operation, capacity-building assistance, and exchange of publicly available non-
confidential information. If there is any dispute related to anticompetitive conducts, 
signatories prefer to solve these disputes by consultation rather than directly submitting 
the disputes to an arbitral tribunal or the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.  
                                                 
349 ICN, ‘About’ <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about.aspx> accessed 4 February 
2016 
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APEC is merely a co-operation among member economies, and it is not even a 
free trade area. However, APEC has published the APEC Principles which are principles 
that recognize the importance of competition law and policy enforcement to protect 
economic efficiency and consumer welfare. Although seven of the AMSs are members 
of APEC, and some of the FTAs concluded between APEC member economies and the 
AMSs include provisions which explicitly recognise the APEC Principles, the FTAs 
among APEC member economies and the AMSs continue to exclude the competition 
chapter from dispute settlement mechanisms. Only the New Zealand-Singapore FTA 
and the ASEAN-Korea Agreement on Trade in Services subject the competition chapter 
or provisions to their dispute settlement mechanisms. 
In the case of NAFTA, member states also include a competition chapter which 
is not subject to NAFTA’s dispute resolution mechanism. This results in two different 
interpretations by two different arbitral tribunals. Under ICSID, the arbitration tribunal 
in UPS v Canada ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the case because disputes on 
competition are not subject to NAFTA. Moreover, it ruled that the host country’s failure 
to protect a foreign investor under NAFTA against the anticompetitive conduct of its 
national monopoly did not violate the minimum standard of treatment, because there 
was no such customary international law.350 Hence, it is unlikely that any country will 
refer its anti-competition disputes to ICSID.  
Relying on the WTO Dispute Resolution mechanism may yield a better result 
because in Mexico – Telecoms, the Dispute Resolution Body Panel ruled in favour of the 
investor.351 However, it should be borne in mind that this case was decided under 
GATS, not under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT). And it 
                                                 
350 UPS v Canada (n 207) 
351 Mexico – Telecoms (n 209)  
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should be noted that the EU, as the third party to this case, had a different view than the 
panel. The EU considered that a practice required by law could not be an 
anticompetitive practice. Because if the law does not allow competition in a particular 
area, there cannot be an anticompetitive practice relating to that matter as it stated ‘It is 
not possible to restrict competition where competition is not allowed.’352 NAFTA’s hard 
law approach has not added significant impact on the competitiveness of member states. 
The lack of authority which has jurisdiction on this matter within the trading bloc has 
proved to weaken NAFTA’s competition law and policy. 
The MERCOSUR’s hard law approach to introduce regional supranational 
competition law through the Fortaleza Protocol is not yet successful. The lack of direct-
effect and principle of supremacy are likely to contribute to the Fortaleza Protocol 
having yet to come into force. Although, MERCOSUR established many 
intergovernmental bodies with decision making power; and the decisions of the Council 
of Common Market are binding on member states; this is not sufficient. The lack of 
investigative powers of the CDC, and the confusing and ambiguous provisions on 
competition in the Fortaleza Protocol are highly likely to deter the effectiveness of 
dispute resolution in anticompetitive practice issues at the regional level. The Agreement 
for the Protection of Competition of 2010 is a step back from the ambitious 
supranational approach, which does not work well for MERCOSUR thus far.  
One of the main reasons countries engage in Free Trade Areas is because of 
market access. It is how small countries such as Singapore, Norway, and Switzerland gain 
access to international trade. Once these countries gain market access, the competition in 
relevant market ensues. If disputes related to anticompetitive practices arise, none of 
                                                 
352  ibid para 7.241 
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them can refer the dispute to arbitration prescribed in their FTAs. Should they decide to 
bring the dispute before other international arbitration tribunals such as WTO or 
ICSID353, the results are inconsistent.  
The main objective of including a competition chapter or provisions in FTAs 
and RTAs is to be symbolic of the Parties’ commitment to maintain competitive markets 
and to support the value of competition to investors and to prevent market access being 
hampered by anticompetitive conducts. One can see that although developing countries 
and the AMS consider competition law and policy as beneficial to trade and investment, 
they are reluctant to fully commit to it at the international level. This may be due to 
sovereignty issues. The existence of a competition chapter or provision in FTAs and 
RTAs represents the ‘best endeavour’ of countries to acknowledge the importance of 
competition law and policy. This suggests that a supranational approach to competition 
law and policy among countries with different development levels could be challenged 
and resisted by developing countries. And most AMSs are developing countries. 
Many of the FTAs do not even include provisions or a chapter on competition at 
all such as for example the China-Thailand FTA, the ASEAN-China FTA, the China-
Singapore FTA, the ASEAN-India FTA, and the ASEAN-  Korea FTA. Only a minority 
of FTAs include a chapter on competition law which is subject to the dispute settlement 
chapter, for example the New Zealand-Singapore FTA, the ASEAN-Korea Agreement 
on Trade in Services, and the India-Singapore FTA. 
Some of the trade agreements among the AMSs such as AFTA, ATIGA, and 
AFAS do not contain chapters on competition.354 ASEAN has started to promote the 
                                                 
353 International Centre for Settlement of  Investment Disputes 
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enactment of competition laws in member states as part of the measures to take to make 
the AEC a highly competitive economic region. Singapore is a member of ASEAN, a 
Free Trade Area which does not have a regional competition law; Norway and 
Switzerland are members of EFTA which also states clearly that Article 18 of the EFTA 
refers to the national competition laws of the member states. These indicate that 
whether or not there is a chapter on competition or an enforceable competition chapter 
in these FTAs does not hinder or contribute to the competitiveness and economic 
growth of these countries. They have already benefited from the effects of globalisation 
even if competition rules are not extended to cross-border trade, and hybrid trade-and-
competition restraints are not treated as a unified whole as advocated by Fox.355  
Private investors have to rely on the national competition law of the host 
countries when disputes on anticompetitive practices arise. This only applies in cases 
outside of the EU because when anticompetitive behaviour affects trade in the EU, there 
are supranational mechanisms to curb such practices. China’s FTAs with Singapore, 
ASEAN and New Zealand356do not contain any provision on competition, let alone one 
which is subject to dispute resolution measures. All FTAs China has signed contain 
competition chapters which are not subject to provisions on dispute resolution.  
Considering the aforementioned individual FTAs which Thailand and Singapore 
have signed as well as the FTAs signed under the ASEAN platform, this thesis argues 
that ASEAN does not envisage competition law and policy and competitive market as an 
essential part of its international trade, at least between ASEAN-China, ASEAN-India, 
                                                                                                                                           
354 There are some trade agreements among AMSs which contain competition provisions and are subject 
to dispute settlement mechanism which are discussed in Chapter 4. 
355 Eleanor M. Fox, ‘The WTO’s First Antitrust Case – Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victory for Trade 
and Competition’ (2006) 9 Journal of  International Economic Law 271, 290 
356 Although there are provisions on monopoly suppliers but those provision do not aim at 
competitiveness of  the market or competition process as a whole. Thus, they are not relevant to 
this thesis. 
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and ASEAN - Korea FTA which form the majority of the FTAs signed between 
ASEAN and its dialogue partners. This thesis also argues that Singapore has gained more 
market access to major economies and conformed more to the international ideology of 
the competitive market than Thailand has. Out of 14 FTAs which Singapore signed 
individually, only 4 do not contain any provision on competition;357 whereas Thailand 
has only signed 5 FTAs individually.358 
 Clearly, the inapplicability of dispute resolution mechanisms on the chapter on 
competition does not stop countries from trading with each other and does not affect 
the competitiveness of a country. This confirms that there is no correlation between the 
competitiveness of a country and the enactment of competition law, but there is a 
correlation between competitiveness and the enforcement of competition law as 
analysed in chapter 2. Indeed, the use of ‘competitiveness’ to promote competition law 
and policy should be done with caution as warned by Krugman.  
                                                 
357 They are The GSFTA singed between Singapore and the Arab States of  the Gulf  (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates); the SJFTA which signed between 
Singapore and the Kingdom of  Jordan; the CECA which Singapore signed with India; and 
CSFTA which Singapore signed with China. 
358 They are FTAs between Thailand and Peru, Japan, India, New Zealand, and Australia. 
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CHAPTER 4  
ASEAN WAY AND SUPRANATIONAL 
APPROACH TO COMPETITION LAW AND 
POLICY 
The previous chapters concluded that the competitiveness of a country lies in its 
ability to provide a high standard of living for its citizens and that a competitive region is 
one which attracts skilled labour, businesses, and investments. Apart from being able to 
attract skilled labour and investment, there are other characteristics of a competitive 
region such as free movement of skilled labour, a high quality infrastructure to support 
sophisticated business operations, the promotion of free and fair competition, and free 
movement of goods, services, and capitals. 
Free movement of labour, goods, services, and capital requires market access.  If 
market access is compromised by domestic incumbents this is a deterrent for foreign 
investors. Likewise, opening up the market to a dominant foreign investor who abuses 
this dominance is not desirable for host governments and domestic businesses. 
Therefore, ASEAN needs a proper competition law and policy approach to effectively 
deal with potential problems. But is it necessary for this approach to be at the regional 
level? Is it not more ideal for AMSs to have an effective national competition law to 
promote competitiveness? 
Chapter 2 proved that having an effective competition policy is not a 
determinant factor of competitiveness. This does not mean that competition law and 
policy has no effect on competitiveness – the importance of competition law and policy 
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for competitiveness is indirect. Having effective competition law enforcement can 
improve a country’s competitiveness provided that this country is, at least, in the 
transition to the Efficiency-Driven stage of development. This thesis argues that if each 
AMS increases their competitiveness individually, ASEAN as a whole should become 
more competitive too. 
Countries that engage in international trade expect their trading partners to 
promote free and fair competition, especially developed countries whose interest groups 
are powerful want to make sure that their investments in host countries will not be 
compromised by anticompetitive practices. FTAs and RTAs are entered into to ensure 
market access.  
Chapter 3 examined the approach to competition law and policy at the 
international organisations level and at the bilateral and multilateral trade agreements 
level.  It confirmed that promoting unified international competition law in a hard law 
approach has failed, and that at the governmental level issues arising out of competition 
chapters in trade agreements are to be solved by means other than the dispute settlement 
mechanisms provided under these same trade agreements. This implies that 
anticompetitive practices will be solved by national competition law. However, the 
UNCTAD model law on international competition law has not had any success because 
a one-size-fits-all competition law does not work given the disparities in development 
and approach to international trade between countries. The preferable approach to 
harmonisation of competition law is through informal consultations, consensus, mutual 
recognition and sharing of best practices which is a soft law approach.  
The informal approach appears to suit the ASEAN way since ASEAN operates 
under such norms. ASEAN has adopted many instruments to promote competitiveness 
155 
 
in the AMSs. This thesis questions whether within the context of the ASEAN way, 
ASEAN’s instruments on competition law and policy have as a significant impact on the 
AMS’s competitiveness as anticipated. It also questions whether a supranational 
approach to ASEAN competition law and policy is necessary for ASEAN to realise a 
highly competitive AEC. Thus, this chapter aims to examine the ASEAN way, the EU 
supranational approach, and ASEAN’s instruments on promoting competition law and 
policy and their impact on the AMSs’ competitiveness.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section analyses the ASEAN 
way which is considered the fundamental norm of ASEAN and considers the sectoral 
approach to competition law and policy. Experience from electricity market in various 
countries will be studied. The second section explores the EU supranational approach, 
especially the functioning and powers of the European Court of Justice, the General 
Court, and the Commission, in order to assess the compatibility between the EU 
supranationality and the ASEAN way.  The third section analyses the AEC and the 
establishment of the ASEAN Experts Group on Competition (AEGC) further. It will 
scrutinise the approach to competition law and policy in the AEC Blueprints, the 
Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy, and other published works by the AEGC to 
identify to what extent these works have impacted on ASEAN becoming a highly 
competitive single market. Special attention is paid to the recommendation on Abuse of 
Dominance in the Regional Guidelines. The fourth section provides an analytical 
conclusion. 
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4.1 THE ASEAN WAY AND ASEAN CHARTER 
ASEAN is very unique in the way it operates. This section examines the ASEAN 
way which is embedded in the way the AMSs cooperate. To fully understand the 
ASEAN way would be facilitated by understanding the ASEAN Charter, because the 
ASEAN Charter is the most important formal and legally binding instrument that 
provides the rules to which the AMSs shall adhere and cooperate as one community – it 
modifies and codifies the ASEAN way. Hence, section 4.1 will examine both. 
4.1.1 What is the ASEAN way? 
There is no exact definition given to what it is. But it can be concluded that 
characteristics of the ASEAN way include ,inter alia, the use of extensive consultation,359 
relies primarily on the consensus and non-legally binding agreements,360 non-interference 
in the internal affairs of other AMSs,361 quiet diplomacy,362 and soft regionalism.363 The 
ASEAN way also relies heavily on personal connections of political elites364 and policy 
                                                 
359 Shaun Narine, ‘ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of  the “ASEAN Way”’ (1997) 37 Asian Survey 961, 
962; For discussion on origin of  the consultation and consensus See Kim Hyung Jong and Lee 
Poh Ping, ‘The Changing Role of  Dialogue in the International Relations of  Southeast Asia’ 
(2011) 51 Asian Survey 953 
360 Daniel Seah, ‘The ASEAN Charter’ (2009) 58 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 197, 199 
361 Tom Ginsburg, ‘The State of  Sovereignty in Southeast Asia’ (2005) 99 American Society of  
International Law 419, 420; For discussion on the change in the ASEAN way approach, See Hiro 
Katsumata, ‘Reconstruction of  Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict 
Adherence to the “ASEAN Way”’ (2003) 25 Contemporary Southeast Asia 104; Hiro Katsumata, 
‘Why is ASEAN Diplomacy Changing? From “Non-Interference” to “Open and Frank 
Discussions” (2004) 44 Asian Survey 237 
362 Katsumata, ‘Reconstruction of  Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to 
the “ASEAN Way”’ (n 361) 
363 Amitav Acharya, ‘Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: From the ‘ASEAN Way’ to the ‘Asia-Pacific 
Way’?’ (1997) 10 The Pacific Review 319; For further discussion on the ASEAN way, See Taku 
Tamaki, ‘Making Sense of  ‘ASEAN Way’: A Constructivist Approach’ (Drafted, the Annual 
Conference of  the International Political Science Association, Japan, 9-13 July 2006) 
<http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_5293.pdf> accessed 20 May 2016 
364 One of  the examples of  personal connection between ASEAN leaders is the joint communiqué 
between the Thai and Cambodian governments signed on 18 June 2008 regarding the dispute 
over the Preah Vihear Temple. This instrument was signed when Pheu Thai Party was the 
government. This party was the third incarnation of  Thai Rak Thai Party founded by the 
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makers to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements.365 The ASEAN way has been used 
primarily to manage boundary relations among the AMSs.366 The operation of ASEAN, 
in fact, upholds and reinforces sovereignty of the AMSs rather than reducing this.367 
ASEAN employs the ASEAN way particularly when there is a regional security issue. 
And it is generally agreed that the ASEAN way has served well in maintaining peace in 
ASEAN. 
ASEAN emphasises the sovereign equality of Member States regardless of the 
size or population. The ASEAN Charter provides that the AMSs have equal rights and 
obligations under the Charter.368 According to Severino, former Secretary General of 
ASEAN, ASEAN is reluctant to invest in anything that may resemble supranational 
authority or to get involved in bilateral disputes.369 State sovereignty has always been the 
cornerstone and behavioural norm of ASEAN.370  
The ASEAN way has been heavily criticised for its suitability to the present 
economic integration. In terms of economic development and economic integration, the 
ASEAN way provides a weak framework for any agreement to be made because national 
interest and ASEAN interest often conflict; a consensus-based decision-making process 
                                                                                                                                           
convicted Thaksin Shinnawatra, former Thai PM who took the role of  Economic Adviser of  the 
Cambodian government in 2009 despite the ongoing clashes over the Preah Vihear Temple 
between the two countries during that time. This is only one of  the examples of  his close link to 
Hun Sen, Cambodian PM. 
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is extremely time-consuming.371 Some commentators stated that it needs to be re-
examined. Its informal approaches that worked fairly well in the past years may not be 
adequate for handling the complexities and challenges that lie ahead. ASEAN’s present 
structure is too inadequate to deal with new issues. 372 
There is a suggestion that in order to realise the AEC, ASEAN should consider 
setting up two supranational bodies: an ASEAN Court, to be responsible for dispute 
settlement, modelled after the European Court of Justice and an ASEAN Economic 
Secretariat responsible for economic affairs relating to ASEAN economic integration.373 
This thesis argues that although this idea seems ideal, it is highly unrealistic and is not 
suitable for ASEAN. As ASEAN took 40 years to finalise its legal personality as an 
intergovernmental organisation, it is unlikely that the ASEAN leaders would agree easily 
with the establishment of any supranational body within the region.374 
Besides, one should not disregard the history of the AMSs which were colonised 
and suppressed by major powers before and after WWII.  This has resulted in Southeast 
Asian people strongly embracing nationalism. It is unlikely that they will agree to their 
governments surrendering any part of their judicial sovereignty to a supranational body. 
Although Thailand has never been colonised, it experienced the extraterritoriality of the 
                                                 
371 Narongchai Akrasanee and Jutamas Arunanondchai, ‘Institutional Reforms to Achieve ASEAN 
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British court in Thailand during 1855 – 1937375 (and extraterritoriality of the courts of 
many other nations). It was a shameful experience for a small country to be forced into 
this. The judiciary in Thailand assumes office after taking the oath before the King376 and 
exercise their power and duties in the name of the King.377 They take pride in their office 
and duties. One can surmise that this is a highly sensitive subject and should be 
approached carefully.  
This unique character of ASEAN makes it even more challenging to find an 
appropriate approach to help ASEAN in becoming a highly competitive region. At the 
same time, it explains why ASEAN decided not to create a supranational body to 
oversee the implementation of regional competition law and policy. 
However, since the late 1990s there is evidence that ASEAN changed the way it 
operates from behind closed door discussions to open discussions among AMSs in order 
to deal more effectively with new or challenging issues such as economics, terrorism, 
drugs, transnational crimes, and the environment.378 The reasons for this change are that 
in the late 1990s ASEAN faced two unprecedented challenges: the Asian financial crisis 
which began in Thailand and haze pollution from Indonesia which affected Singapore, 
Malaysia, Brunei, and the southern part of Philippines. The growing influence of human 
rights and democratic values triggered the AMSs’ concerns over their credentials, 
standings, and reputation in the international arena.379  
                                                 
375 Turan Kayaoglu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China 
(Cambridge University Press 2010) Table I; Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  the Kingdom of  
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4.1.2 ASEAN Charter: A possible new interpretation of the 
ASEAN way 
The previous section shows that although the ASEAN way is embedded in 
ASEAN’s operations and cooperation in security matters, this is changing in economic 
cooperation. This section aims to prove that the change has already begun and legally 
binds the AMSs. Hence, it is possible for ASEAN to use the tools it already has to realise 
a highly competitive region instead of creating a supranational body to achieve this. That 
tool is in the ASEAN Charter.380 
The ASEAN Charter is a legally binding treaty signed by the AMSs in 2007. It 
gives ASEAN legal personality as an intergovernmental organisation.381 Although it is 
criticised as a disappointment by outside critics382, it is considered by those that drafted it 
a “Bible” for ASEAN383 and ‘mother of all documents’, a source of reference and it 
prevails over all other ASEAN instruments.384 The ASEAN Charter is the legal and 
institutional framework for ASEAN.385 It is considered a move towards a rule-based 
region to compliment the consensus and consultation of the ASEAN way. 
The ASEAN Charter codifies the ASEAN way and provides the principles under 
which the AMSs will operate and cooperate in Article 2. The principles relevant to 
economic cooperation are: 
                                                 
380 For history and discussions on ASEAN Charter See Tommy Koh, Rosario G. Manalo and Walter Woon 
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‘(g) enhanced consultations on matters seriously affecting the common interest 
of ASEAN; 
(h) adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy 
and constitutional government; and . . . 
(n) adherence to multilateral trade rules and ASEAN’s rules-based regimes for 
effective implementation of economic commitments and progressive reduction towards 
elimination of all barriers to regional economic integration, in a market-driven economy.’ 
Other than the abovementioned principles, ASEAN continues to uphold and 
value consensus and consultation as the basic principles for decision making.386 This 
means the AMSs come to agreement through consensus and consultation even in 
matters seriously affecting ASEAN’s common interest. When disputes arise, the AMSs 
will resolve these peacefully and in a timely manner through dialogue, consultation, and 
negotiation.387  
In case of disputes relating to specific ASEAN instruments, Article 24 of the 
ASEAN Charter provides that these disputes shall be settled by the stipulated dispute 
settlement mechanisms in the instruments themselves.388 This means that ASEAN 
economic instruments will be solved mainly by the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Vientiane Protocol), which is the most significant of the 
ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms389 because it covers all ASEAN economic 
agreements.390  
                                                 
386 ibid art 20  
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390 Vientiane Protocol art 1(1) and Appendix I   
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4.1.3 ASEAN Sectoral Competition Policy – Aviation Market 
Examples of ASEAN trade agreements which fall under Article 24 of the 
ASEAN Charter are the ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Air Services391 (ASEAN Air 
Services), the ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalisation of Air Freight 
Services392 (ASEAN Air Freight Services), and the ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on 
the Full Liberation of Passenger Air Services (ASEAN Passenger Air Services)393 
(together referred to as the Aviation Agreements). These Aviation Agreements guarantee 
the rights of designated airlines to have a fair and equal opportunity to compete in 
ASEAN. They grant the AMSs access to the aviation market within ASEAN. As a result 
of market access, they require the AMSs to take action to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination and/or anticompetitive practices of the states and/or of the designated 
airlines which are deemed to adversely affect the competitive position of a designated 
airline of any other AMSs. 394  
A) Competition Provisions in the Aviation Agreements 
The Aviation Agreements also provide that airline practices that may be regarded 
as possibly anticompetitive should be closely examined. Examples of such practices 
would be charging fares and rates on routes at levels which are, in total, insufficient to 
cover the costs of providing services (predatory pricing), practices which reflect an 
apparent intent or have the probable effect, of crippling, excluding or driving another 
                                                 
391 Entered into force on 23 November 2009 
392 Entered into force on 23 November 2009 
393 Entered into force on 30 June 2011 
394 ASEAN Passenger Air Services art 12; ASEAN Air Services art 12; ASEAN Air Freight Services art 13  
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airline from the market (exclusionary conducts), and behaviour indicating an abuse of 
dominant position on the route.395  
The Aviation Agreements also provide that other practices can constitute unfair 
competitive behaviour if they are in accordance with the examples listed above. Undue 
state aids and subsidy may be addressed by another AMS requesting consultation 
pursuant to the provision of consultations and amendment.396 And if the AMSs cannot 
reach a solution through consultations, any AMS may invoke the dispute resolution 
mechanism under the Vientiane Protocol.397 These Agreements do not prevent the AMS 
government from granting state aids and/or subsidy as long as it is transparent and does 
not distort competition among the designated airlines. The AMS that is concerned about 
such grants may request complete information on the grant and on a revision to or 
extension of such grant from the AMS who grants it, provided that such information 
shall be treated with the utmost sensitivity and confidentiality.398 
This clearly shows that the AMSs can and will commit to competition rules 
which are more detailed than those under the all-sector approach, and are ready to 
exchange sensitive and confidential information when appropriate and necessary. It 
clearly shows that the AMSs have moved towards a more rule-based approach in 
competition law and policy. Although consultation is still available as a possible means of 
dispute settlement under these Agreements, the Vientiane Protocol is a formal and 
comprehensive mechanism which will play a major role in solving disputes among the 
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AMSs regarding air services. The core of the Vientiane Protocol is the ‘provision for the 
establishment of a panel to look into and objectively assess the dispute, make findings 
and recommend how it would best be resolved.’399  
B) A Soft Law Approach to Dispute Settlement in the Aviation 
Agreements 
The Vientiane Protocol reflects the ASEAN way very well. It keeps sovereign 
equality among the AMSs. It reinforces consultations and consensus and mutual trust 
between the parties to the disputes without using a supranational body. However, it is 
not within the scope of this thesis to discuss in depth the exact procedures of the 
Vientiane Protocol.  
On the other hand, the lengthy procedures in competition cases under the 
Fortaleza Protocol cannot guarantee the effectiveness of competition law enforcement in 
MERCOSUR. This thesis does not claim that the MERCOSUR’s approach does not 
work. In fact, it submits that economic integration differs and is unique. Hence, what 
works for MERCOSUR or the EU, does not necessarily work for ASEAN and vice versa. 
There is no guarantee that the Vientiane Protocol will work perfectly for ASEAN either 
because it has not yet been invoked under the Aviation Agreements. But at least, it 
provides evidence of the AMSs’ commitment to integrate and cooperate in competition 
matters in a manner that corresponds to the ASEAN way. 
These Aviation Agreements prove that ASEAN does commit to its Principles of 
adherence to multilateral trade rules and ASEAN’s rules-based regimes to effectively 
implement economic commitments. The aviation industry and the people of ASEAN 
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benefit from this open skies policy. What people in ASEAN experience is that there are 
many more airlines carrying out passenger air services and that there are more choices in 
low-cost airlines when travelling between AMSs.  
ASEAN started the single market through a sectoral approach. Rules on 
competition for the aviation industry in ASEAN are clearly stated and contain specific 
language which differs from the usual competition law language, for example, unfair 
competitive behaviour (it is usually ‘anticompetitive behaviours’). The dispute settlement 
mechanism is straightforward and unified because all economic agreements are subject 
to the Vientiane Protocol.  
C) Current Progress of ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASAM)  
As stated above, there are three aviation agreements among the AMSs. Each 
agreement provides different freedom of the air.400 Countries normally grant the First 
and Second Freedom, but the rest of the nine Freedoms will be granted upon 
negotiation. However, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) only 
recognise the first five.401 
The ASEAN Air Services has been ratified by all AMSs and entered into force 
on 23 November 2009. There are six Protocols under this Agreement. Protocol 1 and 2 
allow unlimited third, fourth, and fifth Freedom for designated airlines of the AMSs to 
                                                 
400 “The Freedom of  the Air are a set of  commercial aviation rights granting a country’s airline the 
privilege to enter and land in another country’s airspace, formulated as a result of  disagreements 
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operate air passenger services within the ASEAN Sub-Region.402 However, these 
Freedom are limited to and from designated points fixed in the Protocols only.403 
Protocol 3 and 4 allow unlimited third, fourth, and fifth Freedom for airlines of the 
AMSs to operate passenger services between ASEAN Sub-Regions.404 Protocol 5 and 6 
allow an unlimited third, Fourth, and Fifth Freedom for designated airlines of the AMSs 
to provide passenger services between ASEAN capital cities.405  
ASEAN Air Freight Services has been ratified by all AMSs and entered into 
force on 23 November 2011. There are two Protocols under this Agreement. Protocol 1 
provides unlimited Third, Fourth, and Fifth Freedom to designated AMSs airlines to 
provide international air freight services to and from designated points which are listed 
in Article 4. Protocol 2 provides unlimited Third, Fourth, and Fifth to designated airlines 
of the AMSs to provide international air freight services to and from all points with 
international airports in ASEAN. 
ASEAN Passenger Air Services has been ratified by all AMSs and entered into 
force on 30 June 2011. Protocol 1 allows unlimited Third and Fourth Freedom to 
designated airlines of the AMSs to operate the agreed services to and from any ASEAN 
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cities with international airports.406 Protocol 2 allows the unlimited fifth Freedom to the 
designated AMSs’ airlines to operate the agreed services to and from any ASEAN cities 
with international airports.407  
D) Why Aviation? 
Why should ASEAN focus at the air transportation first? Because ASEAN is 
negotiating a collaboration with other dialogue partners on air transportation such as 
China, Japan, South Korea, the US, and the EU.408 If ASEAN’s aviation sector is 
competitive, it will be in a better position to compete with international carriers from 
these countries once the market access has been granted. Besides, tourism is one of the 
key industries in ASEAN. ASEAN is the destination of millions of tourists per year. The 
statistic shows that in 2013 alone, there were 9,8001,000 visitors came to ASEAN. And 
almost half of them are from within ASEAN.409 The more competitive ASEAN’s 
aviation market becomes the more visitors, which leads to better connectivity among 
AMSs and great potential for the tourism industry. With Indonesia’s ratification of the 
Aviation Agreements, this ASAM should foster a gradual convergence in policy and 
market liberalisation.410 
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Transportation is one of the key strategic measures in the AEC Blueprint 2025 to 
help AEC realise its goal to enhance connectivity and sectoral cooperation.411 Thus, it is 
strategically sound to start improving competitiveness in these sectors first. This thesis 
argues that ASEAN does not have enough resources to support and enable the AEGC 
to provide all-sectoral supervision and hinder anticompetitive conducts. It is very 
doubtful whether the AEGC would have enough experts who can assist the AEGC in 
such highly demanding tasks. 
An all-sector approach to competition law and policy has shown a slow progress. 
This is not to say that the progress ASEAN has made in competition law and policy is a 
waste of time. In fact, it is a remarkable success that finally, all AMSs use their best effort 
to introduce comprehensive competition law in their countries. But it could have been 
better and quicker if ASEAN chose a sectoral approach. The capacity building still has a 
long way to go. It took ASEAN more than 10 years to realise the goal of introducing 
national competition law, how long AMSs take to create competent NCAs to curb 
anticompetitive behaviours in their countries and in the region? Can ASEAN wait that 
long? This is the reason why this thesis proposes that ASEAN takes sectoral approach. 
As Porter suggests that it is better for a country to focus on one industry at a time to 
increase its competitiveness. ASEAN should also focus on what it has already started – 
ASAM. 
E) Evidence of Effectiveness of ASAM Policy 
For the purpose of this thesis, an effective sectoral approach to competition law 
and policy is measured by the increase in activities and new entrants because it is 
presumably competitive. Because this thesis argues that in order to become a highly 
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competitive region, ASEAN does need an effective competition law and policy alongside 
with economic development. However, a regional approach to competition law which is 
suitable to ASEAN way is a soft law approach.  
The first aviation Agreement among AMSs came into force since 2009. Before 
that period number of air passengers travelling from ASEAN was approximately 100 
million. However, it is evident that the volume of people travelling by airplanes has triple 
in 2015 from 2009 (Table 1 in Annex 4). Table 2 of Annex 4 also shows the correlation 
between numbers of passengers carried with the number of carrier departure from AMSs 
as the number of registered carrier departure from the ASEAN triple. All data used in 
Table 1 and Table 2 was extracted from the World Bank database.412  
A statistic from ASEAN confirms that the ASAM has a positive impact on 
ASEAN aviation market as aircraft traffic on international routes has significantly 
increased (Table 3 in Annex 4). Although the roadmap of ASAM indicates that AMSs 
intend to apply an all-sector approach to competition law and policy in ASEAN aviation 
market,413 this thesis argues that it will delay effective enforcement of competition law in 
this area and the chance of AEC to become a highly competitive region. 
F) Experience of Sector Specific Regulatory from Other Countries 
Wisuttisak has conducted research on sectoral regulation on electricity of the US, 
the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea.414 He found that these 
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countries have specific regulators to ensure undistorted competition in the relevant 
electricity sectors. Their specific regulators also collaborate with competition authorities 
in their countries to optimise the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. 
According to Wisuttisak, In the US, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) oversees the wholesale of electricity pricing and regulates interstate transmission 
of natural gas, oil, and electricity. FERC collaborate with Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the two prominent federal antitrust 
enforcement authorities. The FTC advises the FERC on various issues such as merger 
regulation and regulatory reform.415  
However, the FERC does not have authority in Texas. Texas has its own 
independent system operator, the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCT). The 
ERCT is regulated by the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) and the Texas 
Legislature.416 Texas is considered one of the most competitive electric markets in the 
world.417 New entrants were encouraged to enter the market. The number of active retail 
electric providers (REPs) had increased from 10 to 52 in 2013 and number of products 
had increased from 11 to 322. It has 110 REPs alongside with other providers. PUCT 
plays a key role in promoting competition in the market and educate consumers to 
empower them to act in the market.418   
In the UK, Wisuttisak found that Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets 
(OFGEM) regulate both wholesale and retail electricity market. Its tasks involve 
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ensuring market competition and consumer welfare are pursued.419 OFGEM will 
coordinate with Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) which oversee market 
competition in the UK. The two authorities have concurrent power and work together 
under the framework of competition law.420 
In Australia, Wisuttisak found that the Australia approach to regulation of energy 
market is similar to that of the UK. In Australia, the Australian Energy Market 
Commission (AEMC) which has authority to making rules on National Electricity 
Market.421 The AEMC collaborate with the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) and the Australia Energy Regulator (AER). The AER is 
responsible for monitoring wholesale and retail energy market.422 It has independent 
board and shares staff, resources, and facilities with the ACCC.423 Theses authorities 
have made a memorandum to coordinate by inter alia keeping each other informed, 
sharing information, and not disclosing confidential information received from each 
other, consulting and cooperating.424  
In the case of New Zealand, Wisuttiak found that the country applied overall 
competition policy on its electricity market through the work of the Commerce 
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Commission which was not very effective because it was not rigorously enforced.425 The 
government later established the Electricity Authority in 2010 (formerly known as 
Electricity Commission) to oversee wholesale and retail electricity market.426 The two 
authorities coordinate through a series of memoranda of understanding they signed.427 
In Japan, Wisuttisak found that Japan has a progressive approach to liberalisation 
of its electricity market. The Electricity Utilities Industry Law was amended many times. 
In 2003 as part of liberalisation, Ministry of the Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
had to support the establishment of the Electricity Power Council of Japan (ESCJ),428 
which is a private organisation which provide neutral advice as to rules and regulation of 
the fair and transparent use of electric power.429 According to Wisuttisak, ‘the Japan Fair 
Trade Commission (JFTC) plays an indirect role in stimulating market competition’430 
Wisuttisak found that in South Korea the Korean Electricity Commission 
(KOREC) regulate both wholesale and retail electricity market and ensures fair 
competition. According to him, KOREC has played a very active role in the market. The 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) is not applicable to regulated sector. 
Therefore, KOREC and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MCIE) 
assume the key role in this sector. However, the MRFTA is applicable to unregulated 
activities of Korea Electric Power Corporation’s (KEPCO). In this regard, the Korea 
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Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) is in charge of such supervision. KFTC collaborate with 
MCIE and KOREC in matters of adoption of regulations which may create an 
anticompetitive effect.431 
It is clear from Wisuttisak’s research that sectoral approach to curbing 
anticompetitive conducts has been practised in many countries. Specific regulators and 
competition authorities collaborate together to enhance competitiveness in the market. 
Their role complements each other.  
The difference between these countries’ experience and ASEAN is the AEGC is 
not the competition authority of ASEAN. The role of the AEGC is only as a platform 
for the exchange of best practices among AMSs which is dealt below. Its expertise in any 
given market is doubtful. This sectoral approach to competition law and policy is 
suitable to AMSs as it allows the AMSs to agree on a specific industry with which they 
are confident and more comfortable to engage on in a rule-based fashion. The choice of 
dispute settlement mechanisms in the Vientiane Protocol provides consistency and 
predictability. Although no disputes on competition laws in the aviation industry among 
the AMSs have occurred so far, this shows a strong commitment by the AMSs to be 
bound by these rules. Besides, the sectoral approach allows ASEAN to improve its 
competitiveness in accordance with Porter’s recommendations. 
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4.2 THE EU APPROACH TO COMPETITION LAW 
AND POLICY 
This section focuses on the centralised and decentralised powers of the 
Commission to enforce the EU competition law. It aims to support the thesis that the 
EU approach to competition law and policy is not suitable to the ASEAN way.  
Since the very beginning of the integration of the European countries after the 
WWII, ensuring that the market is not distorted was incorporated in the Treaties 
between the European countries.432 Members of the Union were aware of the regional 
competition rules imposed upon them. Upon accession, new members are also bound by 
the EU competition law.  
Majone considered the importance attached to rules on market competition as 
strictly utilitarian i.e. ‘it would be impossible to integrate a group of heavily regulated 
economies without limitations on the interventionism of the national governments.’ He 
asserted that the European leaders did not agree to commit on regional competition law 
because they embraced the genuine free-market philosophy.433 This is true, because the 
EU pursues a social market economy.434 It is a type of market that combines market 
freedom with social balance and is at contrast with a laissez-faire market economy. It 
requires ‘a clear legal and political regulatory framework to ensure that competition is 
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durably maintained’.435 This ideology corresponds to the legal platforms chosen in the 
establishment of the EU – centralised, law-based institutions. 
The European model of regional integration is ‘integration through law’ as 
Majone put. The law is a substitute for democratic politics. The use of legal means is to 
compensate the lack of mutual trust among a growing number of member states.436 
According to Mojone, ‘Miles Kahler argued that economic integration need not lead to 
centralized, law-based institutions that tend to expand the scope of their 
competencies’.437 Besides, the EU model has been heavily criticised as ‘excessive policy 
harmonization’.438 It is argued that at the establishment of the European integration, the 
founding fathers were too concerned with overcoming the nationalism that had led 
Europe to the World Wars by focusing solely on the transferring of sovereign national 
state powers to the supranational body and lost sight on exploring other alternatives for 
inter-states relations.439  
This is opposite to ASEAN. Regional competition law was not discussed at the 
establishment of ASEAN in 1967. ASEAN does not have regional competition law and 
policy. AMSs enacted their own competition laws and apply their own competition 
policy as they see appropriate. Moreover, ASEAN operates on mutual trust. There is no 
legal sanction on an AMS which does not or cannot fulfil its obligations. AMSs opt for 
consultation and consensus and dispute settlement mechanisms such as those prescribed 
in the Vientiane Protocol. The ASEAN way maybe regarded as slow when measured 
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with the EU standard, but at least none of the AMS expresses the intention to leave the 
community yet.  
It is evident that the excessive policy harmonisation cannot guarantee the 
stability of the EU. Brexit is the good example which speaks for itself. This undoubtedly 
raises the question whether such level of harmonisation is suitable and necessary for 
ASEAN. Is such a supranational organisation necessary for economic integration such as 
the AEC? Rodrik suggested that globalisation, states, and democracy cannot coexist, and 
that when they clash, it is global economy that has to give way. He further asserted that 
‘[a] thin layer of international rules that leaves substantial room for manoeuvre by 
national governments is a better globalization.’440 He insisted that we need ‘smart 
globalization, not maximum globalization.’441 
In the EU, the Union has exclusive competence in, inter alia, establishing the 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market.442 The 
Commission is entrusted with the power to propose legislative acts,443 It was conferred 
the sole power to enforce EU competition law, especially to grant exemption to 
anticompetitive agreements pursuant to Article 101(3),444 jurisdiction over large mergers 
in 1990,445 and ‘is responsible for fact-finding, and taking action against anticompetitive 
practices which affect the common market and imposing fine and penalties, adopting 
block exemption regulations, conducting sectoral inquiries, investigating mergers and 
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state aids’.446 Such decisions by the Commission are subject to review by the EU 
Courts.447 
However, Reg 1/2003 decentralised that power to grant exemption under Article 
101(3) to the national competition authorities and the national courts448 and created the 
European Competition Network (ECN). The Commission’s infringement decisions are 
subject to review by the EU Courts.449  
Within the Commission, the DGCOM is responsible for making competition 
policy450 and manages the day-to-day operations of the Commission. There are two 
Hearing Officers who work independently from the DGCOM and who report directly 
to the Commissioner for administrative purposes. Their tasks are to safeguard the due 
process and parties’ procedural rights, conduct oral hearings, and to act as an 
independent arbiter in antitrust and merger disputes between the parties and DGCOM 
regarding the exercise of procedural rights.451 It was reported that the DGCOM had 947 
permanent staff in 2010.452 
The fact that the Commission has the power to propose laws, to investigate 
suspicious anticompetitive practices, to issue statements of objection, to accept 
commitments proposed by undertakings, and to impose fines against undertakings 
appears to combine the inclusive power of the enforcement of EU competition law in 
one organisation.  
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The EU Courts include the Court of Justice (ECJ), the General Court (EGC), 
and the Civil Service Tribunal. Their powers are stated in Article 19 of the TEU. There 
are two major doctrines established by the ECJ which enable the Commission to 
effectively enforce and implement the EU competition law:  the doctrine of direct 
effect453 and the doctrine of supremacy.454 The ECJ has one judge from each Member 
State and 11 Advocate Generals (AG)455. The EGC has one judge from each Member 
State, but there is no position of AG separated from the judges. Hence, a judge in the 
EGC must be designated to perform the function of AG in a plenary session.456 One 
Advocate General will be assigned to a case and has the power to question both parties 
in a public hearing. If the ECJ decides that an Opinion of the AG is necessary, the AG 
will provide his opinion of the case which may or may not be followed by the judges 
who will render judgement after this.457  
It is very clear that the EU approach to competition law and policy is a hard law 
approach. The language of the competition provisions in the TFEU is precise; the legal 
obligation and commitment which is required of the member states are enforceable, and 
the issues of anticompetitive behaviours are solved and interpreted by internal dispute 
resolution system. What makes the EU hard law approach successful (in terms of 
enforceability and applicability of member states), but the WTO one fails? 
The European Competition Network (ECN) and the Commission form a 
network of competition authorities. The ECN is a forum for discussion and cooperation 
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in the application and enforcement of EU competition law.458 The ECN ‘does not have 
any autonomous powers or competences. It is not an institution, and it does not have 
any legal personality.’459 The establishment of the ECN is necessary because of the 
decentralisation of powers away from the Commission to enforce competition law. So 
that NCAs can enforce Article 101 and 102 more fully, a forum of discussion to ensure 
that all NCAs are on the same page must be created. The ECN does not need any power 
to enforce the law, as that power rests with the NCAs and the Commission. 
Considering the DGCOM comprises of nearly 1,000 staff members, the size of 
this organisation is enormous. ASEAN has a higher total population than the EU. That 
implies a bigger organisation would be needed to be able to oversee the enforcement of 
competition law and policy at the regional level effectively should a supranational 
approach be chosen.  
In 2009, the ASEAN Secretariat was reported to function on a small annual 
operational budget of US$ 9.05 million, while the EU and its Commission have nearly 
US$ 190 billion.460 In 2015, it was reported that the ASEAN Secretariat’s budget was 
US$ 19 million.461 It is unlikely that contributions from the AMSs would be increased to 
afford a new supranational body, because AMSs equally contribute to the operational 
annual budget of the Secretariat.462  
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According to Rodrik, Cameron’s study of 18 advanced economies found that the 
governments have grown the largest in the economies that were the most exposed to 
international markets. Rodrik also found a strong positive correlation between a nation’s 
exposure to international trade and the size of its government due to social insurance 
motives. Once the markets expand and are more exposed to competition internationally, 
people demand compensation against that risk. The government must ‘establish peace 
and security, protect property rights, enforce contracts, manage the macroeconomy, . . . 
preserves the legitimacy of markets by protecting people from the risk and insecurities 
markets bring with them.’463 Hence, the government needs to expand to be able to deal 
with these responsibilities efficiently. Additionally, the political transaction costs of 
setting up, maintaining and changing a system’s formal and informal political 
organisation, costs of running a polity464 should be taken into account when considering 
setting up a supranational body to oversee the market of the AEC.  
The above paragraph strongly supports the pragmatic point of view of the 
unsuitability of a supranational body for the ASEAN way. If a country which is exposed 
to international trade needs its government to expand to effectively deal with the 
challenges it will face, a region as big as ASEAN which exposes itself to the globalisation 
and international market must have even larger government-like body, provided that 
ASEAN pursues a supranational approach to its functioning. 
The aim of the economic integration is to reduce the transaction costs between 
members of the trading bloc to facilitate and promote trade between them, not to raise 
the costs of transactions. Trade barriers are abolished; labour, goods, and capitals can 
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move freely in the intra-regional trade area. This is the point of the economic integration. 
AMSs desire to increase trade among them and to increase competitiveness of their 
markets and undertakings. The AEC is not for political stability, but to enhance 
prosperity. Setting up a supranational body will increase transaction costs among the 
AMSs which contradicts the reasons for this integration. 
 
 
4.3 ASEAN’S APPROACH TO REGIONAL 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 
For ASEAN as a regional block the formation of other territorial economic 
organisations such as NAFTA and the EU was perceived as an economic threat.465 The 
emerging economies of India and China and the loss of incoming FDI in these countries 
made ASEAN leaders reconsider ASEAN’s position in the world trade. Once again 
ASEAN was driven by the fear of being left behind in the world economy.   
At the fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore on 28th January, 1992, the heads of 
the six ASEAN Member States signed three documents: the Singapore Declaration of 
1992, the Framework Agreement for Enhancing the ASEAN Economic Cooperation 
(Framework Agreement), and the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (CEPT Agreement). The AMSs 
agreed to fully establish the AFTA within 15 years (by 2008) and agreed that the main 
mechanism for enhancing trade amongst the member states was the CEPT. 
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It took ASEAN five years to realise the importance of regional integration and 
competitiveness. In its Leaders Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1997, the leaders finally 
committed themselves and declared in ASEAN Vision 2020 that they would work 
towards closer economic integration and narrowing the gap of development levels 
among member states. Among many other promises, they expressed the desire to create 
a highly competitive ASEAN economic region. 
In the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II in Bali, on 7 October 2003, the leaders 
of ASEAN declared their intention to create an ASEAN Community by 2020 which is 
comprised of three pillars namely ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.  
The leaders agreed to accelerate the establishment of the AEC by signing the 
Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community 
by 2015 on 13 January 2007. It is believed that the rising economic power of countries 
such as India and China was the reason why ASEAN accelerated the process to establish 
a single market and production base.466  
They also signed the Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community 
Blueprint in Singapore, on 20 November 2007, to adopt the AEC Blueprint (AEC 
Blueprint 2015).  
The AEC Blueprint 2015 describes the characteristics and elements of the AEC 
as a single market and production base and as a highly competitive region.467 In order to 
become a highly competitive economic region, it put forward six areas to be developed 
by the ASEAN Member States (AMSs). They are: 1. Competition policy, 2. Consumer 
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protection, 3. Intellectual Property Rights, 4. Infrastructure development, 5. Taxation, 
and 6. E-Commerce.  
Regarding competition policy, the AEC Blueprint 2015 laid down only four 
strategies to be undertaken by the AMSs by the end of 2015 which are:  
1. Introducing competition law in all ASEAN Member States (AMSs) by 2015. At 
the time of writing (April 2016), all AMSs except Cambodia have enacted 
national competition laws. However, the competition laws of Myanmar and 
Laos are not yet in force.  
2. Establishing a network of authorities or agencies responsible for competition 
policy to serve as a forum for discussing and coordinating competition policies. 
The ASEAN Experts Group on Competition (AEGC) was created in 2007 to 
undertake this role. 
3. Encouraging capacity building programmes/activities for AMSs in developing 
national competition policy. The AEGC is in charge of this task. 
4. Developing a regional guideline on competition policy by 2010, based on 
country experience and international best practices with the view to create a fair 
competition environment.468 The AEGC has published the Regional Guidelines 
on Competition Policy (Regional Guidelines) and Handbook on Competition 
Policy and Law in ASEAN for Business in 2010 (Business Handbook). In 2012, 
it published Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies in Competition 
Policy and Law for ASEAN (RCC Guidelines). 
As can be seen, the strategies for ASEAN competition policy from 2007 – 2015 
were limited. Most of the works have been done in time except introducing competition 
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law in all AMSs. The ambitious goal of becoming a highly competitive single market and 
production base in 2015 was, indeed, ambitious. It is evident that on 31 December 2015, 
ASEAN has only begun its route to become a highly competitive region, and has not yet 
reached the finishing line. The impact of the AEC Blueprint 2015 on the AMSs’ 
competitiveness is marginal. The AMSs’ overall competitiveness, the effectiveness of 
antimonopoly policy, and the goods market efficiency in 2008 – 2016 have not 
significantly improved compared to the period before the adoption of the AEC 
Blueprint 2015. (See Tables 10 – 17 in Annex 1 of chapter 2 for details). ASEAN has 
opted for a soft law approach in competition law and policy of the region, which is more 
suitable to ASEAN due to the ASEAN way. 
4.3.1 THE AEGC 
A network of agencies under the AEC Blueprint 2015469 was established in 
August 2007 by the ASEAN Economic Ministers called the ASEAN Experts Group on 
Competition (AEGC) to serve as a forum for discussion and cooperation among 
ASEAN member states and as an official ASEAN body to exchange policy experiences 
and institutional norms on competition law and policy. Its goal is to promote a healthy 
competitive environment in ASEAN470 and to a foster culture of fair competition.471  
The AECG has published a number of publications on advocacy of competition 
law to the AMSs and their stakeholders. It is not an authority. The AEGC has no 
authoritative power to implement, enforce, apply, interpret, or impose any fine on any 
firm engaged in anticompetitive acts against ASEAN. The AEGC has no jurisdiction and 
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supranational status over AMSs as the DGCOM has over the EU member states. Some 
may compare AEGC with the ECN, but they were established for different purposes. 
The AEGC is comprised of the heads of national competition authorities from 
member states. Each AMS will chair the AEGC by rotation.472 There is no physical 
office or secretariat of AEGC. The AEGC is divided into 5 working groups. Most of the 
works and goals set for the AEGC have been completed. It has yet to develop and 
finalise the AEGC Capacity Building Roadmap.473 The latest work under the AEGC, 
which was led by the Competition Commission of Singapore, is the Toolkit for 
Competition Policy, Law and Advocacy in ASEAN.474 
The AEGC has developed a strategic plan for 2016 – 2025 called the ASEAN 
Competition Action Plan (ACAP) which is identical to the strategic measures for 
competition policy provided in the AEC Blueprint 2025.475 The AEGC also works with 
partners such as Australia-New Zealand through the “Competition Law Implementation 
Program” under the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA476 and Germany in the 
“Competition Policy and Law in ASEAN” project.477  
                                                 
472 As of  6 April 2016, Laos chairs the AEGC 
473 AEGC, ‘About ASEAN Experts Group on Competition (AEGC)’ (n 468) 
474 ASEAN Competition Policy and Law, ‘First Meeting of  ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand Heads of  
Competition Agencies on Competition Cooperation’ (27 April 2016) <http://www.asean-
competition.org/read-news-first-meeting-of-asean-australia-and-new-zealand-heads-of-
competition-agencies-on-competition-cooperation> accessed 19 May 2016 
475 ASEAN Competition Policy and Law, ‘ASEAN Experts Group on Competition’ <http://www.asean-
competition.org/aegc> accessed 17 May 2016 
476 It was reported that two experts from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission visited 
Thailand and shared with the Office of  Trade Competition Commission some experiences and 
practices in competition law from 15 – 18 March 2016. See ASEAN Competition Policy and Law, 
‘Assistance to Thailand under the Competition Law Implementation Program (CLIP) ACCC 
Expert visit to Thailand (15-18 March 2016)’ News Thailand, 21 March 2016 <http://www.asean-
competition.org/read-news-assistance-to-thailand-under-the-competition-law-implementation-
program-clip-accc-expert-visit-to-thailand-15-18-march-2016> accessed 19 May 2016 
477 GIZ, ‘Competition Policy and Law in ASEAN’ <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/14574.html> 
accessed 17 May 2016; ASEAN Competition Policy and Law, ‘Development Partners’  
<http://www.asean-competition.org/development-partners> accessed 17 May 2016 
186 
 
4.3.2 The AEGC’s Works on ASEAN Competition Law 
and Policy 
A) The AEC Blueprint 2025 
In November 2015, ASEAN leaders adopted the new AEC Blueprint 2025 
which envisions ‘a competitive, innovative, and dynamic ASEAN’.478 In order to increase 
the region’s competitiveness and productivity, the AEC Blueprint 2025 focuses on 
elements which can improve ASEAN’s competitiveness by aiming at 1 engendering a 
level playing field for small firms through effective competition policy, 2 fostering the 
creation and protection of knowledge, 3 deepening ASEAN participation in global value 
chains, and 4 strengthening related regulatory frameworks and overall regulatory 
practices and coherence at the regional level.479 
A competitive, innovative and dynamic ASEAN has eight key elements as set out 
in the AEC Blueprint 2025.480 It is clear that the visions of the AEC in 2025 are relatively 
more sophisticated and advanced than those in the AEC Blueprint 2015. As mentioned 
earlier the deadline in the AEC Blueprint 2015 resulted in the beginning of the AEC 
rather than the completion of its ambitious goals, therefore, it remains to be seen 
whether the vision for the AEC in 2025 will be realised or will be yet another beginning 
of the competitive, innovative, and dynamic ASEAN. 
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The AEC Blueprint 2025’s strategies for effective competition policy are more 
detailed and comprehensive than those of the 2015 version. There are seven strategies as 
follows:481 
1. Introducing competition laws to the AMSs that do not have them to establish 
an effective competition regime in ASEAN. And effectively implementing the 
national competition laws based on international best practices and the ASEAN 
guidelines. At the time of writing, only Cambodia has yet to pass the law. 
According to Saroeung Kem, Director of Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry 
of Commerce, the Cambodian’s Competition Bill is expected to be enacted by 
the end of 2016.482 Thus far, the most recent guideline is the Regional 
Guidelines on Competition Policy which was published in 2010. According to 
Toh Han Li, Chief Executive, Competition Commission of Singapore, the 
international best practices which seem to be the most suitable for ASEAN are 
those recommended by the International Competition Network.483 The fact 
that ASEAN managed to introduce competition laws in 9 of the 10 member 
states is a remarkable success considering that the AMSs cooperate through 
consensus and non-legally binding methods. This should not be taken for 
granted. This thesis has included the current status of competition laws of the 
AMSs as well as provisions on unilateral conducts or abuse of dominance of 
each AMS in Annex 3. 
2. Strengthening the capacities of the AMSs’ competition-related authorities to 
effectively enforce competition laws by providing technical assistance and 
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capacity building. This strategy is carried over from the AEC Blueprint 2015. In 
this regard, ASEAN has cooperated with strategic partners such as Australian 
and New Zealand, and received support from Germany and the OECD. But it 
depends on the AMS leaders to make the most of this cooperation for the 
benefit of the people in ASEAN. 
3. Fostering a “competition-aware” region with fair competition by establishing 
platforms where businesses can have access to information and are encouraged 
to comply with the law and to promote competition advocacy and sector-
studies on industry structures and practices that affect competition. The AEGC 
published the Business Handbook to provide businesses with information on 
substantive and procedural rules on the competition laws of the AMSs in 
simple language. Regarding competition advocacy, the AEGC published the 
Toolkit for Competition Policy, Law and Advocacy in ASEAN to provide 
practical guidance, tools and templates to develop and deliver advocacy 
activities for competition law and policy.484  
4. Establishing Regional Cooperation Arrangements on competition policy and 
law to effectively deal with cross-border commercial transactions by 
establishing competition enforcement cooperation agreements. One can 
conjecture that the new platform will deal with cross-border issues while 
national competition authorities (NCAs) remain in charge of domestic 
anticompetitive practices. The AEGC, with its existing network of NCAs and 
resources, is in a good position to deal with cross-border commercial 
transactions and it would be counterproductive to establish another body to 
oversee this matter. However, it can be argued that the AEGC serves only as a 
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forum for discussions and is not vested with the power to enforce competition 
law; consequently, for the AEGC to effectively deal with this issue is a rather 
ambitious plan. It remains to be seen whether AMSs will opt for establishing a 
separate body to administer this agreement or not. If this regional competition 
enforcement cooperation agreement is concluded as an economic agreement, it 
can provide consistency and predictability to the AMSs competition authorities 
and businesses in terms of dispute settlement because it will be subject to the 
Vientiane Protocol. 
5. Developing a regional strategy on competition policy and law convergence to 
achieve greater harmonisation in the AMSs. A number of useful 
recommendations have been made by Both such as the alignment of wider 
political, trade and economic interests of the AMSs and focusing on 
competition advocacy.485 However, differences in economic development of 
member states can compromise the regional substantive competition law.486 
6. Maintaining consistency on the approach to competition policy and law in the 
region by ensuring the alignment of those chapters which are negotiated by 
ASEAN under various FTAs. In this regard, ASEAN has been quite consistent. 
Most FTAs which ASEAN signed with dialogue partners do not include a 
chapter or provisions on competition at all. The exceptions are the ASEAN - 
Japan FTA which has a competition chapter which is not subject to the dispute 
settlement chapter and the ASEAN-Korea Agreement on Trade in Services 
which has a competition chapter which is subject to the dispute settlement 
measures in the FTA.  
                                                 
485 Both, ‘Regionalisation of  Competition Policy: What Lessons Can Be Drawn for ASEAN from Other 
Region’s Experience?’ (n 302) 28 - 29 
486 ibid 20 
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7. Enhancing competition policy and law in ASEAN by taking into consideration 
of international best practices. As mentioned earlier, the work of the ICN 
appears to be most suitable to the ASEAN way of operation. 
It is fair to say that ASEAN has started dealing with many of the strategies 
referred to above. The result of ASEAN’s effort will have to be evaluated in 2025. On 
paper, these strategies should produce a great outcome for ASEAN provided that the 
AMSs come together and effectively pool their resources for the benefit of ASEAN as a 
whole. As mentioned in chapter 2 the AMSs should not compete with each other in a 
zero-sum game, but in a positive-sum game where each AMS continues to focus on 
increasing the competitiveness of its most important industries. 
B) ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy  
The Regional Guidelines are non-binding and serve only as a reference.487 They 
were completed with assistance from InWEnt – Capacity Building International 
(Germany) and with the support from the AEGC and relevant Ministries in Member 
States.488 Member states may opt in or out from any recommendations made in the 
Regional Guidelines. The Regional Guidelines are not an exhaustive list of 
recommendations. It is rather short because it only outlines what competition law and 
policy is and should be.489  
In terms of abuse of dominance or unilateral conducts490 the Regional Guidelines 
suggest that dominance refers to market powers that have the ability to sustain profitable 
                                                 
487 AEGC, ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy 2010 (n 467) 1 
488 ibid, i 
489 AEGC, Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies in Competition Policy and Law for ASEAN, (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2012) 5 
490 Regional Guidelines, Chapter 3, 3.3 Prohibition of  Abuse of  a Dominant Position 
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prices above competitive levels491 which correspond to the explanation of market power 
provided by the EU Commission in its Guidance on Enforcement Priorities in Applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings492 and the ICN Workbook.493 The Regional Guidelines allow the member 
states to decide whether they will adopt the market share threshold test.494  
Abusive of dominance conducts consist of exploitative and exclusionary 
conducts, discriminatory behaviour and limiting production market, or technological 
development to the prejudice of consumers.495 However, Resale Price Maintenance is 
not included in the examples of anticompetitive conducts and agreements. The Regional 
Guidelines also clearly encourage the member states to consider applying effects-based 
approach instead of per se standard to determine whether the unilateral act in question 
constitutes an abuse of dominance.496 
The Regional Guidelines are a product of the AEC Blueprint 2015, which did 
not contain much detail as to what the AMSs needed to achieve other than introducing 
national competition law, establishing the AEGC, encouraging capacity building, and 
developing regional guidelines. The Regional Guidelines fail to provide the AMSs with 
helpful recommendation and advice. It does not contain any explanations that can be 
expected in a guideline. For example, it only refers briefly to what can be considered as 
dominance, but it does not show how this can be analysed. It does not make any firm 
recommendation other than using generic and plain language such as ‘AMSs should 
                                                 
491 AEGC, ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy 2010 (n 467) 3.3.1.1 
492 Commission, ‘Guidance on Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of  the EC Treaty to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings’ (Communication) 2009/C 45/02 OJ C45/7 
(EU Guidance 2009) para 11 
493 ICN, ‘Unilateral Conduct Workbook Chapter 3: Assessment of  Dominance’ (10th Annual ICN 
Conference, Netherlands, May 2011) para 5 
494 AEGC, ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy 2010 (n 467) 3.3.1.1 
495 ibid 3.3.2 
496 ibid 3.3.1.2 
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consider prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position.’, and ‘AMSs may provide an 
illustrative list of such conduct:’  
According to McEwin, the Regional Guidelines ‘were written by a European law 
firm and are based on European Community competition law with little account taken 
of the economic conditions and institutions in Southeast Asia and the appropriateness of 
the general model of competition law for the region.’ Hence, it has not been followed in 
detail by the AMSs.497 This is not a surprise as there is hardly any detail in the Regional 
Guidelines which the AMSs can use. When Thailand proposed amendments to the 
Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 (1999), the Law Reform Commission of Thailand did 
not take the Regional Guidelines into account.498 
The Regional Guidelines serve a purpose in outlining what competition law and 
policy should be and member states can refer to it when enacting competition law, but it 
does not help ASEAN becoming a highly competitive region by giving scant 
recommendations. One cannot see the concrete benefit the AMSs can gain from using 
the Regional Guidelines because there are four AMSs which enacted the national 
competition laws before the publication of the Regional Guidelines. However, the 
remaining AMSs have not taken the Regional Guidelines into account either. The ICN’s 
recommended practices, reports, and workbooks contain far more useful and helpful 
information which the AMSs could have used if they had been published earlier.  
                                                 
497 Ian McEwin, ‘Introduction to CPI Special Issue on ASEAN Competition Law’ (2015) 1 CPI Antitrust 
Chronicle 2, 3 
498 คณะกรรมการปฏริปูกฎหมาย, บนัทกึความเหน็และขอ้เสนอแนะ เรือ่ง แนวทางการตรากฎหมายว่าดว้ยการแข่งขนัทางการคา้ 
(กม.คปก.(น) ที ่ ๒/๒๕๕๗) dated 28 November 2557 (2014) [Law Reform Commission of  Thailand, 
Memorandum of  Comments and Recommendations on Guideline on Drafting of  Trade Competition 
Law (gor mor. kor por gor. (nor) No. 2/2014)] 
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C) Handbook on Competition Policy and Law in ASEAN for Business 
2013 (Business Handbook) 
First published in August 2010, this Handbook is not a comprehensive guide to 
competition law and enforcement in member states; rather it simply documents and 
compiles information regarding both substantive and procedural issues of the 
competition laws and contains some case studies. It is aimed at ‘providing, in a language 
easily understandable to non-experts, basic notions of the substantive and procedural 
competition laws applicable in AMSs, to the benefit of regional and transnational 
businesses engaged in the ASEAN region.’499 This Handbook has been updated twice as 
more AMSs have enacted competition law.  
D) Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies in Competition Policy 
and Law for ASEAN (RCC Guidelines) 
The RCC Guidelines were published in 2012 and funded by the German Federal 
Foreign Office under a joint project named “Capacity Building for the ASEAN 
Secretariat” between the ASEAN Secretariat and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Germany. This guideline focuses mainly 
on institutional building, enforcement and advocacy. It is said that while the Regional 
Guidelines provides an outline of competition law and policy, the RCC Guidelines 
provides a description to the national competition authorities of the process of how to 
develop a competition enforcement system.500 
                                                 
499 AEGC, Handbook on Competition Policy and Law in ASEAN for Business (3rd ed, ASEAN Secretariat 2013) 4 
500 AEGC, Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies in Competition Policy and Law for ASEAN (n 489) 5 
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Recommendations for drafting an understandable competition law suggest 
possible drafting processes by formal or informal consultation, use of experts, public 
hearings, and advisory bodies. Itis suggested that in transition economies, drafting a one-
law model with simplified language is desirable. It is recommended that provisions on 
cartels, unilateral practices, and mergers are included, while unfair trade practices that 
harm consumers should be enacted in consumer protection laws.  
However, the recommendation on unilateral acts or abuse of dominance does 
not provide much detail. It only suggests that anticompetitive conducts by incumbents 
should be distinguished into exploitative and exclusionary practices.501 It provides more 
information on building agency competency. Hence, it was referred to in the proposed 
amendment of Trade Competition Act by the Law Reform Commission of Thailand.502 
E) Toolkit for Competition Advocacy in ASEAN (Toolkit) 
This is the latest publication under the AEGC and came out in early 2016. It 
provides the AMSs with practical guidance and templates for the national competition 
authorities to develop and deliver advocacy activities to different stakeholders.503 Its 
guidance takes into account the different levels of the NCAs’ competencies. It identifies 
major stakeholder groups and gives sound recommendations to young NCAs as to what 
                                                 
501 ‘Selecting the appropriate substantive provisions 
     Unilateral practices: abuse of  a dominant position, monopolisation 
The second objective is met by implementing laws that forbid firms with market power (i.e. “dominant 
operators”) from making it impossible for other businesses to compete with them. One classic 
example is for a business to get exclusive contracts with all suppliers of  a key material or 
component necessary to make the product that the business makes. Another classic example is 
for a business to acquire all of  its competitors. These kinds of  prohibited activities are generally 
referred to as unlawful monopolization activities or abuses of  dominant position. 
Unilateral anticompetitive practices by dominant operators can take many forms. It may be useful to 
further distinguish them into two general categories: exploitative practices and exclusionary 
practices.’ (the Core Competencies Guidelines, p. 19) 
502 คณะกรรมการปฏริปูกฎหมาย [Law Reform Commission of  Thailand]  (n 498) 11 
503 AEGC, Toolkit for Competition Advocacy in ASEAN (n 484) 4 
195 
 
should be their priorities. The Toolkit provides different strategies for different 
stakeholder groups. The strategies cover designing the right activities for different focus 
groups, maintaining campaign momentum, evaluation of the activities, templates of 
feedback form, and the sharing of success stories by the AMSs. 
This Toolkit is a very impressive piece of work by the AEGC. It pays attention 
to details and provides substantial information which is readily used by the AMSs. It may 
not have a direct effect on ASEAN’s competitiveness, because it was not designed to do 
so. However, if the AMSs adopt it fully, competition advocacy and creating a 
competition aware society should be achieved as anticipated. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
ASEAN came into existence amid a strong sense of nationalism in the member 
states. They had been invaded and colonised by powerful countries. The start of their 
cooperation in 1967 was mainly to create security and stability in the region. ASEAN 
enlargement was seen as more for political than for economic reasons. The inclusion of 
Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos was mainly to diminish China’s influence over the 
region. The expansion to a market that is bigger than the EU’s is seen as the 
consequence of the enlargement, but not as the reason for this. 
However, the emerging NAFTA and single market of EU have urged AMSs to 
consider a deeper economic integration. It is not debatable whether the AEC will form a 
fully single market as the EU, because it will not. The AEC is definitely not going to be a 
custom union with a common currency. At best it is a free trade union that encourages 
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freer movement of skilled labour, goods, and capitals. The AMSs have no intention to 
give up their judicial sovereignty to a supranational organisation to oversee matters 
concerning the AEC.  
However, changes have come to the ASEAN way. Although it is true that the 
AMSs prefer consultation and consensus, this does not mean that the AMSs will never 
move away from this norm. It is evident that AMSs can and will cooperate in a rule-
based fashion where and when necessary. All ASEAN economic agreements are subject 
to the Vientiane Protocol which provides a formal and comprehensive dispute 
settlement mechanism. Moreover, AMSs have begun to adopt more detailed competition 
rules for the aviation industry. The competition provisions in the ASEAN Air Service, 
ASEAN Air Freight Services, and ASEAN Passenger Air Services demonstrate a deeper 
commitment to competition rules by all AMSs than what is included in agreements with 
other dialogue partners.  
The EU experience and history is entirely different from ASEAN’s. It used a 
supranational approach since the very beginning and has always emphasised free 
competition and an undistorted market. The annual operational budget of the EU, the 
Commission, and the amount of staff of the DGCOM is enormous compared to the 
whole ASEAN Secretariat. This is because ASEAN did not intend to create any 
supranational bodies to oversee any regulations.  
The ASEAN way may take longer in arriving at a conclusion or reaching an 
agreement, but it is the way that AMSs have agreed upon in the ASEAN Charter. It is 
unique to ASEAN and one can conjecture that the AMSs are quite comfortable with it. 
At least, they are comfortable enough to formalise it into the ASEAN Charter. And at 
least, the ASEAN way has not resulted in excessive integration that AMSs would want to 
197 
 
leave the community. Harmonisation of competition law and policy can be done through 
a sectoral approach. ASEAN can take a different direction from the EU. The EU starts 
at centralised competition rules. ASEAN can start with sectoral competition rules. The 
more sectors reach trade agreements like the aviation industry, the larger the number of 
competitive industries in ASEAN. Eventually, ASEAN’s competitiveness as a whole can 
be enhanced. 
ASEAN has an embedded norm of cooperation through consensus and 
consultation. The functioning and the mode of operation of a supranational body such 
as the Commission are not compatible with the ASEAN principles as set out in the 
ASEAN Charter. In order to create an effective supranational body to administer 
regional cooperation of competition law and policy, ASEAN will have to turn 180 
degrees from its Charter.  
ASEAN has already begun with the sectoral approach to competition law 
enforcement in the aviation sector so any attempt to create a regional competition law to 
curb anticompetitive practices will pull away resources which can be used more 
effectively to invest in a sectoral approach. Why not try to make use of what ASEAN 
already has in place and try to make it work? This is not to suggest that the AEGC is 
irrelevant or insignificant or should be replaced with a sectoral regulator. The AEGC is 
crucial to the promotion of competitiveness and undistorted ASEAN single market. But 
to put all burden on an organisation which clearly is not sufficient funded and staff 
would be unproportioned. 
Another problem with the supranational approach for ASEAN is that there is 
very little necessity for such a supranational body when there is no regional competition 
law for that body to administer. If ASEAN aims at creating a competitive region, 
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effective competition law and policy is only a small part of this. To accomplish this 
ASEAN can increase competitiveness by for instance improving the infrastructure and 
by investing in the training and education of skilled labourers for more sophisticated 
industries without relying on a supranational approach. However, this does not imply 
that competition law does not matter. This thesis has explained and emphasised in 
chapter 2 the impact of competition law and policy on competitiveness. Effective 
competition law and policy can and will have the most impact on competitiveness when 
a country is in, at least, transition from Factor-Driven to Efficiency-Driven stage. 
Additionally, when considering the AMSs stance on regional competition law 
and policy platforms, the establishment and the works of the AEGC remain very 
informal and non-legally binding which is contrary to the sector specific approach. The 
purpose of the establishment of the AEGC is clear – to be a platform of discussion and 
exchange for countries experiences and best practices. The AEGC has done really good 
work in meeting all required tasks before the deadline so far. The AEGC has cooperated 
with many international organisations and liaised with member states’ competition 
authorities to produce all its works. This is not an easy task to achieve. However, this 
thesis argues that the AEGC has substantially promoted building capacity, and provides 
guidance to member states as individual states in ASEAN rather than providing guidance 
on competition law and policy on a regional level.  
The AEGC has promoted capacity building among AMSs and met almost all of 
the targets set in AEC Blueprint 2015. However, the Regional Guidelines, Business 
Handbook, and the RCC Guidelines are not legally binding. They are merely suggestions 
and recommendations to member states. There is no sanction in disregarding or 
nonconforming to the suggestions made in these documents.  
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However, the ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Air Services, the ASEAN 
Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberation of Passenger Air Services, and the 
ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalisation of Air Freight Services 
provide provisions on fair competition and safeguards which recognise the importance 
of fair and equal opportunity and agree that some business practices can be considered 
anticompetitive and cause an anticompetitive effect on markets which will eventually 
lead to market distortion. These trade agreements are subject to the Vientiane Protocol. 
It can be implied that at the regional level, AMSs are reluctant to commit to an 
all-sectoral approach to competition law and policy. They prefer non-legally binding 
recommendations and focus on best practices exchange. But it is clear that AMSs are not 
reluctant to commit more deeply in competition law if this is beneficial to all AMSs such 
as with the aviation industry. It is easier to negotiate and agree on what constitute 
anticompetitive practices in a particular sector than agreeing on general competition law 
and policy. Although dispute settlement on this issue is not by means of a supranational 
body, the ASEAN way of dealing with this issue by a formal and comprehensive 
mechanism under the Vientiane Protocol is a good start. This corresponds with Porter’s 
suggestion that it is easier to focus on competitiveness of a particular industry than to 
make a nation competitive as a whole. If ASEAN focuses on increasing competitiveness 
in a particular industry within the region, and continues the same approach with other 
industries; there is a very good chance that ASEAN’s competitiveness will increase 
accordingly. Hence, a sectoral approach to increase competitiveness can eventually lead 
to an increase in competitiveness in all sectors.  
However, having rules on competition in a particular market within ASEAN is 
unlikely to result in more competitiveness as proved in chapter 2. The level of 
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development in the AMSs is crucial to fully benefit from the effectiveness of 
competition law and policy. Especially on the ASEAN level where there are only 
voluntary recommendations for AMSs. Hence, AMSs need to endeavour to increase 
their economic development to fully benefit from an efficient competition law and 
policy. 
If ASEAN continues to agree on specific industries and uses the Vientiane 
Protocol as the sole mechanism for settling disputes, there is a good chance that a body 
of knowledge in solving disputes on competition among the AMSs will form. However, 
its impact on the competitiveness of ASEAN or ASEAN’s particular market needs to be 
evaluated with due care and process. 
The success of the sectoral approach will depend on the political will of the 
AMSs to ensure that they adhere to the rules as agreed in the ASEAN Charter and other 
economic agreements. This corresponds to Porter’s diamond theory that the 
government is the influential factor which can improve or hinder any facet of the 
diamond. Chances are uncontrollable and unpredictable. But the government’s actions 
should be reliable and accountable to increase the competitiveness of the nation. 
However, in the case of ASEAN, stable and efficient governments are not common. 
Singapore which has such a stable government stands out in that respect. Since 2001, 
Thailand has changed governments 8 times and two coups d’état took place. One can 
surmise that under such constant political changes and government instability; it will be 
hard for Thai government agencies to effectively deliver government policy.  
 This thesis argues that for the time being the best possible way for ASEAN to 
increase its competitiveness is to not focus on all-sector competitiveness and creating a 
supranational body, but on the economic development of the AMSs, on how to make 
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the most of ASEAN way, and to maximise the use of all ASEAN trade agreements and 
instruments to the benefit of all AMSs on a sectoral basis. As Rodrik argued, ‘capitalism 
does not come with a unique model. Economic prosperity and stability can be achieved 
through different combinations of institutional arrangements. . . Nations are likely to – 
and indeed are entitled to – make varying choices among these arrangements depending 
on their needs and values.’504 So does ASEAN.  
The next chapter will analyse and scrutinise competition provisions on abuse of 
dominance in Singapore and Thailand to understand the potential obstacles which 
ASEAN may face when trying to converge national competition laws.   
                                                 
504 Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy Can’t coexist (n 440) xviii 
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CHAPTER 5  
COMPETITION LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT IN SINGAPORE AND 
THAILAND: A STUDY OF ABUSE OF 
DOMINANT POSITION 
 
This chapter analyses the disparities in the AMSs’ national competition laws to 
demonstrate the difficulties which could be an obstacle for the AMSs when harmonising 
and converging their competition laws. This could compromise ASEAN’s goal of 
becoming a highly competitive region. This chapter will prove that there is a better way 
to pursue that goal which ASEAN has already begun developing and which should be 
used more fully.   
Both claimed that in order to have efficient cooperation in competition law 
enforcement, five driving forces must be attained: 1. substantial volume of cross-border 
trade among members; 2. laws protecting confidential information which may be 
gathered and exchanged by the national competition authorities (NCAs); 3. coherence of 
the competition law regime concerning the goals of competition law and policy, the 
interpretation of core competition law principles, the investigation process, the and 
design of competition law; 4. mutual trust between members which requires 
transparency and predictability of law enforcement; and 5. Sufficient resources such as 
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budget and personnel.505 If this is true, then it is unlikely that ASEAN can achieve 
effective competition enforcement because the incoherence in the competition law 
regime is obvious; it is doubtful whether the AMSs have mutual trust in each other’s law 
enforcement. Other reasons are the lack of laws protecting confidential information at 
the regional level and insufficient resources for the NCAs of member states. 
This chapter explains and scrutinises the enforcement of abuse of dominance of 
two AMSs, Thailand and Singapore. The example of abuse of dominance is used because 
market access within the AEC should not be hampered by local and foreign incumbents 
that abuse their dominance to the detriment of consumers and market competition. This 
chapter does not discuss abuse of dominance under a sector specific regime because the 
AEC Blueprints and Regional Guidelines aim at the harmonisation and convergence of 
general competition law. Thus, this chapter intends to demonstrate the obstacles to 
harmonising general competition law and policy. This thesis uses the examples of 
Singapore and Thailand because they demonstrate the disparities in capacities of their 
NCAs, the structures and powers of the NCAs, and competition culture, 
competitiveness, and stage of development. They each enacted their competition law 
over a decade ago, so there should be enough information on their competition law 
enforcement and advocacy. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. Firstly, an examination of competition 
laws and their objectives in the two states. Secondly, a comparison of provisions on 
abuse of a dominant position. Thirdly, a comparison of the structure and the 
investigative and prosecution powers of their NCAs. Fourthly, an analysis of the case 
                                                 
505 G. Deniz Both, ‘Drivers of  International Cooperation in Competition Law Enforcement’ (2015) 38 
World Competition 301 
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studies on the abuse of dominance. The final section consists of an analysis and 
conclusion.  
 
 
5.1  AN OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW 
AND ITS OBJECTIVES IN SINGAPORE AND 
THAILAND  
5.1.1 Singapore 
Three important and closely related developments took place between 2000 and 
2003 in the run up to Singapore's enactment of its generic Competition Act 2004.506 
Firstly, the liberalisation policies which Singapore introduced at the end of the 1990s. 
The goal for this is to stimulate previous monopolies to compete more when they are 
exposed to market competitiveness. Secondly, a final report produced by the 
government-appointed Economic Review Committee (ERC) on the 4th February 2003.  
The main focus of the ERC report is on the roles of the States Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). The report strongly recommended that Singapore should not rely 
entirely on the SOEs as primary engines for Singapore’s economic development. 
Contrarily, it should encourage small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Singapore to 
compete with SOEs. Thirdly, the bilateral free-trade agreements that were entered into 
                                                 
506 Burton Ong, ‘The Origins, Objectives and Structure of  Competition Law in Singapore’ (2006) 29 
World Competition 269 <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/ 
documents/apcity/unpan025141.pdf> accessed 3 August 2012 
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between Singapore and the US. The US-Singapore FTA was seen as a trigger point for 
Singapore’s decision to adopt a generic competition law. The Singapore Competition Act 
2004 was largely influenced by Anglo-European competition laws.507 
The Singapore Competition Act (SCA) does not discuss the goals and purposes 
of the law, but the Competition Commission of Singapore (CCS) emphasises in the 
Guidelines of Major Provisions that competition is a crucial part of Singapore’s 
economy; open and vigorous competition brings efficiency, innovation and responds to 
consumer needs which leads to consumer welfare; and society in turn benefits from 
productivity and allocative efficiency.508  
Singapore submitted to the ICN that the objectives of Singapore unilateral 
conducts laws are to ensure an effective competitive process (as a mean to achieve other 
goals) and to maximise efficiency,509 and asserted that the key objective of the SCA is 
economic efficiency.510 Singapore’s competition law aims at protecting the competition 
process, not the competitors and at efficiency because vigorous competition urges firms 
to be innovative and efficient. As a consequence, consumers enjoy better services and 
goods, more choices and at lower prices – consumer welfare is enhanced.511  
In the second reading of the Competition Bill, Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, the then 
Senior Minister of State for Trade and Industry stated that ‘the purpose of this piece of 
                                                 
507 ibid 274 
508 CCS, ‘CCS Guidelines on Major Provisions’, para 2.1 
<https://www.ccs.gov.sg/legislation/~/media/custom/ccs/files/legislation/ccs%20guidelines/
majorprovisionsjul07final.ashx> accessed 1 August 2012 
509 ICN, ‘Report on the Objectives of  Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of  Dominance/Substantial 
Market Power, and State-Created Monopolies’ (6th Annual Conference of  the ICN, Moscow, May 
2007) 8 
510 ibid 14 
511 CCS, ‘CCS Guidelines on the Major Provisions’ (n 508) para 2.1; CCS, ‘CCS Competition Philosophy’ 
(last updated 30 December 2014) <http://www.ccs.gov.sg/about-ccs/what-we-do/ccs-
competition-philosophy > accessed 3 August 2016 
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legislation is to ensure that we have an efficient functioning market in Singapore and, 
ultimately, a competitive economy with competitive firms.’512 Another reason why 
consumer welfare is not Singapore’s goal for competition law is that exploitative 
behaviours of incumbents do not necessarily constitute abuse of dominance.513 
Exploitative abuses such as excessive pricing (purchasing and selling) are not punishable 
under the Singapore Competition Act, Section 47(2).514 Moreover, in the CCS’ 
Guidelines on Section 47 Prohibition does not mention exploitative abuses of 
consumers, and examples of conduct that may amount to an abuse in Annex C of the 
Guidelines do not provide any example of exploitative pricing abuses.  
This thesis argues that the intention of the Singapore Competition Act is not to 
protect consumers from excessive pricing because that should be dealt with by consumer 
protection law, but to ensure that competition is not distorted. It is evident that 
consumers in Singapore have always been encouraged to be aware of their rights.   
                                                 
512 Singapore Parliamentary Reports, (19 October 2004) vol 78 (First Session) <http:// 
sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic.jsp?currentTopicID=00070463-ZZ&currentPubID=00075146-
ZZ& topicKey=00075146-ZZ.00070463-ZZ_1%23%23> accessed 19 August 2012 
513 Lim Chong Kin and Scott Clements, ‘Singapore’ in Thomas Janssens and Thomas Wessely (eds) Getting 
the Deal Through: Dominance 2015 (Law Business Research 2015) 199; R. Ian McEwin, 
‘Competition Law in Singapore’ (Global Economic Group 17 March 2011) 
<http://www.globaleconomicsgroup.com/publication/competition-law-in-singapore/> accessed 
30 May 2015. 
514 Abuse of  dominant position 
      47.—(1) Subject to section 48, any conduct on the part of  one or more undertakings which amounts 
to the abuse of  a dominant position in any market in Singapore is prohibited. 
                (2)  For the purposes of  subsection (1), conduct may, in particular, constitute such an abuse if  it 
consists in — 
                   (a) predatory behaviour towards competitors; 
                   (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of  consumers; 
                     (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or 
                     (d) making the conclusion of  contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of  
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of  the contracts. 
               (3)  In this section, “dominant position” means a dominant position within Singapore or 
elsewhere. 
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Caveat emptor is the key to consumer policy in Singapore because effective 
competition policy is seen as more efficient in delivering benefits to consumers in the 
long term.515 It is also reported that Singapore’s approach to welfare under competition 
law is total welfare, not consumer welfare.516 This is supported by the CCS’ first 
infringement decision on abuse of dominance, which clearly states that ‘competition 
policy in Singapore adopts the total welfare standard instead of the consumer welfare 
standard.’517 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the SCA fundamentally aims at efficiency and 
protection of competition. Consumer welfare is considered as a by-product of an 
efficient, competitive market. 
5.1.2 Thailand518 
Thailand has a very different philosophy towards competition law. Before it was 
enacted in 1999 as a single Act, Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 (1999) (TCA),519 there 
was another Act in force, the Price Fixing and Anti-Monopoly Act of 1979 which 
combined two keys components – overseeing price-fixing and antimonopoly. Price 
fixing has long been used by Thai governments to control prices of goods.520 Consumer 
                                                 
515 CCS, ‘The Interface Between Competition and Consumer Policies: Contribution from Singapore’ 
DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2008)3 (Global Forum on Competition, 21 – 22 February 2008) 
<http://www.oecd.org/countries/singapore/39792372.pdf> accessed 30 May 2015 
516 Chong Kin and Clements, ‘Singapore’ (n 513) 197; McEwin, ‘Competition Law in Singapore, (n 513) 
517 Re Abuse of  a Dominant Position by SISTIC.com Pte Ltd [2010] SGCCS 3, notes 364 and note 457 
518 The English translation of  the Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 (1999) which is referred to and quoted 
in this thesis, except indicated otherwise, is translated in the personal capacity of  Dr Pinai Na 
Nakorn (Juridical Official of  the Foreign Law Division of  the Office of  the Council of  State), 
‘Tentative Translation of  the Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 (1999)’ 
<http://www.dit.go.th/en/backoffice/uploadfile/255609171741011889987.pdf> accessed 8 
August 2016 
519 Royal Gazette Vol 116 Part 22kor 31 March B.E. 2542 (1999), entered into force 1 May B.E. 2542 
(1999)  
520 For history of  Thai competition laws please see: Mark Williams, ‘Competition Law in Thailand: Seeds 
of  Success or Fated to Fail?’ (2004) 27 World Competition 459; Archanun Kohpaiboon, Paritat 
Chantasakda, and Alongkorn Tanasritunyakul, ‘Competition Policy in Thailand’ (Workshop on 
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goods markets have always been under the governments’ control. Every time when 
consumer goods prices are rocketing, Thai consumers demand that governments control 
the price instead of letting the rule of demand-supply plays its part. Thai Governments 
tend to use a protectionist approach in handling markets and consumers.521  
The antimonopoly part of the 1979 Act is aimed at promoting fair 
competition.522 One can see clearly how the market could not function efficiently in 
Thailand – within the same act the Government wanted to protect fair and free 
competition on the one hand and to control how businesses set their prices on the other. 
It was unlikely an effective functioning of the market could be realised under this 
conflicting Act.  
In 1999, the Department of Internal Trade which oversaw the 1979 Act, decided 
to separate the 1979 Act into two Acts: the Price of Goods and Services Act of 1999 and 
the TCA. The objective of the TCA is to promote fair and free trade within a 
competitive environment.523 The reason for enacting the TCA was included in the 
bottom of the last page of the Act as a note, stating that  
                                                                                                                                           
Competition Policy in Southeast Asia: A Stock Take of  Recent Development, Asian 
Development Bank, Manila, 11-12 January 2010) 15; เดอืนเด่น นิคมบรริกัษ์, การปฏริปูเพือ่ลดการผกูขาด
และส่งเสรมิการแขง่ขนัในเศรษฐกจิไทย (เปนไท พ.ศ. 2555 (2012))  9 - 13 <http://v-reform.org/market-
reform/> accessed 23 February 2016 [Duenden Nikomborirak, A Reform to Alleviate Monopoly and 
Promote Competition in Thai Economy (PenThai 2012)] 
521 Charging excessive high price is considered unfair practices under Sections 25 and 29 of  the Trade 
Competition Act B.E. 2542 (1999). Also in case of  retails and hypermarkets industry, the 
Government decided to limit the expansion of  large discount stores to help local small groceries. 
See Retail Super Store v Local Groceries at p. 239 
522 OECD, ‘Contribution from Thailand’ CCNM/GF/COMP/WD(2001)8 (1st Meeting of  the Global 
Forum on Competition, 17 – 18 October 2001) 
<http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=CCNM/GF/COM
P/WD(2001)8&docLanguage=En> accessed 3 August 2016 
523 ibid; UNCTAD, ‘Handbook on Competition Legislation Consolidated Report 2001 – 2012’ (n 206) 
1287; Nipon Paopongsakorn, ‘Thailand Trade Competition Act’ (APEC-OECD Cooperative 
Initiative Workshop, Paris, December 2003) 133 <http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/APEC-
OECD/2003-12/013.pdf> accessed 15 July 2013; Nipon Paopongsakorn, ‘Institutional 
Arrangements for the Competition Authority in Thailand’ (APEC-OECD Cooperative Initiative 
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The reason for enactment of this Act is because of the 
repeal of Price Fixing and Anti-Monopoly Act which contained 
provisions on price fixing and anti-monopoly in the same Act. 
Therefore, it is deemed appropriate to improve the provisions 
on anti-monopoly and enact the law regulating trade 
competition that can guard against monopolistic conducts, 
decrease or limit a systematic trade competition. This will 
promote free trade and prevent unfair trade practices. Hence, it 
is necessary to enact this Act.524 
According to Thanitkul and UNCTAD, the TCA was modelled on Korean, 
Japanese, Taiwanese, and German competition laws.525 There are two views as to what 
influenced the Thai Government to enact the TCA. According to research by Sakda 
Thanitcul, it was the Thai Government who initiated the idea, while Thai business 
representatives believed that the Government was under pressure from the US526 
‘seeking to force open the Thai economy to benefit its global players.’527  
The TCA does not provide its objectives in either its preamble or provisions. 
The Thai Government submitted its commentary on the objective of the Act as ‘to 
promote fair and free trade. Its principle is mainly to look after business practices.’528 A 
former Commissioner in Thailand’s first Trade Competition Commission (TCC) stated 
that the objective of the law ‘is to promote fair and free trade within a competitive 
environment and control anti-competitive practices.’529 He also submitted another paper 
to the same workshop stating that the TCA aims to protect competition and the 
                                                                                                                                           
Workshop, Paris, December 2003) 92 <http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/APEC-OECD/2003-
12/005.pdf> accessed 5 March 2014  
524 Author’s own translation from original Thai text of  the TCA. 
525 Sakda Thanitkul, ‘Competition Law in Thailand: A Preliminary Analysis’ (2002) 1 Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 171, 172; UNCTAD, Review of  Recent Experiences in the 
Formulation and Implementation of  Competition Law and Policy in Selected Developing Countries: Thailand, 
Lao, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/2 (UN 2005) 2 
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditcclp20052_en.pdf> accessed 3 August 2016 
526 Thanitkul, ‘Competition Law in Thailand: A Preliminary Analysis’ (n 525) 171 - 172 
527 Williams, ‘Competition Law in Thailand: Seeds of  Success or Fated to Fail?’  (n 520) 468 
528 UNCTAD, Handbook on Competition Legislation: Consolidated Report 2001 – 2012 (n 206) 
529 Paopongsakorn, ‘Thailand Trade Competition Act’ (n 523) 133  
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competitive process.530 However, in 2013 there was another submission by Thailand to 
the APEC Competition Policy and Law Group Meeting on the recent development of 
TCA stating that the objectives of the TCA are ‘To promote free and fair business 
competition. To improve market efficiency and protect competition not competitors.’531 
Consumer welfare and total welfare are not mentioned in the TCA or the TCC’s 
guidelines. And from the enforcement record of the Thai Commission, Thai consumers 
have not benefited from its work since its establishment in 1999. It is correct to 
conclude that total welfare is not the real object of the TCA, let alone consumer welfare. 
Can it be construed that the TCA considers welfare as a result of free and fair 
competition? The answer is possibly yes. But then it remains to be seen whether free and 
fair competition in Thailand could enhance consumer welfare and how the TCC pursues 
this. 
The fact that the Thai representatives decided to add market efficiency and the 
protection of competition to the APEC meeting in 2013 certainly cannot be construed as 
that this was the intention of the Act at the time of the enactment. Could it be construed 
that the Thai Competition Commission decided to pursue efficiency when enforcing the 
law in 2013? It is highly unlikely because the track records of the TCC on abuse of 
dominance cases reveal no reference to market efficiency in its decisions. The only 
possible conjecture is that it was only because many countries in APEC promote 
efficiency as the objective of their competition laws, that Thailand should include it too. 
                                                 
530 Paopongsakorn, ‘Institutional Arrangements for the Competition Authority in Thailand’ (n 523) 92  
531 Thailand, ‘Recent Development of  Thai Trade Competition Act’ 2013/SOM1/CPLG/034 (APEC 
Competition Policy and Law Group Meeting, Jakarta, 3-4 February 2013) 
<http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/Workshop/w2013/13_cplg1_034.pdf> accessed 9 August 
2016 
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Singapore’s competition law takes a purist regime. It aims at purely economic 
purposes – market efficiency and protection of the competition process. It also applies 
an effect-based approach and economic analysis. This corresponds to the 
recommendation set in the Regional Guidelines. Although Singapore’s Competition Act 
was modelled after the UK Competition Act, Singapore has certainly adapted the 
competition law to suit its own market conditions.  
Singapore is an advanced economy despite its small market size. Its aim of 
becoming the FDI hub of the region cannot be achieved without focusing on efficiency 
and ensuring robust and undistorted competition in addition to providing a business 
friendly environment to investors. Singaporean consumers are made aware of the 
dynamic of the competition and the significance of the global market. They are protected 
not by control of consumer goods prices, ensuring everything is cheap and affordable, 
but by ensuring all firms are competing vigorously and strive for the most efficient way 
to produce and provide goods and services that have a better quality than those of their 
competitors. This results in that Singaporean consumers’ welfare is enhanced along with 
total welfare, and not at the cost of total welfare. 
The current TCA takes a mixed regime which aims at free and fair 
trade/competition which is the most basic objective of any country that enacts 
competition law. It is not easy to justify fairness. It is very subjective. However, since 
Thailand does not actually pursue efficiency, the problem of conflicting aims of 
competition law is unlikely to arise because there is no consideration of efficiency to take 
into account.  
At the time of writing (June 2016), the TCA is undergoing an amendment. 
However, the draft Bill does not provide the objective of the law. According to Nynnart 
212 
 
Gherdlarppon,532 the Cabinet has approved the first draft of the Trade Competition Bill 
in March 2016. Now the Trade Competition Bill is under the reading by the Thai 
National Legislative Assembly and is expected to pass as an Act by the end of 2016. 
According to Gherdlarppon, the Bill aims at promoting free and fair competition and 
market efficiency.533 
Regarding the competitiveness of ASEAN and AEC, as proved in chapter 2 
there are multiple factors used to determine the competitiveness of a country, an 
effective competition law and policy is one of them. And chapter 3 demonstrated that an 
informal approach to harmonise competition law and policy is likely to be more 
welcome than a supranational approach. Most importantly, chapter 4 provides evidence 
that although the ASEAN way embraces consensus, consultation and non-legally 
binding agreements, AMSs are ready to commit to and adhere to a rule-based approach 
in economic cooperation such as in the aviation industry. A sectoral approach to 
harmonisation in competition law and policy practices among the AMSs appears to be 
more achievable than the harmonisation and convergence of all-sector general 
competition law and policy. If ASEAN’s aviation industry can be more competitive as 
the AMSs adhere to rules on competition and safeguards, and the AMSs expand this 
approach to other industries, competitiveness will be further enhanced in these 
industries which could make ASEAN as a region more competitive. 
A quick example supports that given the vastly different approaches of two of 
the AMSs in curbing anticompetitive agreements of taking a sectoral approach seems 
more plausible than a general all sector approach. In Singapore, an agreement between 
                                                 
532 Senior Trade Officer, Bureau of  Business Competition, Department of  Internal Trade Ministry of  
Commerce, Royal Thai Government 
533 Nynnart Gherdlarppon, ‘Regulator Discussion on New Competition Law Regimes in ASEAN’ (Panel 
discussion at the 5th Annual Asia-Pacific Law Leaders Forum, Singapore, 3 – 4 March 2016) 
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undertakings to share markets is prohibited unless it falls into block exemptions i.e. the 
agreements which contribute to improving production or distribution or to promoting 
technical or economic progress,534 which clearly promotes the efficiency of undertakings.  
In Thailand, the same agreement is also prohibited, unless it is allowed by the 
TCC. There is no block exemption. The TCC may allow undertakings to enter into 
contracts to share markets, fix quantity of their productions lower than market demand 
if: it is commercially reasonable and can promote business activities; does not cause 
serious damage to the economy; and does not impact fundamental consumers’ 
benefits.535 It is obvious that the exemption under the TCC does not promote efficiency 
of undertakings and is very subjective. What does ‘promote business activities’ mean? Is 
it efficiency? Nobody knows. Moreover, a leniency programme is available under the 
SCA but not under the current TCA. A proposed amendment to introduce leniency into 
Thai law is under way.536  
The discrepancies in practice create uncertainty and unpredictability for investors 
whether they can or cannot conclude such contracts. The exemptions are different in 
both countries. Therefore, the cost and time incurred in preparing all required 
documents to be filed to relevant authorities is higher than if both countries would use 
the same criterion for exemptions. How can Thailand and Singapore harmonise and 
converge their differences in curbing cartels? How does this practice help the AEC 
becoming a highly competitive region? If this is dealt with in a specific sector it would be 
more feasible that an agreement could be reached. 
                                                 
534 Competition Act (Cap 50B, 2006 Rev Ed) ss 34 (2)(c) and 41  
535 Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 (1999) ss 27(6) and 37 (At the time of  writing, the TCA is proposed 
to be amended. However, Sections 60, 70 and 72 of  the drafted Trade Competition Bill are not 
changed in substance. The exemptions are roughly the same.) 
536 Gherdlarppon, ‘Regulator Discussion on New Competition Law Regimes in ASEAN’ (n 533); Drafted 
Trade Competition Bill s 68 (as of  15 March 2016) 
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5.2 PROVISIONS ON ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 
In this section, the comparison between provisions on abuse of dominance of 
Singapore and Thailand will be compared concurrently without division into parts. 
As mentioned briefly above that Section 47 prohibition does not aim to curb 
exploitative abuses in imposing excessive pricing on consumers which is a special 
characteristic of the SCA.  This section prohibits abuse of dominance by one or more 
undertakings. The concept of an undertaking is the same as in the EU approach of any 
entity engaging in economic activity.537  
However, Section 47 prohibition is not applicable to “any undertaking entrusted 
with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a 
revenue-producing monopoly in so far as the prohibition would obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to that undertaking.”538 
However, the CCS claim that it will apply this exemption very narrowly.539 It is hard to 
conclude whether the CCS does apply this exemption very narrowly since there is only 
one case on abuse of dominance even though in that case the CCS did apply the 
exemption very narrowly. 
The TCA provide a specific definition of the word “business operator” as a 
producer, distributor for production, importer etc. who engage in these activities in the 
                                                 
537 SCA section 2; CCS, ‘CCS Guidelines on the Section 47 Prohibition’ (CCS June 2007) 4 
<http://www.ccs.gov.sg/legislation/~/media/custom/ccs/files/legislation/ccs%20guidelines/s4
7jul07final.ashx> accessed 29 May 2012   
538 SCA section 48 and Third Schedule 
539 CCS, ‘CCS Guidelines on the Section 47 Prohibition’ (n 537) 28 
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course of business.540 This definition, therefore, automatically excludes any entity which 
engages in business activity that may not be in the course of their business. 
Apart from a narrowly defined ‘business operator’, the TCA also provide 
exemption to the application of the Act in section 4 that it does not apply to government 
agencies, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), farmer co-operative groups, other business 
as prescribed in the ministerial regulation (which no business has been prescribed as 
such yet). This is a major flaw in the TCA as the SOEs are protected when they indeed 
engage in business activity in the usual course of their business and compete with private 
sectors. It may seem that the SOEs have an advantage over the private sectors, in fact, 
the SOEs are in the disadvantage position. Because such lax approach toward them 
cause them to be uncompetitive.  
The SCA does not provide the definition of a dominant position. An 
undertaking is considered dominant when it has market power. The CCS describes the 
assessment of dominance in its guidelines using the same strategy as the EU. An 
undertaking has market power when it can profitably sustain a price above competitive 
level without constraint from competitors or powerful buyers.541 Dominant position, 
however, refers to a dominant position in Singapore or abroad.542 There is no market 
share threshold for market dominance although the CCS may consider an undertaking 
whose market share is above 60% as likely to hold a dominant position.543 
On the other hand, the TCA prescribed the definition of a dominant business 
operator as one that has market share and turnover above the limitation set by the TCC. 
                                                 
540 TCA section 3 
541 ibid 5 
542 SCA section 47(3) 
543 CCS ‘CCS Guidelines on the Section 47 Prohibition’ (n 537) 6 
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And it took the TCC eight years to publish the threshold. A business operator has a 
dominant position when it has more than 50% market share and turnover of more than 
1 billion Baht in the same year. In the case of collective dominance, the TCC explicitly 
limits to only collective dominance by the first three business operator of the relevant 
market whose market share is over 75% and total turnover more than 1 billion Baht.544 
This is one of the major obstacles in the enforcement of the law in Thailand as in the 
case of Abbott’s AIDS Medication below. 
Abusive acts are listed in section 47, but it is not an exhaustive list.545 They 
include predatory behaviour toward competitors.546 The CCS takes into account pricing 
below cost, intention to eliminate a competitor, and the feasibility of recouping losses 
when determining whether predatory behaviour occurs.547Dominant undertaking is 
prohibited from limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers;548 applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;549 or making the 
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of the contracts.550 
                                                 
544 ประกาศคณะกรรมการการแขง่ขนัทางการคา้ เรือ่ง หลกัเกณฑก์ารเป็นผูป้ระกอบธุรกจิซึง่มอีํานาจเหนือตลาด, ราชกจิจา
นุเบกษาฉบบัประกาศและงานทัว่ไปเล่ม ๑๒๔ ตอนพเิศษ ๑๕ง  ลงวนัที ่7 กุมภาพนัธ ์พ.ศ. 2550 (Hereinafter 
referred to as Notification of  Dominance Criteria) [The Trade Competition Commission 
Notification titled Notification of  Dominance Criteria, Royal Gazette issue 124 special edition 
15ngor dated 7 February 2007] 
545 ibid 22 
546 SCA section 47(2)(a) 
547 ibid  
548 SCA section 47(2)(b) 
549 SCA section 47(2)(c) 
550 SCA section 47(2)(d) 
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Under the TCA the abusive conducts are different. A dominant business 
operator is prohibited from pricing unfairly,551 unfairly impose vertical restraint to its 
customers such as tying and exclusive dealing,552 unreasonably reduces, limit, withdraw 
of production, selling, delivery, an import or destroy or render goods damaged to reduce 
supply to increase the price553 and unreasonably intervene in other business operators.554 
There is no prohibition on refusal to deal with competitors. Hence, under the TCA, it is 
illegal to engage in abusive pricing conduct toward competitors, but a dominant 
undertaking may not be punished if it engages in non-price abusive conducts unless that 
non-price abusive conduct amounts to intervention in other undertaking’s business. 
Consumers can rely only on provision of section 25(3) to curb the dominant 
undertaking’s abusive conducts because other clauses aim at exclusionary conducts 
towards competitors or other business operators. The most difficult part for consumers 
to deal with abuse of dominance is not in the limitation of the TCA, but the 
effectiveness of the regulator and the TCC. 
 
 
                                                 
551 TCA section 25(1) 
552 TCA section 25(2); คณะกรรมการการแขง่ขนัทางการคา้, แนวปฏบิตัติามมาตรา 25 แห่งพระราชบญัญตักิารแขง่ขนัทาง
การคา้ พ.ศ. 2542 การใชอ้าํนาจเหนือตลาดในทางมชิอบ มกราคม พ.ศ. 2552, 8 – 10  
<http://otcc.dit.go.th/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Guidelines-under-Section-25.pdf> 
accessed 30 March 2015 [Trade Competition Commission, Guidelines Under Section 25 of  the 
Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 on Abuse of  Dominance dated January 2009, 8 - 10]  
553 TCA section 25(3); Trade Competition Commission, Notification titled Notification of  Dominance 
Criteria (n 544) 11 
554 TCA section 25(4) 
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5.3 THE NATIONAL COMPETITON 
AUTHORITIES OF SINGAPORE AND THAILAND 
5.3.1 Organisational Structure 
A) Singapore 
The CCS is an independent statutory board under the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry.555 The CCS consists of one Chairman and 2-16 members appointed by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry.556 The persons appointed as the Chairman and 
Commissioners must be chosen for their ability and experience in industry, commerce or 
administration or for their professional qualifications or for their suitability otherwise.557  
The Commissioners are in office for a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 5 
years as determined by the Minister and they are eligible for re-appointment.558 
The SCA does not disqualify a Commissioner who has direct or indirect interest 
in a transaction or project of the Commission provided that he discloses the nature of 
his interest at the first meeting of the CCS at which he is present after he becomes aware 
of the relevant facts. The consequence is that the Commissioner who has such an 
interest must not take part in any deliberations or decisions of the CCS relating to that 
transaction or project and must be disregarded for the purpose of constituting a quorum 
of the CCS for deliberation or decision making. This includes transactions or projects by 
spouses, parents, step-parents, sons, step-sons, daughters, step-daughters, adopted sons, 
                                                 
555 AEGC, Handbook on Competition Policy and Law in ASEAN for Business (n 499) 52 
556 Competition Act (Cap 50B, 2006 Rev Ed) s 5 
557 ibid para 1(3), First Schedule under s 5(2) 
558 ibid para 3, First Schedule under s 5(2) 
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adopted daughters, brothers, sisters, half-brothers, half-sisters, step-brothers, and step-
sisters of the Commissioners.559 
The administration of the CCS is divided into 6 divisions that report directly to 
the Chief Executive of CCS. The Chief Executive is appointed by the CCS with approval 
from the Minister, and cannot be removed from office without consent from the 
Minister.560 These divisions are Business and Economics, Corporate Affairs, Legal, 
Enforcement, Policy and Markets, and Strategic Planning (which has been renamed as 
International and Strategic Planning561). Each division undertakes certain duties. Legal, 
Enforcement, and Business and Economics work closely together to investigate 
anticompetitive practices. 
Although the CCS members are appointed by the Minister, the operational and 
executive staff members are not government officials. Although one cannot claim that 
there is no government intervention or influence at this point, the CCS does appear to 
be better structured than the TCC.  
B) Thailand 
The TCC is currently structured under the Department of Internal Trade, 
Ministry of Commerce, and is not an independent body. The Minister is ex officio the 
Chairman of the TCC; the Permanent-Secretary for the Ministry of Commerce is ex officio 
the Vice-Chairman; and the Permanent-Secretary for the Ministry of Finance is ex officio a 
                                                 
559 ibid para 11 (1) - (3), First Schedule under s 5(2) 
560 ibid s 10 
561 CCS, ‘Changes to CCS Management and Divisions’ <https://www.ccs.gov.sg/about-ccs/ccs-
updates/changes-to-ccs-management-and-divsions> (updated on 20 April 2016) accessed 25 May 
2016 
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Commissioner. The Minister appoints 8 – 12 Commissioners. The TCC is under 
complete control of the Minister of Commerce.  
The Commissioners that are appointed by the Minister should be, in equal 
number, chosen from two groups: qualified persons in law, economics, business 
administration or public administration; and qualified members of the private sectors. 562 
This organisational structure is also prone to the private sectors undue influence over the 
TCC.563 The Commissioners, other than the Minister and the Permanent-Secretaries, are 
in office for only 2 years and are eligible for re-appointment for not more than two 
consecutive terms.564 This means that the TCC will be run mainly at the discretion of the 
Minister of Commerce with the aid of part-time Commissioners.  
The structure of the TCC is the major reason the TCA has not been effectively 
enforced. Two researchers from the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) 
found very close relationships between some former members of the TCC, businesses 
against which anticompetitive practices complaints were made, and politicians.565 They 
identified four major cases of conflict of interest as follows566 
 
 
                                                 
562 TCA s 6 
563 พนูสนิ วงศก์ลธตู (ed), รายงานทดีอีารไ์อ ฉบบัที ่92 มนีาคม 2554 (ฉบบัพเิศษ) เรือ่ง พระราชบญัญตัวิ่าดว้ยการแขง่ขนั
ทางการคา้ พ.ศ. 2542: ขอ้จาํกดัและการปฏริปู (1st edn, July 2012) 11 [Poonsin Wongkoltoot (ed), TDRI 
Report Issue 92 March 2012 (special edition) on Trade Competition Act 1999: Limitation and Reform] 
564 TCA s 9 
565 เดอืนเด่น นิคมบรริกัษ์ และ สุณพีร ทวรรณกุล, 'การผกูขาดทางธุรกจิกบัการเมอืง' (การสมันาวชิาการประจาํปี เรือ่ง สู่หนึ่ง
ทศวรรษหลงัวกิฤตเิศรษฐกจิ: ไดเ้รยีนรูแ้ละปรบัปรุงอะไรบา้ง?, ชลบุร,ี 9 - 10 ธนัวาคม พ.ศ. 2549 (2006)) 
<http://tdri.or.th/research/y06c/> accessed 24 May 2016 [Duenden Nikomborirak and 
Suneeporn Twankul, ‘Monopoly and Politics’ (Annual Seminar on A Decade After Economic 
Crisis: What have we learned and improved?, Chonburi, 9 -10 December 2006] 
566 ibid 8 - 10  
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1. Charoen Pokphand Group (CP) by Chiaravanont Family 
The CP Group owns extensive businesses.567 Complaints were lodged for 
anticompetitive practices, especially with regards to monopolies in seeds, animal food, 
eggs, retails, and cable television. Thanin Chiaravanont was advisor to the Minister of 
Finance. His niece’s husband, Wattana Muangsook, was the former deputy Minister of 
Commerce (2002-2003), the former Minister of Commerce (2004), the former Minister 
of Industry (March 2005), and the Minister of Social Development and Human Security 
(August 2005). Lieutenant Suchai Chaowisit was Director General of the Department of 
Internal Trade and a Member of the Audit Committee and Chairman of Independent 
Directors of CPAll (a subsidiary of CP) in 2000. He was an ex officio Secretary-General of 
the office of the TCC when the complaint against CP’s cable television business was 
lodged. 
2. Suramaharat Group (ThaiBev) by Sirivadhanabhakdi and 
Techapaiboon Families 
ThaiBev has extensive business groups, mostly in beverages and related 
industries.568 Complaints were made with regards to abuse of dominance practices, 
                                                 
567 Agro industry and food; crop integration; feed ingredients trading; seeds, fertilizer, plant protection; 
International trading; pet; pharmaceutical (China); marketing and distribution; 
telecommunication; property development; automotive and industrial products (China); plastics; 
finance and banking (China). See Charoen Pokphand Group, ‘About Us’ 
<http://www.cpgroupglobal.com/en/aboutus.php> accessed 24 May 2016 
568 Brewery groups (Beer Thai, Beerthip, Cosmos); distillery groups (Sangsom, Sura Bangyikhan, Red Bull); 
related business groups (including 7 companies such as Thai Beverage Recycle, Thai Beverage 
Energy, Thai Beverage Logistics, and Thai Molasses); marketing group (4 companies); 
international business group (International Beverage Holdings Limited is ThaiBev’s wholly own 
subsidiary which has 32 subsidiaries in six countries); sale group (Beer Group, Liquor Marketing 
Group, Sales Channels Management Group – total 18 companies); non-alcohol beverage business 
group (Thai Drinks, SPM Foods and Beverage); sale agent group (5 companies); group of  listed 
companies on the stock exchange of  Thailand (Oishi Group and Serm suk Group – total 14 
companies); trademark group (Thai Beverage Brands, Archa Beer, Beer Chang, Chang Beer 
International); and others ( 8 companies such as Re Bull Distillery (1998), Thai Beverage 
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especially tying and bundling and monopolistic behaviour in government procurement 
of supply of paper. Its links with politics are made through the Techapaiboon family. 
Wirun Techapaiboon (managing director) was deputy Minister of the Office of the 
Prime Minister and deputy Minister of Finance. Sumeth Techapaiboon’s son-in-law was 
the former deputy Minister of Finance, and a major donor of former PM Taksin 
Shinnawatra’s Thai Rak Thai party. Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi does not have a direct 
link to politics, but he invested in companies that belonged to the former PM Taksin 
Shinnawatra.    
3. Siam Cement Group (SCG) by the Crown Property Bureau  
The SCG owns four companies namely SCG Cement-Building Materials, SCG 
Chemicals, SCG Packaging, and SCG Investment.569 Complaints of abuse of dominance 
and hard core cartel (price fixing) were made. Although, the research did not find any 
relationship with politics, SCG’s managing director, Bodin Asavanij, was appointed as a 
Commissioner twice in 2000 and in 2004. 
4. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) by Ministry of Finance 
The SOEs in the research are those public companies listed in the stock 
exchange of Thailand. They are designated monopolies established under the laws such 
as MCOT which was used to monopolise radio wave, television and broadcasting in 
Thailand; Airport of Thailand which monopolises airport business; PTT which 
monopolises trade in gas and whose shares are held by many politicians either directly, 
by nominees (financial institutions), or holding companies. 
                                                                                                                                           
Training). See ThaiBev, ‘Business Groups’<http://www.thaibev.com/en08/home.aspx> accessed 
24 May 2016 
569 SCG, ‘Business Overview’  <http://www.scg.co.th/en/02business_overview/03_scg_cement_business.html> 
accessed 24 May 2016 
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Other than the relationships mentioned above, the researchers also identified 
four other conflict of interest cases between the alleged companies engaging in 
anticompetitive practices and Thai politicians such as AIS Co. Ltd (belonging to former 
PM Taksin Shinnawatra and his family members) which was accused of engaging in a 
cartel with another major mobile phone operator, DTAC, on tying and bundling mobile 
phones with phone services.570  
Needless to mention the TCC has failed to undertake what it is supposed to do 
for almost two decades. One disadvantage of this structure is that when there is an 
absence of government, the TCC cannot function. This happened with the last coup 
d’état` in Thailand. At that time, the TCC was due to expire from office, and it could not 
hold any meetings to consider complaints or issues. It had to wait until the new 
government was formed before it could resume its functions. 
It is clear that the current TCC was structured under the influence of politics and 
business. This certainly hinders and impedes judgement and decision making when it 
comes to prosecuting businesses, especially those big businesses with close ties to 
politicians. It is the most serious flaw in the enforcement of competition law system in 
Thailand. Thai competition law may have some drawbacks, but that could have been 
mended with the more active and efficient commission. Political will is clearly absent. 
Powerful conglomerates which belong to some elite families causes regulatory capture in 
the TCA. This problem cannot be solved unless an overhaul of structure and power of 
the TCA takes place. 
                                                 
570 นิคมบรริกัษ์ และ ทวรรณกุล, 'การผกูขาดทางธุรกจิกบัการเมอืง'  [Nikomborirak and Twankul, ‘Monopoly and 
Politics’] (n 565) 10 - 11 
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The Trade Competition Bill proposes an ‘overhaul’ of the structure of the TCC. 
For example there will be seven Commissioners who are shortlisted by a Selecting 
Committee.571 The Selecting Committee will submit the list to the Minister of 
Commerce, who will present the list to the Cabinet for approval. Once the Cabinet has 
approved the list, the Prime Minister shall appoint candidates who have been approved 
as Commissioners.572 The Commissioners will take office for a term of six years and are 
eligible for re-appointment for no more than two consecutive terms.573  
The Commissioners must have at least 10 years of experience in law, economics, 
finance, accounting, industry, business administration, consumer protection or other 
areas which are beneficial to the tasks of overseeing market competition.574 Political 
officials, members of parliament, senators, and people holding positions in political 
parties, members and senior officers of local administrations are not eligible to be 
Commissioners.575 The Commissioners must not hold managing position in business 
organisations; hold more than 5% of shares in any company; be government officials; be 
general partners in partnerships; be employees or contractors of government agencies, 
local government; or be directors or advisors of SOEs.576 
The new proposed Bill tries to solve this problem by excluding politicians and 
businessmen from being appointed as Commissioners. But the new Trade Competition 
                                                 
571 The Selecting Committee consists of  seven ex officio members – Permanent-Secretary of  Ministry of  
Commerce, Permanent-Secretary of  Ministry of  Finance, Permanent-Secretary of  Industry, 
Permanent-Secretary of  Agriculture and Cooperatives, Secretary-General of  National Economic 
and Social Development Board, Chairman of  Thai Chamber of  Commerce, Chairman of  
Federation of  Thai Industries (Drafted Trade Competition Bill s 11 (as of  15 March 2016)) 
572 Drafted Trade Competition Bill ss 8 and 12 (as of  15 March 2016) 
573 ibid s 15 
574 ibid s 9 
575 ibid s 10  
576 ibid s 13 
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Bill does not exclude family members of the politicians and businessmen from being 
appointed. This can still threaten the independence of the TCC.  
The function of the Office of the TCC is to carry out administrative tasks to 
support the TCC.577It is headed ex officio by the Director-General of the Department of 
Internal Trade who functions as its Secretary-General.578 However, the new Bill proposes 
a restructuring. The new Office of the TCC will be an independent governmental body, 
not under any Ministry. The new proposed Office of the TCC will be headed by a 
Secretary-General, who will be publicly recruited through selection and appointment, 
presumably by the TCC.579 In case nobody applies or the TCC does not find a suitable 
person from the public recruitment, the TCC can select and appoint anyone who is Thai, 
not over 65 years of age, and who can work full time for the Office of the TCC.580 The 
disqualifications of the Secretary-General are, inter alia, being a managing director of 
businesses, being a government official, being an employee or contractor of government 
agencies or SOEs, or holding positions in politics.581 Yet again, this does not prevent 
spouses and children of politicians and business moguls to apply for the position. 
5.3.2 Investigative and Prosecution Power of the CCS and the 
TCC and Private Enforcement 
The CCS and the TCC are vested with powers and duties to enable them to 
perform the tasks prescribed by respectively the SCA and the TCA. However, in this 
thesis, only the powers of the CCS and the TCC relating to investigation and prosecution 
will be examined because these powers are crucial to the functioning of the NCAs. Thus, 
                                                 
577 TCA s 18 
578 ibid 
579 Drafted Trade Competition Bill ss 37 and 40 (as of  15 March 2016) 
580 ibid ss 37 and 38 
581 ibid s 38 
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it is a good example to identify disparities in their investigative and prosecution power 
and private enforcement which impact the enforcement and hence the effectiveness of 
the Acts.   
A) Singapore 
The powers of the CCS are laid out in Section 7582 which does not go into great 
detail, but covers the necessary. The powers relating to investigation and prosecution are 
in Division 5 Enforcement. In this regard, the CCS has published the CCS Guidelines on 
the Powers of Investigation and the CCS Guidelines on Enforcement in June 2007 to 
clarify to the general public and stakeholders how the CCS will conduct its investigations 
as prescribed by Article 61 of the SCA. The CCS has both investigative and prosecution 
powers. 
Regarding its investigative powers, the CCS has the power to investigate the 
alleged anticompetitive agreements583 and abuse of dominance.584 The CCS can issue a 
written notice requiring a specific document, information, and explanation of 
documents, from a person or his present or past officer or employee, which the CCS 
considers related to its investigations.585 The CCS has investigative powers for 
anticompetitive behaviours if there are reasonable grounds for suspicion. In this regard, 
                                                 
582 Powers of  Commission 
7. – (1) Subject to the provisions of  this Act, the Commission may carry on such activities as appear to the 
Commission to be advantageous, necessary or convenient for it to carry on for or in connection 
with the performance of  its functions and the discharge of  its duties under this Act or any other 
written law and, in particular, the Commission may exercise any of  the powers specified in the 
Second Schedule. 
(2) This section shall not be construed as limiting any power of  the Commission conferred by or under 
any other written law. 
(3) The Commission shall furnish the Minister information with respect to its property and activities in 
such manner and at such times as the Minister may require. 
583 SCA s 34  
584 ibid s 47 
585 ibid ss 61A and 63  
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the CCS may appoint an inspector to conduct the investigations;586 enter into premises 
without warrant; 587 enter and search premises with warrant;588 and issue interim 
measures.589 
Upon the completion of the investigation, if the CCS finds that there is an 
infringement of Section 34 and/or Section 47, the CCS may give directions to bring the 
infringement to an end590 and requires the person concerned to modify the agreement or 
conduct, or to terminate the agreement, prohibit the anticipated merger from taking 
effect, or require the merger to be dissolved.591 The direction may be given to the parent 
company of a subsidiary which directly violates Section 34 and/or 47 of the Act.592 The 
CCS’s directions normally take immediate effect, but the CCS may allow a period of time 
for the undertaking to comply with the direction.593 
The CCS may apply to register the direction with a District Court. Once 
registered, the direction is effective as if it was issued by the District Court. Non-
compliance of the registered direction without reasonable excuse is considered contempt 
of court.594 The undertaking which is subject to the direction can appeal to the 
Competition Appeal Board (CAB) which is an independent body from the CCS.595 The 
                                                 
586 ibid s 62 
587 ibid s 64 
588 ibid s 65 
589 ibid s 67 
590 ibid s 69 
591 ibid s 69(2) 
592 CCS, ‘CCS Guidelines on Enforcement’ 3 
<https://www.ccs.gov.sg/legislation/~/media/custom/ccs/files/legislation/ccs%20gui
delines/ccsguidelineenforcementjul07final.ashx> accessed 25 June 2016 
593 ibid 4 
594 ibid 
595 ibid 5 
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CAB’s decisions are subject to judicial review by the High Court and then the Court of 
Appeal on point of law arising therefrom.596 
The SCA allows private enforcement in infringement of anticompetitive 
agreements and abuse of dominance in civil action against the infringing undertaking.597 
But the injured person can exercise such a right only after the CCS has made a decision 
of infringement in respect to the alleged anticompetitive conducts. And if there is an 
appeal regarding that direction, the injured person can exercise the right only upon the 
expiry of the appeal period or upon determination of the appeal.598 In this case, the court 
is bound by Section 86(7) to accept as final and conclusive any relevant infringement 
decisions599 by the Commission, the Competition Appeal Board, the High Court, and the 
Court of Appeal, which establish that the prohibition in question has been infringed. 
The time limitation in this case is two years after the time that the CCS made the 
decision or two years from the determination of the appeal, whichever occurs later.600 
B) Thailand 
The TCC does not have the power to conduct investigations. Section 8 of the 
TCA does not attribute such powers to the TCC.  The investigative powers belong to 
the investigative sub-committees which will be appointed by the TCC and there can be 
more than one investigative sub-committee to conduct investigations. Moreover, the 
investigative-subcommittee must consist of no more than 5 members, one of them must 
be either police or a public prosecutor, and the rest are government officials.601 It is clear 
                                                 
596 ibid 
597 SCA s 86 
598 ibid s 86(2) and (3); CCS, ‘CCS Guidelines on Enforcement’ (n 592) 5 
599 SCA s 86(3) 
600 ibid s 86(6); CCS, ‘CCS Guidelines on Enforcement’ (n 592) 13 
601 TCA s 14 
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that if the TCC does not appoint an investigative sub-committee, there will be no 
investigation.  
The Council of State has ruled that although the TCC is authorised to act as an 
inquiry officer under the Criminal Procedure Code,602 the TCC cannot conduct the 
investigation by itself. The TCC is required by Section 14 to appoint the investigative 
sub-committee to conduct the investigation. Once the investigation is complete, the 
investigative sub-committee must submit its evidence, its findings, and its opinion to the 
TCC for further consideration. 603 The implication of this interpretation is that the TCC 
must always appoint an investigative sub-committee to conduct an investigation under 
this Act. Hence, the assumption that the TCA intends to authorise the investigative sub-
committee only to investigate cartels may not be accurate.604 Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that opinions of the Council of State is not binding on the Judiciary. 
If the TCC considers that an undertaking has infringed the TCA, the TCC has 
the power to issue a written administrative order requiring the undertaking to suspend, 
cease, rectify or vary its acts. It should be noted that the TCC cannot impose a fine on 
an undertaking upon issuing this administrative order. The TCC is immune from any 
claims from the undertaking for issuing this written order. In this regard, the 
                                                 
602 TCA s 15 
603 สาํนักงานคณะกรรมการกฤษฎีกา, บนัทกึสาํนักงานคณะกรรมการกฤษฎีกา เรื่อง อํานาจการสอบสวนตามกฎหมายว่า
ด้วยการแข่งขนัทางการค้า (เรื่องเสร็จที่ ๒๐๙/๒๕๕๒) 5 – 6 [Office of  the Council of  State, 
Memorandum of  the Office of  the Council of  State on  Investigative Power under the Trade 
Competition Law (finished matter no. 209/2009) 
<http://law.dit.go.th/Upload/Document/%E0%B9%80%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B7%E0%B9%88
%E0%B8%AD%E0%B8%87%E0%B9%80%E0%B8%AA%E0%B8%A3%E0%B9%87%E0%B8%
88%20209-
52%20%E0%B8%AD%E0%B8%B3%E0%B8%99%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%88%E0%B8%AA%E0
%B8%AD%E0%B8%9A%E0%B8%AA%E0%B8%A7%E0%B8%99.pdf> accessed 30 May 2016 
604 UNCTAD, Review of  Recent Experiences on the Formulation and Implementation of  Competition Law and Policy in 
Selected Developing Countries: Thailand, Lao, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe (n 525) 20 
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undertakings have the statutory right to be heard.605 The TCC is required statutorily to 
specify its reasons for both questions of fact and questions of law and sign this written 
order.606 The order is subject to review by the Appellate Committee, which is final.607  
However, the TCC cannot sue undertakings violating the TCA on its own. It 
must refer the case with its opinion to pursue legal action to the public prosecutors. If 
the public prosecutor rejects the application from the TCC, the Chairman of the TCC 
(which is the Minister of Commerce) will have to appeal to the Attorney General for a 
final decision.608  If the Attorney General decides in favour of the TCC, the case will be 
brought to the court. If the Attorney General decides against the TCC, the case is 
dropped.609  
Under the proposed Bill, the TCC still has to submit its opinion to the public 
prosecutor. And if the prosecutor refuses by issuing a non-prosecution order, the TCC 
has the right under the proposed Bill to appeal such order to the Attorney General. If 
the Attorney General opines that the case is not complete and needs further 
investigation, the Chairman of the TCC and the Attorney General shall establish a 
working group comprised of an equal number of representatives from the TCC and the 
public prosecutor office to complete the investigation. Once the co-committee finishes 
the investigation, it shall submit the case to the Attorney General to file the case before 
the Court.610 
                                                 
605 TCA s 32 para 1  
606 ibid s 32 para 2 
607 ibid ss 31, 42 – 47  
608 ibid s 16 
609 Criminal Procedure Code B.E. 2477 s 145/1 as amended by the National Council for Peach and Order, 
Order 115/2557 on Amendments of  the Criminal Procedure Code dated 21 July 2014 
610 Drafted Trade Competition Bill s 27 (as of  15 March 2016) 
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Private litigation is allowed under the current TCA; civil societies are also eligible 
to sue on behalf of consumers.611  However, the injured persons are not allowed by the 
TCA to institute a criminal action on their own, they have to lodge a criminal complaint 
to the TCC for consideration.612 The time limit for an injured person to bring a claim to 
the court is within one year from the date the injured person has or ought to have had 
the knowledge of the grounds for action.613 The right of private enforcement remains the 
same in the proposed Bill.614 
 
 
5.4 CASE STUDIES ON ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 
The objective of this section is to provide evidence in as much detail as possible, 
subject to availability of reliable data, on the enforcement by the CCS and the TCC of 
abuse of dominance provisions to demonstrate the great disparities between these 
authorities and their approaches in the analysis of the cases as well as their transparency 
and accountability. The disparities in these areas are evidence as to why it is highly 
unlikely that a supranational approach to competition law and policy in ASEAN will be 
possible and hence this cannot enhance ASEAN’s competitiveness.  
5.4.1 Singapore 
Section 47 of the SCA covers abuse of dominance. There are some exemptions 
provided under the Third Schedule. There has been only one case of abuse of 
                                                 
611 TCA s 40  
612 ibid ss 8(13) and 55  
613 ibid s 41 
614 Drafted Trade Competition Bill ss 75 and 76 (as of  15 March 2016) 
232 
 
dominance before the CAB which was final. There are another four cases on abuse of 
dominance615 which the CCS has investigated, but the undertakings in question have 
made voluntary commitments to the CCS to amend their business practices. The CCS 
conducted the investigation and analysed its first abuse of dominance case very carefully 
and thoroughly as is shown below.  
This thesis argues that as a result of its strong commitment to curb and punish 
abusive incumbents with hefty fines and the elaborated legal reasoning and economic 
analysis applied to the first abuse of dominance case, the CCS has received full 
cooperation from incumbents in later cases to provide voluntary commitments instead 
of spending their time and resources to fight against the CCS.  
A) SISTIC.com Pte Ltd616 (SISTIC) 
On 4 June 2010, the CCS issued an infringement decision against SISTIC for 
infringing Section 47 of the SCA on the ground of abuse of dominance by concluding a 
large number of exclusive agreements with venue operators in Singapore which resulted 
in closure of market entrance and hence the market being distorted. The CCS imposed 
SGD 989,000 for infringing Section 47 pursuant to Section 69(4) of the SCA, which 
allows the CCS to impose up to 10% of turnover in Singapore for each year of 
infringement. 
After the case was final, the CCS commissioned Professor Stephen Davies to 
conduct post-enforcement evaluation of markets. 617 The project was completed and a 
                                                 
615 Up until February 2016 
616 Re Abuse of  a Dominant Position by SISTIC.com Pte Ltd [2010] SGCCS 3  
617 CCS, ‘Occasional Paper: Post-Enforcement Evaluation Methodologies and Indicative Findings’ (26 
August 2013) 11 - 12 <http://www.ccs.gov.sg/content/ccs/en/Media-and- 
Publications/Publications.html> accessed 27 April 2016 
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report was published on 26 August 2013. Although is quite early to assess this, it is still 
relevant to this thesis. 
After enforcement of the decision, the market shares of the smaller competitors 
of SISTIC’s have doubled. And the market had a new entrant from Japan. But SISTIC 
continues to enjoy the benefit of being the first mover and brand loyalty from the event 
promoters. Disappointingly, there is no evidence that the CCS’s decision has had an 
impact on SISTIC’s booking fee. 
B) Coca-Cola Singapore Beverages (CCSB)618 
In March 2012 the CCS received a complaint on CCSB anticompetitive practices 
that consisted of concluding exclusive agreements and engaging in rebates with local soft 
drink distributors. Upon investigation, the CCSB provided the CCS with a voluntary 
agreement to remove the anticompetitive clauses in its agreements with local 
distributors. The CCS then ceased investigation, but will continue to closely monitor 
market practices. 
C) Cordlife Group Limited (Cordlife) 619 
In June 2014, the CCS commenced an investigation on Cordlife regarding its 
exclusive agreements with baby fair organisers and hospitals which could potentially 
have the effect of limiting competition under Section 47. Cordlife provided the CCS with 
voluntary commitments to remove the existing exclusive arrangements that were subject 
                                                 
618 CCS, ‘Media Release: Coca-Cola Singapore Beverages Changes Business Practices in Local Soft Drinks 
Market following Enquiry by CCS’ <https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-publications/media-
releases/cocacola-singapore-beverages-changes-business-practices-in-local-soft-drinks-market-
following-enquiry-by-ccs> accessed 31 May 2016 
619 CCS, ‘Media Release: Cordlife removes exclusive arrangements with baby fair organisers and hospitals 
following investigation by CCS’ (last updated 19 June 2015) <https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-
publications/media-releases/cordlife-removes-exclusive-arrangements> accessed 26 May 2016 
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to investigation. The CCS was satisfied with the proposed voluntary commitment and 
ceased its investigation on 17 June 2015. 
D) Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. (APBS) 620 
The CCS received complaints regarding APBS for infringing Section 47. APBS 
concludes outlet-exclusive contracts with retailers prohibiting them from selling draught 
beer from competing suppliers and restricting the choices of draught beers available to 
retailers and consumers.  The CCS conducted an investigation and commissioned a 
market survey accordingly. APBS has since provided the CCS with a voluntary 
commitment to cease its outlet-exclusivity practice and will not impose this condition in 
its supply of draught beer contracts with retailers which are entered into from 28 
December 2015; including renewal contracts. Thus, the CCS ceased its investigation on 
28 October 2015. 
E) Supply of Lift Spare Parts for Maintenance of Lifts in HDB 
Estates621 
The CCS received a complaint regarding a supplier of a specific brand of lift 
parts (the Company) that supplies lift spare parts for the purposes of service and 
maintaining lifts located in a Housing Development Board (HDB) estate which would 
likely infringe Section 47. The CCS investigated and the Company provided the CCS 
with a voluntary commitment to amend its business practices. The CCS conducted a 
                                                 
620 CCS, ‘Media Release: Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Ends Exclusive Business Practices Following 
CCS Investigation’ (last update 7 January 2016) <https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-
publications/media-releases/asia-pacific-breweries-singapore-ends-exclusive-business-practices-
following-ccs-investigation> accessed 26 May 2016 
621 CCS, ‘Media Release: Supply of  Lift Spare Parts for Maintenance of  Lifts in HDB Estates: CCS 
Consults on Proposed Voluntary Commitments by Supplier’ (last update 22 January 2016) 
<https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-publications/media-releases/supply-of-lift-spare-parts-
public-consultation-on-proposed-voluntary-commitments-by-supplier> accessed 26 May 2016 
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public consultation from 22 January – 5 February 2016 and invited interested parties to 
provide feedback on the proposed commitment which is a list of amended Terms and 
Conditions of Supply attached to the Proposed Commitment. The case is pending (as of 
May 2016). 
5.4.2 Thailand 
As said, Thailand has a consistently poor record of competition law enforcement 
due to the structure of the TCC. Regarding abuse of dominance, Section 25 of the 
current TCA622 prohibits a dominant business operator (undertaking) from engaging in 
certain anticompetitive practices such as predatory pricing, exclusive dealing, limiting 
production, and interfering with other undertakings’ business practices, which are subject 
to vague notions such as ‘unfairly’ and ‘without justifiable reason’.623 
Section 3 of the SCA defines ‘business operator with market domination’ as  
one or more business operators in the market of any 
goods or service who have the market share and sales volume 
above that prescribed by the Commission with the approval of 
the Council of Ministers and published in the Government 
Gazette, having regard to the market competition. (emphasis 
added)624 
                                                 
622 Abuse of  Dominance under the new proposed Bill is in Section 58 which is identical to the current 
TCA Section 25 
623 Section 25. A business operator having market domination shall not act in any of  the following 
manners:  
(1) unfairly fixing or maintaining purchasing or selling prices of  goods or fees for services;  
(2) unfairly fixing compulsory conditions, directly or indirectly, requiring other business operators who 
are his or her customers to restrict services, production, purchase or distribution of  goods, or 
restrict opportunities in purchasing or selling goods, receiving or providing services or obtaining 
credits from other business operators;  
(3) suspending, reducing or restricting services, production, purchase, distribution, deliveries or 
importation without justifiable reasons, or destroying or causing damage to goods in order to 
reduce the quantity to be lower than the market demand;  
(4) interfering in the operation of  business of  other persons without justifiable reasons. 
624 The new proposed Bill provides almost the same definition quoted here. However, it imposes a revision 
requirement on the TCC to revise the definition at least every 5 years from the date of  the 
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It was reported that the original market dominance threshold proposal submitted 
for the Cabinet’s approval in 2000625 was that dominant firms need to hold only 33% of 
market share with the same amount of turnover.626 However, before the proposal was 
approved, the TCC decided to shift its approach from one threshold which is applicable 
to all industries to a sector specific approach.627 The first two industries which came 
under scrutiny from the TCC were the retail and wholesale industry and the motorcycle 
industry.628  
The reason for such selective considerations was ambiguous as reported in 
anonymous interviews conducted with representatives of the Thai retail and motorcycle 
industries on 30 October 2003 by Williams. The interviewees revealed that the abrupt 
shift in policy was caused by lobbying from domestic undertakings, and ironically by 
concern over the growth of FDI in these domestic markets.629 The proposed threshold 
for retail and wholesale sector was for a dominant incumbent to hold at least 20% 
market share and have a turnover of 27 billion Baht or more in the relevant market.630  
However, that proposal received negative criticism from academics, business 
sectors and civil societies for reasons of discrimination.631 It was reported that a year 
later, Mr Wattana Muangsook, the then Minister of Commerce and the ex officio 
                                                                                                                                           
publication of  the Notification in the Royal Gazette. (Section 4 of  the Drafted Trade 
Competition Bill) 
625 Williams, ‘Competition Law in Thailand: Seeds of  Success or Fated to Fail?’  (n 520) 481 
626 Thanitkul, ‘Competition Law in Thailand: A Preliminary Analysis’ (n 525) 175 
627 Williams, ‘Competition Law in Thailand: Seeds of  Success or Fated to Fail?’  (n 520) 481; ‘Motorcycle 
Industry Scrutinized by Trade Competition Law’ (2003) 5 SGA Bulletin, 3 
<http://www.chaninatandleeds.com/Thailand%20Law%20News%20Jan03.html#hl6> accessed 5 
June 2014 
628 Williams, ‘Competition Law in Thailand: Seeds of  Success or Fated to Fail?’  (n 520) 482  
629 ibid  
630 ibid 481  
631 Deunden Nikomborirak, ‘The Political Economy of  Competition Law: The Case of  Thailand’ (2006) 
26 Northwestern Journal of  International Law & Business 597, 604 
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Chairman of the TCC, withdrew this proposal. Nikomborirak opined that the decision to 
withdraw the threshold was due to its inappropriateness, and reckoned that the strategy 
to withdraw the proposed threshold was ‘merely a tactic to further delay the 
establishment of the definition of dominance and, hence, the enforcement of the law.’632 
But this thesis argues that Wattana Muangsook, former Minister of Commerce, withdrew 
this proposal because it could potentially affect his wife’s family business, because if the 
threshold was in effect, Tesco Lotus and Makro could potentially fall within the category 
of dominant undertaking633. 
After several proposals, the TCC finally obtained Cabinet’s approval to issue a 
fundamental definition. On 8th February 2007, the Notifications of the TCC on the 
Criteria for Business Operator with Market Domination634 took effect. A World Bank 
expert was cited that the criteria were set too high in the context of Thailand, and that 
there were approximately only a 100 firms that could be considered as holding a 
dominant position635  (as it requires the firm to hold over 50% market share in the 
previous year and at least a yearly turnover of one billion Baht (approximately 
£20,000,000.00)). 636  As evident, the definition of dominance under the TCA and the 
                                                 
632 ibid 
633 See his conflict of  interest link to a powerful business group at CP Group at Charoen Pokphand 
Group (CP) by Chiaravanont Family on p. 217 and note 689 below 
634 ประกาศคณะกรรมการการแขง่ขนัทางการคา้ เรือ่ง หลกัเกณฑก์ารเป็นผูป้ระกอบธุรกจิซึง่มอีํานาจเหนือตลาด, ราชกจิจา
นุเบกษาฉบบัประกาศและงานทัว่ไปเล่ม ๑๒๔ ตอนพเิศษ ๑๕ง  ลงวนัที ่7 กุมภาพนัธ ์พ.ศ. 2550 (Hereinafter 
referred to as Notification of  Dominance Criteria) [The Trade Competition Commission 
Notification titled Notification of  Dominance Criteria, Royal Gazette issue 124 special edition 
15ngor dated 7 February 2007] 
635 ศกัดา ธนิตกุล, คาํอธบิายและกรณศีกึษา พระราชบญัญตักิารแขง่ขนัทางการคา้ พ.ศ. 2542 (2nd ed, วญิ�ชูน  พ.ศ. 
2553) 94 [Sakda Thanitkul, Explanation and Case Studies Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 (2nd, 
Winyuchon 2010)] 
636 ‘1. Business operator, in any goods or services, with market share in the previous year over 50% and at 
least 1,000 million baht turnover; or  
       2. The top three business operators, in any goods or services, with combined market share in the 
previous year over 75% and at least 1,000 million baht turnover  
       The exception is for a business operator with the market share less than 10% or turnover less than 
1,000 million baht in the previous year.’ (tentative translation by Office of  the TCC) 
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SCA differs greatly. According to Both, different meanings given to ‘dominance’ can 
complicate cooperation on the regional level.637  
The TCC published the Guidelines on Section 25 dated January 2009,638 which 
stated explicitly that acquiring dominance is not prohibited under the TCA, but that the 
abuse of such dominance is.639 This Guideline was reviewed for potential updates by a 
specialised sub-commission.640 
The Guidelines use the term ‘relevant market’ and mention product and 
geographical market. Regarding geographical market, it takes into account substitution, 
cost of transportation, and product deterioration as determinants for the geographical 
market, but not the SSNIP test. Example given of cost of transportation is confusing. It 
states:  
‘(1) Cost of delivery is high when compared with 
product value. For example, the delivery of the products from 
Central Thailand to the North costs a lot of money hence 
products sold in the North are more expensive than products 
sold in the Centre. Consequently, the products which are 
delivered to the North cannot compete with the products sold 
in the Centre. It follows that the Central and the North areas are 
                                                 
637 Both, ‘Drivers of  International Cooperation in Competition Law Enforcement’ (n 505) 310 
638 คณะกรรมการการแขง่ขนัทางการคา้, แนวปฏบิตัติามมาตรา 25 แห่งพระราชบญัญตักิารแขง่ขนัทางการคา้ พ.ศ. 2542 
การใชอ้ํานาจเหนือตลาดในทางมชิอบ มกราคม พ.ศ. 2552 <http://otcc.dit.go.th/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Guidelines-under-Section-25.pdf> accessed 30 March 2015 [Trade 
Comeptition Commission, Guidelines Under Section 25 of  the Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 
on Abuse of  Dominance dated January 2009] 
639 ibid 1 
640 Sakda Thanitkul and Duenden Nikomborirak were among the six appointees to review Guidelines on 
Section 25, Section 27, and Section 29. The specialised sub-committee was appointed on 7 
January 2015 and expected to finish the reviews of  the three Guidelines within 3 months. 
However, the report of  this specialised sub-committee is not publicly available on the TCC 
website. See ประกาศคณะกรรมการการแขง่ขนัทางการคา้ เรือ่ง การแต่งตัง้คณะอนุกรรมการเชีย่วชาญเฉพาะ
เรือ่ง การจดัทาํแนวปฏบิตัทิางการคา้ทีเ่ป็นธรรม ลงวนัที ่ 7 มกราคม พ.ศ. 2558  
<http://law.dit.go.th/Upload/Document/9337e47a-27f8-44d7-8bbb-9c1b8cceb10b.pdf> 
accessed 28 May 2016 [Trade Competition Commission Notification titled Appointment of  
specialized sub-committee on Preparation of  the Guideline on Fair Trade Practices date 7 
January 201] 
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not in the same geographical market.’641 (Tentative translation by 
the author) 
The example given of product deterioration is even more confusing. It states: 
‘(2) Products which are prone to deteriorate or have 
limited shelve life such as fresh fruits and vegetables may not be 
suitable for long distance transportation and to be sold in 
remote area, and are not substitutable. Hence, they are in 
different geographical markets.’642 (Tentative translation by the 
author) 
These examples given are confusing as they do not appear relevant. Determining 
a geographical market by asking whether costs of transportation are higher, or products 
will deteriorate quicker without examining whether consumers are willing to switch to 
sellers in neighbouring areas if the price is increased by 10%, the mobility of buyers, as 
well as the ability of other competitors from neighbouring areas to respond to buyers’ 
demand in a prompt and cost effective manner, is a questionable practice. According to 
this definition, mangoes sold in Bangkok are not in the same geographical market as 
mangoes sold in Chiangmai without regard to the ability of the supplier to deliver these 
mangoes efficiently at low cost and in a short time.  
It is true that high transportation costs can result in a smaller geographic market, 
as explained by the Guidelines on Section 47 Prohibition of Singapore,643 but the CCS 
takes other factors into consideration too. Besides, the definition of geographical market 
as provided in the TCC Guidelines does not suit the geography of the market for 
services.  
                                                 
641 คณะกรรมการการแขง่ขนัทางการคา้, แนวปฏบิตัติามมาตรา 25 แห่งพระราชบญัญตักิารแขง่ขนัทางการคา้ พ.ศ. 2542 
การใชอ้ํานาจเหนือตลาดในทางมชิอบ (n 638) 3 [Trade Competition Commission, Guidelines Under 
Section 25 of  the Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 on Abuse of  Dominance] 
642 ibid 
643 CCS, ‘CCS Guidelines on Market Definition’ (CCS 2007) para 4.8 
<http://www.ccs.gov.sg/legislation/~/media/custom/ccs/files/legislation/ccs%20guidelines/m
ktdefinitionjul07final.ashx> accessed 16 August 2012 
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Regarding the product market, the TCA takes into consideration 7 factors ,listed 
here from the most influential to the least important: demand-substitution and cross 
elasticity of demand (using SSNIP test), supply-substitution and cross elasticity of supply 
and switching costs, final usage of products by consumers (aims of product 
consumption) and switching costs incurred by buyers, buyers’ recognition and 
perception of products/services, distribution channels (through distributor or direct 
sale), price and quality, and physical appearance of products/services. 644  
The Guidelines explicitly mention that the TCC may obtain data relating to the 
buyers’ recognition and perception of products/services by conducting market surveys, 
questionnaires, or by making use of previous researches.645 This is a very different 
approach to the CCS because the CCS explicitly states that determination of the relevant 
market should not rely on an earlier definition as market competition may have 
changed.646 
One can conjecture that the enforcement of abuse of dominance in Thailand is 
challenging as neither the TCA, nor the Notification of Dominance Criteria, nor the 
Guidelines on Section 25 provide clear and useful examples for defining the market and 
assessing dominance There is no mention of market power and it does not mention 
judgements in abuse of dominance cases in Japan, Germany, Korea, and Taiwan as 
useful references even though the TCA was modelled after the competition laws of these 
countries. The reality in enforcing Section 25 supports the thesis that the structure of the 
                                                 
644 คณะกรรมการการแขง่ขนัทางการคา้, แนวปฏบิตัติามมาตรา 25 แห่งพระราชบญัญตักิารแขง่ขนัทางการคา้ พ.ศ. 2542 
การใชอ้ํานาจเหนือตลาดในทางมชิอบ (n 638) 3 – 4 [Trade Competition Commission, Guidelines 
Under Section 25 of  the Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 on Abuse of  Dominance] 
645 ibid 4  
646 CCS, ‘CCS Guidelines on Market Definition’ (n 643) paras 5.8 - 5.9 
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TCC and the Office of the TCC as well as the TCA are not promoting competition and 
competitiveness. 
There is a clear lack of transparency and accountability on the part of the TCC in 
advocacy of competition law and policy in Thailand. There are a total of 95 complaints 
lodged with the TCC between October 1999 and March 2015; 53 of which concern 
unfair trade practices; 24 of which concern anticompetitive agreements; and 18 of which 
concern abuse of dominance.647 According to Nikomborirak, there is no information on 
how these decisions were made by the TCC and what information the TCC took into 
consideration.648 When a party to the complaint requested a copy of a non-confidential 
version of its decisions, the TCC made it difficult for the interested party to obtain such 
information.649  
                                                 
647 สภาปฏริปูแห่งชาต,ิ วาระปฏริปูที ่ ๑๒: การผกูขาดและการแขง่ขนัทีเ่ป็นธรรม: การปฏริปูกฎหมายแขง่ขนัทางการคา้ (n 
213) 13 - 14 [National Reform Council of  Thailandม Reform Agenda No. 12: Monopoly and Fair 
Competition: Trade Competition Law Reform] 
648 นิคมบรริกัษ์, การปฏริปูเพือ่ลดการผกูขาดและส่งเสรมิการแขง่ขนัในเศรษฐกจิไทย (n 520) 13 – 15 [Nikomborirak, A 
Reform to Alleviate Monopoly and Promote Competition in Thai Economy] 
649 คาํวนิิจฉยัคณะกรรมการวนิิจฉยัการเปิดเผยขอ้มลูขา่วสารสาขาเศรษฐกจิและการคลงัของประเทศ ที ่ ศค ๖/๒๕๔๕ เรือ่ง 
อุทธรณ์คาํสัง่มใิหเ้ปิดเผยขอ้มลูขา่วสารเกีย่วกบัการพจิารณาและคาํวนิิจฉยัของคณะกรรมการการแขง่ขนัทางการคา้ 
กรณทีีม่กีารรอ้งเรยีนว่ามกีารขายพว่งอนัเป็นการฝ่าฝืนพระราชบญัญตักิารแขง่ขนัทางการคา้ พ.ศ. ๒๕๔๒ dated 
5 November B.E. 2545 (2002) <http://www.oic.go.th/FILEROOM-
PDF/CABOICFORM05/DRAWER01/GENERAL/DATA0002/00002559.tif.pdf> accessed 
23 February 2016. [Decision of  the Information Disclosure Tribunal of  Economics and 
National’s Finance Division number Sor Kor 6/2545 on Appeal of  the Decision not to disclose 
information relating to proceedings and decision of  the Trade Competition Commission on a 
complaint of  an alleged tying and bundling which violates the Trade Competition Act 1999 dated 
5 November 2002] In this case, Boonrod Brewery Co. Ltd (Boonrod), complainant of  the abuse 
of  dominance by ThaiBev, file a request with the TCC for a copy of  the TCC’s decision on its 
complaint, particularly on the TCC’s legal reasoning in questions of  law and questions of  fact as 
well as individual Commissioner’s opinions and dissenting opinions on 4 October 2000, but the 
TCC refused citing these information could not be disclosed according to Section 53 of  the 
TCA, and that the disclosure of  such information would prevent the Commissioners from giving 
their opinions freely without being under pressure. Then Boonrod appealed to the Office of  the 
Official Information Commission (OIC) on 8 November 2000. The OIC found that Boonrod’s 
request was not clear and ordered it to re-submit its request to the TCC. Boonrod resubmitted its 
request accordingly on 19 February 2001 to the TCC. But the TCC denied disclosing this 
information claiming the same reason on 19 March 2002. Boonrod appealed to the OIC again on 
18 June 2002. The OIC ordered the TCC to disclose the information to Boonrod on 5 
November 2002.   
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The only official and publicly available information about cases decided by the 
TCC that contain  ‘legal reasoning’, is in the bulletin published by the Department of 
Internal Trade (DIT).650 However, this bulletin does not contain all cases on abuse of 
dominance hence academics’ criticism of and references to the cases are used to 
complete the findings. 
It should be noted that since the enforcement of the TCA in 1999, no case was 
filed to the Court. And the Cabinet has never appointed an Appellate Committee 
pursuant to Section 42.651 Case studies on abuse of dominance in Thailand are narratively 
examined below. It should be noted that most cases are dated. The last case on 
TrueVisions is the most recent case which did not receive any attention from the TCC. 
A) Whiskey and Beer Tying 
Tying whiskey with beers is not a new trade practice in Thailand. It already made 
the headlines in 1997.652 In early 2000, Boonrod Brewery, producer of Singha Beer, filed 
a complaint to the Prime Minister alleging that the Suramaharat violated Section 25(2) 
(unfairly tying and bundling) and 29 (unfair trade practices)653 of the TCA. The Office of 
the Prime Minister forwarded the complaint to the Minister of Commerce as ex officio 
                                                 
650 กรมการคา้ภายใน, 'รูร้อบงานแขง่ขนัทางการคา้: ครบรอบ 72 ปี วนัสถาปนากรมการคา้ภายใน' [Department of  
Internal Trade, ‘Understanding Trade Competition Work: 72nd Anniversary of  the Establishment 
of  the Department of  Internal Trade’] 
651 Under the new proposed Bill, there will be no Appellate Committee because the TCC is authorised to 
consider the appeals of  its own decisions. The decisions on the appeals are final. There is no 
provision on judiciary review. (Sections 77 and 79 paragraph 3 of  the Drafted Trade Competition 
Bill as of  15 March 2016) 
652 นิคมบรริกัษ์ และ ทวรรณกุล, 'การผกูขาดทางธุรกจิกบัการเมอืง'  [Nikomborirak and Twankul, ‘Monopoly and 
Politics’] (n 565) 27; See background of  beer market in Thailand in Williams, ‘Competition Law 
in Thailand: Seeds of  Success or Fated to Fail?’  (n 520) 478 
653 TCC section 29 A business operator shall not carry out any act which is not free and fair competition 
and has the effect of  destroying, impairing, obstructing, impeding or restricting business 
operation of  other business operators or preventing other persons from carrying out business or 
causing their cessation of  business. 
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Chairman of the TCC. The TCC then appointed a sub-committee to conduct a study on 
the market and the complaint.654 
In June 2000, the sub-committee on whiskey and beers tying found that: 1. 
Suramaharat owns ThaiBev, the producer of Chang Beer. Suramaharat has a statutory 
monopoly on Thai whiskey. There are cross ownerships among the distributors, 
producer groups, and sub-distributors of ThaiBev and Suramaharat. Both corporations 
share the same board of directors. Suramaharat’s distributors and sub-distributors are 
located at the same address as Chang Beer.655 Although the Bulletin of the DIT does not 
explicitly state that the sub-committee applied the SEE test, the explanation seems to 
point to that conclusion. 
The sub-committee found that there was tying of Thai whiskey produced by the 
Suramaharat with Chang beer at many levels of distribution. The conditions of tying and 
bundling varied. Sometimes the distributors were allowed to not buy the tied Chang 
beer, but the tying Thai whiskey would be more expensive when bought alone, and 
sometimes ratios between Thai whiskey and Chang beers were imposed etc.656 
The sub-committee found that Suramaharat unfairly tied Chang beer with its 
Thai whiskey. But in 2002, the criteria on market share and turnover of a dominant 
undertaking were not yet enforced. Thus, there were not enough facts to determine 
whether Suramaharat was a dominant undertaking pursuant to Section 3.657 
                                                 
654 ธนิตกุล, คาํอธบิายและกรณศีกึษา พระราชบญัญตักิารแขง่ขนัทางการคา้ พ.ศ. 2542 (n 635) 380 – 381 [Thanitkul, 
Explanation and Case Studies Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542] 
655 กรมการคา้ภายใน, 'รูร้อบงานแขง่ขนัทางการคา้: ครบรอบ 72 ปี วนัสถาปนากรมการคา้ภายใน' (n 650) 48 – 49 
[Department of  Internal Tradeม ‘Understanding Trade Competition Work: 72nd Anniversary of  
the Establishment of  the Department of  Internal Trade’] 
656 ibid 49 
657 ibid 50 
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However, the sub-committee also considered Section 27(3) (10) (anticompetitive 
agreements)658 and Section 29 (unfair trade practices)659 and concluded that tying and 
bundling was provided for specifically in Section 25. Therefore, Section 25 should be 
applied. Besides, violations of Section 27(3) (10) consist of agreements between 
competitors (horizontal agreements), not vertical agreements. And market survey also 
found that whiskey and beer were not in the same market. The majority of the sub-
committee found that there was not enough evidence of an agreement with a view to 
have market dominance or market control.660 
Regarding the infringement of Section 29, some members of the sub-committee 
opined that this section is an umbrella clause and that hence the whiskey and beer tying 
in question should be subject to this. However, the majority of the sub-committee found 
that tying and bundling was normal business practice to maximise profits and could not 
be considered as destroying, impairing, obstructing, impeding, or restricting business 
operations of other undertakings or preventing other undertakings from carrying out 
business or causing cessation of their businesses.661 The interpretation of the majority of 
the sub-committee is worrying, because it focused on type of conduct rather than the 
effects of such conduct. This is contrary to the provision of Section 29 (see note 6530) 
Finally, the TCC agreed with the sub-committee and ruled that the alleged tying 
practices did not violate Section 25, 27, and 29. However, the TCC notified the sub-
distributors that the tie-in of Chang beer was an inappropriate practice and hence should 
                                                 
658 TCC section 27 
659 See note 653 
660 กรมการคา้ภายใน, รูร้อบงานแขง่ขนัทางการคา้: ครบรอบ 72 ปี วนัสถาปนากรมการคา้ภายใน'  (n 650) 50 
[Department of  Internal Tradeม ‘Understanding Trade Competition Work: 72nd Anniversary of  
the Establishment of  the Department of  Internal Trade’] 
661 ibid 50 - 51 
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be terminated.662 The TCC also directed the DIT to occasionally monitor marketing 
practices of the distributors and producers in the beer and whiskey industry and report 
findings to the TCC.663 
B) Cable Television v Consumers 664 
In early 2000, the TCC received complaints from consumer groups relating to 
abuse of dominance of a monopoly cable television company which increased its 
member packages fee and limited choices for its members.   
Prior to 1998 there used to be two cable television companies namely 
International Broadcasting Corporation Plc., and UTV Cable Network Plc. These 
companies were granted concessions from the MCOT665 in form of a joint-venture 
agreement between them and the MCOT. Due to the financial crisis during 1997-1998, 
the two competitors restructured their shareholder structure and acquired cross 
ownership with approval from the MCOT. They remain different legal entities, but use 
the same trademark “UBC”. The acquisition did not affect the joint-venture agreement 
that they have with the MCOT.  
                                                 
662 ibid; See also Williams, ‘Competition Law in Thailand: Seeds of  Success or Fated to Fail?’  (n 520) 478-
479; UNCTAD, Review of  Recent Experiences in the Formulation and Implementation of  Competition Law 
and Policy in Selected Developing Countries: Thailand, Lao, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe (n 525) 23 - 24;  
Nikomborirak, ‘The Political Economy of  Competition Law: The Case of  Thailand’ (n 631) 603; 
นิคมบรริกัษ์ และ ทวรรณกุล, 'การผกูขาดทางธุรกจิกบัการเมอืง'  [Nikomborirak and Twankul, ‘Monopoly 
and Politics’] (n 565) 27; Kohpaiboon, Chantasakda, and Tanasritunyakul, ‘Competition Policy in 
Thailand’ (n 520) 19;  นิคมบรริกัษ์, การปฏริปูเพือ่ลดการผกูขาดและส่งเสรมิการแขง่ขนัในเศรษฐกจิไทย (n 
520) 20 [Nikomborirak, A Reform to Alleviate Monopoly and Promote Competition in Thai Economy]  
663 There are another two Notifications of  the TCC on Appointment of  the Investigative Sub-Committee 
in Relation to Whiskey and Beer tying dated 24 February 2554 (2011) and 20 June 2556 (2013). 
However, the reports of  these Investigative Sub-Committees are not publicly available. 
664 กรมการคา้ภายใน รูร้อบงานแขง่ขนัทางการคา้: ครบรอบ 72 ปี วนัสถาปนากรมการคา้ภายใน'  (n 650) 52 - 55 
[Department of  Internal Tradeม ‘Understanding Trade Competition Work: 72nd Anniversary of  
the Establishment of  the Department of  Internal Trade’] 
665 The Mass Communication Organization of  Thailand is an SOE which operates its own television 
channel and is authorised by law to grant concessions to other undertakings.   
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As part of the approval plan, the MCOT required that UBC must continue to 
offer its basic monthly plan (silver package) to lower-income customers. But after the 
acquisition, UBC proposed to MCOT to modify its monthly packages, such as 
substantially increasing installation fees for new members and increasing the Gold 
Package monthly membership from 890 Baht to 1,060 Baht. Besides, UBC sought 
MCOT’s approval to remove the requirement to continue to offer the silver package by 
providing a new standard substitute package. The MCOT approved all proposals.666  
However, consumers complained to the TCC that the fees for the new standard 
substitute package were unreasonably high and that UBC did not make new customers 
aware of this by intentionally concealing its existence from the consumers.667 
The TCC appointed an investigative sub-committee. The investigative sub-
committee analysed the market structure on the following issues: service market, 
geographical market, and barrier to entry. The following analysis is drawn from the 
bulletin of the DIT. 
Regarding the service market, the sub-committee considered supply substitutions 
relating to fees, customer base, quality and characteristics of service, and convenience in 
servicing. The conclusion was that cable television with membership subscriptions was a 
different market from free televisions, satellite dishes, video rentals, and cinemas. 
Regarding the geographical market, the sub-committee considered broadcasting 
technology and the government’s monitoring and supervision criteria. The conclusion 
was that the geographical market was Thailand. The sub-committee also concluded that 
                                                 
666 Williams, ‘Competition Law in Thailand: Seeds of  Success or Fated to Fail?’  (n 520) 477 
667 ibid 
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small undertakings could not enter the market due to limitations in broadcasting 
technology and high investment hence UBC was a monopoly with a 100% market share. 
Regarding barriers to entry, the sub-committee found the following reasons 
prevented new entrants: 1. High sunk costs; 2. uncertainty in license application as there 
was no governmental body regulating the Telecommunications industry which rendered 
new entrants unable to lease or invest in the fibre optic network; 3. Government’s 
investment policy limited foreign investment, and 4. The market size was small. 
The Office of Attorney General also examined the concession contract between 
UBC and MCOT and came to the following conclusions: 1. The joint-venture is UBC’s 
venture because the UBC is entirely invested in the venture, the UBC unilaterally pays 
the operation costs, and is solely responsible for the members without any account made 
to the MCOT part; and 2. UBC is not an SOE hence it is not exempted under Section 
4(2) of the Trade Competition Act.  
Regarding the SEE test, the World Bank representative, two economics 
academics, and one law academic mutually agreed that UBC, despite consisting of two 
separate companies, having the same board of directors who act on behalf of the two 
companies meant that they are a single unit, and thus constitute a dominant undertaking 
under Section 25.  
The sub-committee also examined the practices of UBC and concluded that 
UBC abused its dominance by bundling and forcing all members to sign up for the Gold 
package which was the most expensive package. The sub-committee also determined the 
extent of abuse of dominance and found that customers had to pay higher fees and the 
cost of changing from the MMDS system to satellite and cable. In terms of efficiency, 
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after the merger, the sub-committee found that cost of operation per member was 
higher than before the merger. But the quality of services did not seem to have 
increased.  
The sub-committee submitted its findings and opinions to the TCC. The TCC 
ruled that although there was cross ownership and the two companies remain different 
legal entities, they share the same board of directors who act on behalf of the UBC. 
Hence, it was not under Section 27(1)668 prohibition on anticompetitive agreement 
between two undertakings. The TCC also found that UBC had a 100% market share and 
was a monopoly, but its practice in increasing monthly membership fees did not infringe 
Section 25(1) on unfair price fixing669 because there was a justifiable reason for such an 
increase in the fee. The TCC opined that the change in monthly package was under 
supervision and approval from the MCOT since UBC had notified the MCOT who 
ensured that the monthly fee was fair and that the increase in monthly packages 
represented additional choices for consumers. 
However, according to Williams, things were handled slightly differently from 
the document provided by the DIT. From his findings, the investigative sub-committee 
‘took a very literalist view of Section 25’ and concluded that there were still two separate 
entities and that they did not qualify as a single economic entity. Thus, UBC could not 
violate Section 25 on abuse of dominance. The sub-committee found that this was an 
infringement of Section 27 on anticompetitive agreement between undertakings. It 
surmised that the sub-committee arrived to this conclusion to avoid the application of 
Section 25 because at that time the TCC had not published its criteria for dominance yet. 
This means Section 25 was inoperable. To avoid the same mistake as in whiskey and 
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beer tying, the sub-committee tried to apply Section 27 instead. According to Williams, 
when the sub-committee submitted its opinion to the TCC, the TCC disagreed and 
concluded that UBC should be treated as one single unit that violated Section 25(3) 
(refusal to supply).670 
Although the information on analysis of the case provided by the DIT and 
Williams are slightly different, their conclusion is the same. No infringement decision 
was issued, and no sanctions were applied to UBC. The TCC decided to refer the case to 
the MCOT instead.671 At the end, the MCOT affirmed the TCC findings that the 
increased monthly fee was not unfair price fixing due to UBC’s operating loss. The 
MCOT did not impose any sanction on UBC or order a reduction of monthly fees. This 
was because the MCOT is entitled to 6.5% from UBC’s turnover. However, UBC began 
to offer a less expensive monthly package to its customers to meet the original 
requirements imposed by the MCOT. But the cheaper package did not really offer any 
real choices to consumers. Nevertheless, there is evidence that in March 2005, UBC 
eventually offered real choices to its customers and potential customers as a result of 
facing competition from new entrants in the market.672 
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C) Battle of the Japanese Motorcycle Manufacturers 
This case is a saga which ends with a tragic death of the knight. It is the only case 
which was handed to the public prosecutor for prosecution of the alleged incumbent. 
And of course, it did not end well. 
On 7 November 2001, the TCC received a complaint from motorcycle 
manufacturers namely Yamaha, Suzuki, and Kawasaki who alleged that A.P. Honda, a 
dominant motorcycle manufacturer, abused its dominance. However, there are many 
versions of what Honda allegedly did to abuse its dominance.  
Some researchers reported that Honda abused its dominance by concluding 
distribution agreements containing a quota and queue clause. Honda Wave was the most 
popular model in the market hence it was in very high demand. Motorcycle distributors 
were given quota and queue to receive a certain amount of Honda Wave motorcycles in 
disproportion to the amount of other brands of motorcycles that distributors are selling. 
The more other brands of motorcycle it sells, the less number of Honda Waves it would 
receive. As a result, more and more distributors abandoned other brands.673  
According to the DIT bulletin, the abusive practice in question was the offer of 
special conditions to dealers who sell other brands to become a sole dealer of Honda 
motorcycles. Another practice was that in case Honda failed to influence the dealers and 
distributors to switch to Honda; it would appoint a new dealer or distributor to sell 
Honda motorcycles in competition with the existing dealers.674 
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Nikomborirak reported that Honda’s abusive practice was to prohibit dealers 
from exhibiting and selling competing brands in the same store.675 Williams reported that 
Honda’s abusive practices were the conclusion of exclusive dealing agreements, having 
competitors advertising hoardings removed, and persuading dealers to switch to Honda 
only.676 
  The TCC appointed a specialised sub-committee which took 2 years to finish its 
investigation. The specialised sub-committee concluded that Honda engaged in unfair 
trade practices under Section 29677(act carried out which is not free and fair and has the 
effect of restricting business operation of other business). The sub-committee chose to 
avoid applying Section 25 (abuse of dominance) even though Honda had a 70% market 
share as this section was inoperable at the time of the case.  
Williams reported that on 30 April 2003, the TCC published the Guidelines for 
Unfair Trade Practices under Section 29 which appears to have been used retrospectively 
in this case because on the same day, the TCC announced submission of this case to the 
public prosecutor.678 The Guidelines clearly stated that Section 29 is only applicable for 
unfair trade practices in business to business dealings.679  
No details emerged as to why and how the sub-committee came to the 
conclusion provided in the bulletin from the DIT, let alone that there was any publicly 
available record of a similar nature. Williams reported that during the course of 
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investigation, Honda was not given the opportunity to present its case to the sub-
committee and that the allegation did not contain a clear accusation as to what it did 
wrong and that there was no supporting evidence for the conclusion. It was reported 
that the Japanese Ambassador to Thailand personally accompanied the President of 
Honda to lobby the Minister of Commerce to reverse the TCC decision.680  
On 30 April 2003, the TCC agreed with the findings of the specialised sub-
committee to prosecute Honda pursuant to Section 29 and ordered the Secretary-
General of the Office of the TCC to investigate, collect evidence and proceed under the 
TCA. The Office of the TCC submitted the case to the Office of the Attorney General 
(OAG) for proceedings on 1 August 2003. But the OAG refused to file the case to the 
court on the grounds of insufficient evidence and requested that the TCC investigated 
further.681  
The TCC conducted further investigation and collected more evidence as 
instructed by the OAG. But on 15 November 2006, the OAG issued a non-prosecution 
order and returned the files to the TCC on the ground of invalid investigation. The 
OAG claimed that the TCC did not appoint the investigative sub-committee to 
investigate the case pursuant to Section 14. Hence, the investigation was invalid. The 
Chairman of the TCC disagreed and issued a dissenting opinion and appeal of that order 
to the Attorney General.682 
On 22 May 2007, the Attorney General ordered the TCC to appoint the 
investigative sub-committee to conduct the investigation for this case. On 1 August 
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2007, the TCC appointed the investigative sub-committee accordingly. Meanwhile the 
TCC wrote an urgent letter to the Council of State asking for advice on whether it was 
bound by Section 14 to appoint an investigative sub-committee to conduct 
investigations. The Council of State replied in a memorandum dated April 2009 that the 
TCC was indeed bound to appoint the investigative sub-committee. 
On 30 November 2009 the investigative sub-committee finished the 
investigation and submitted its findings to the TCC to prosecute Honda for infringing 
Section 29. The TCC, on 31 March 2010, agreed with the investigative sub-committee 
and submitted the case to the OAG for a prosecution order accordingly.683 
Unsurprisingly, to the public’s disappointment, there was no detail on how the sub-
committee interpreted Section 29 in this case. 
On 23 August 2010, the OAG issued a non-prosecution order, which was 
appealed by the TCC on 11 April 2011. On 29 March 2012, the OAG sent a 
memorandum to the Chairman of the TCC to order the investigative sub-committee to 
conduct further investigation and to remind the TCC that the limitation statute would 
expire in April 2013.684 
On 27 June 2012, the TCC appointed another investigative sub-committee. The 
investigative sub-committee investigated on the issues suggested by the OAG and 
submitted its findings to the TCC. The TCC approved the case and submitted to the 
OAG on 10 January 2013.685 
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On 28 March 2013, the Attorney General issued a non-prosecution order on the 
grounds of insufficient evidence686 without giving any legal reasoning and analysis. The 
case was dropped. 
The new proposed Bill changed the way the Attorney General can intervene with 
the TCC’s decisions as already mentioned in section B on investigative powers in 
Thailand. 
For stakeholders in Thailand (except Honda), this case is a great disappointment. 
It is the first case that the TCC finally agreed with the investigative sub-committee that 
there was an infringement even though this alleged infringement was against Section 29 
(unfair trade practices to destroy other business operators) rather than against Section 25 
(abuse of dominance). The TCA authorises the TCC to issue an administrative order 
under Section 31 and 32 as described in 5.3.2 Investigative and Prosecution Power on 
page 225. And the TCC is immune from claims and liability under Section 31. The TCC 
could have issued such an order requiring Honda to cease its abuse of dominance.  
It is not known to the public why the TCC decided to pursue this case the way it 
did even though it has all the power it needs to protect the functioning of the market. To 
conjecture that the TCC was intimidated by the thought of issuing a written order with 
reasons for such an order both for the questions of fact and for the questions of law and 
to sign the order is beyond comprehensible. There is no reason to be afraid of issuing 
such an order when the law completely protect the TCC from all liability.  
On hindsight, one could surmise that the administrative order under Section 31 
does not contain any fines. It only authorises the TCC to require the undertaking to stop 
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the infringement. However, had the TCC issued that order, Section 33 provides that the 
undertaking must comply with this order. And Section 52 provides that the undertaking 
which fails to comply with the administrative order issued under Section 31 will be 
imprisoned for a term of 1 - 3 years or fined of 2 – 6 million Baht,687 and daily fined an 
amount not exceeding 50,000 Baht688 throughout the period of failure to comply. 
In fact, had the TCC decided to issue such an order and had Honda decided to 
appeal, Honda would have had no chance of winning, because the TCA provides that 
the rules and procedure for the appeal shall be as prescribed and published in the Royal 
Gazette by the Appellate Committee; and thus far, no such rules are published and there 
has never been an Appellate Committee. Maybe the TCC was concerned that Honda 
might not have the opportunity to fully defend itself since there was no procedure for 
appeal, and so the TCC decided it was best that the public prosecutor should file the 
case before the court. 
Had this case happened in Singapore, one can surmise that the CCS would have 
issued an infringement order with elaborate legal reasoning as it did in SISTIC, or Honda 
might have fully cooperated with the CCS and provided a voluntary commitment.  
D) Retail Super Store v Local Groceries 
This case involves large hypermarket stores such as Central Group, Tesco Lotus, 
Carrefour, Big C, and Makro.689  These companies were accused of unfairly applying 
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various aggressive business strategies towards local suppliers. For example, it was 
reported that the Central Group's retail arm, Central Retail, and its subsidiaries allowed 
their member suppliers to deliver the goods to their premises from 8pm to 8am, but for 
non-member suppliers the delivery time was limited from 2am to 4am.690  
Others were condemned of charging fees such as entrance fees, advertising fees, 
removal of goods fees, and product displaying fees. Moreover, they also demanded 
promotional and marketing discounts from suppliers as well as promotional discounts 
for holding special marketing events. They also charged their suppliers for electronic 
commerce transactions, and indirectly forced their suppliers to produce goods for their 
own house brand to compete with the suppliers’ products.691 These strategies enabled 
them to be in a much better position than the local groceries shops in terms of lower 
operational costs as they passed on most of these costs to their suppliers. It resulted in 
cheaper prices than those charged by the local groceries shops.  
The strategies largely affected two interested groups – the local, traditional 
groceries shops and the local suppliers. Nine out of ten local groceries shops were 
reported to be affected by the intense competition with major competitors.692 The 
research results of TDRI were cited to support that such competition benefited the 
consumers in terms of lower prices and that the local retailers should adjust themselves 
to the competition.693 The retailers, through provincial chambers of commerce, urged 
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the Thai Government to protect them from foreign competitors by repealing the Alien 
Business Act.694  
Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinnawatra, was reported to have met with 
former Tesco Global CEO, Terry Leahy and confirmed to Leahy that ‘Thailand places a 
high worth on foreign investment.’695  On the other hand, his Ministers showed concerns 
on the matter. They even considered freezing the expansion of foreign hypermarkets as 
the election was approaching.696 The end result was that the former Deputy Minister of 
Commerce, Newin Chidchob, announced his plans to list retail business as controlled 
businesses, designate their zoning, and to investigate the potential breach of the TCA.697  
According to Sakda Thanitkul, former member of the specialised sub-committee 
on Retail Business, the control of the business did not receive much support from the 
public and the draft bill was finally withdrawn. The zoning regulation does not have 
much impact on the foreign retailers as by the time of the enforcement of the regulation, 
the foreign retailers already expanded to more than 117 branches throughout the 
country.698 Nevertheless, the investigation by the specialised sub-committee established 
by Mr Chidchob concluded that the aggressive business strategies adopted by the major 
retailers were in breach of Section 29. The specialised sub-committee proposed to the 
TCC to file a criminal charge against the foreign retailers.699  
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However, Mr Chidchob was transferred to another position before the TCC 
made any formal allegations against the major retailers. Subsequently, the specialised sub-
committee was replaced under the new Minister of Commerce. Finally, no criminal 
charges were pressed. Instead, in October 2006, the TCC published the Guidelines for 
Unfair Trade Practices in the Wholesale/Retail Business pursuant to the provision of 
Section 29 (Guidelines on Retails), which is modelled after the Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission’s approach (JFTC),700  and considered this as ‘the most appropriate 
approach’ for Thailand to solve the issues.701  
According to Thanitkul, this approach aimed at preventing the four major 
retailers from engaging in anticompetitive conducts. It was not to hinder their efficiency, 
‘but to give the clear signal to large retailers that they have to be careful about their 
conducts because of their huge bargaining power. . .’702 This optimistic and positive idea 
of warning them to be more careful, while in fact, these multinational corporations are 
well aware and familiar  with anticompetitive conducts under the competition laws in 
their home countries that they should refrain from engaging in, and they have now been 
given a second chance to be careful. 
Thanitkul believes that: 
If there is a complaint lodged by weak SMEs suppliers 
alleging that a large retailer grossly violating these Guidelines, 
the staff at the office of the Competition Commission will step 
in by informing them that there are complaints against their 
business behaviour. As business operators, management of large 
retailers do not want to spend their time on defending 
themselves by showing evidences like vendor agreements that 
they entered into with weak SMEs suppliers. It is argued that 
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top management of large retailers would rather refrain from 
such alleged conduct by instructing their purchasing 
departments to watch out about their particular conduct.703 
Thanitkul argued further that the definition of ‘unfair low price’704 (predatory 
pricing) provided in the Guidelines on Section 29 was the key to solve the problem as it 
may prevent the large retailers from ‘driving out Mom & Pop stores with so-so 
efficiency.’705 He also asserted that avoiding a criminal lawsuit against the large retailers 
by simply publishing the Guidelines on Section 29 and not prosecuting them -- despite 
clear evidence of Section 29 violation -- was ‘far better’ than pursuing criminal charges or 
not taking any action at all.706 Given the poor record of enforcement of the TCC and its 
very politically dependent structure, this thesis argues that the decision not to prosecute 
sent the wrong signal to the incumbents. It signalled that the TCC does not take its 
duties seriously. Besides, studies show that illicit gains from cartel are significantly larger 
than fines imposed on firms. And firms from advanced economies have more potential 
to engage in international cartels (See 2.1.2 Competitiveness of a Firm). Hence, such a 
view toward big multinational corporations can be seen as either extremely optimistic or 
naïve.   
The Guidelines merely described the acts considered as unfair in the retail and 
wholesale business. Therefore, it has very little impact on the major retailers.707 It was 
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criticised as ‘unsatisfactory and appears to be a sop to appeal to nationalistic 
sentiment.’708  
In addition to publishing this ‘middle ground solution’709, to the disappointment 
of many local groceries shops, Thaksin’s administration decided not to restrict the 
zoning of the major retailers. The local small retailers were distressed. In order to 
appease them, the former Prime Minister employed his usual strategy to ‘help’ local 
groceries shops affected by these major retailers’ business strategies by instructing the 
State Owned Bank, Krung Thai Bank, to provide ‘generous credit’ to help them save 
their businesses.710  
E) Abbott’s AIDS Medication 
Between November 2006 and January 2007, the Ministry of Health granted many 
compulsory licenses for the government to use generic versions of AIDS medications in 
its National Health Insurance scheme so that these would be accessible to the poor. The 
Government pays royalty fees to the patent holders, which is in accordance with the 
World Trade Organisation’s Agreement on Trade Related to Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights and Thai law.711 The use of the compulsory licensed AIDS medication is 
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made available only to those who cannot afford it. Patients using private health services 
will continue to pay the full market price.712   
Abbott announced that it would not register its AIDS medication sold under 
tradename ‘Kaletra’ and its new version which does not require refrigeration, which is 
especially important in Thailand’s climate, to avoid compulsory licensing. On 26 April 
2007, the Thai Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS (TNP+), the AIDS ACCESS 
Foundation, and their supporters filed a complaint against Abbott alleging it violated 
Section 25(3) on abuse of dominance for its refusal to supply.713  
It should be reiterated that by the time the complaint was lodged, the TCC had 
already published its criteria of dominance which entered into force on 8 February 2007. 
The TCC released a one-page decision on the complaint to the Chair of Foundation for 
Consumers. The TCC decided that Abbott’s withdrawal of its registration of Kaletra did 
not violate Section 25(3) of the TCA.714 
The TCC took about 8 months to reply to the Foundation for Consumers’ 
complaint. The TCC considered Section 25(3) by referring to its criteria for market 
dominance and emphasised that the market shares of previous year should be over 50% 
and that there should be at least 1 billion Baht turnover. The TCC simply concluded that 
Abbott had a smaller turnover than that in 2005 (which was not the previous year in this 
case) without specifying how they calculated the turnover and where the data came from 
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and without considering Abbott’s market share. The most unconventional aspect in the 
definition of dominance was that TCC did not even start with defining the relevant 
market. The TCC jumped right to the turnover. Not starting with defining the relevant 
market is gross negligence on the part of a national competition authority.  
On hindsight, the TCC might have considered that defining the relevant market 
was irrelevant because Abbot’s turnover was not over one billion Baht. This saved the 
TCC a lot of thinking and analysis. 
Regarding Section 25(3), the TCC further explained that other than its low 
turnover, Abbott had not yet obtained the required Certificate of Product Registration 
hence Kaletra was not yet available in Thailand. Since there was no Kaletra, it was not 
possible that Abbott has restricted, reduced, or suspended its distribution.  
Then the TCC explained in the letter that Abbott did not withdraw its 
registration of Kaletra with the intent to cause a person residing in Thailand and 
intending to purchase Kaletra for his personal consumption to have restricted 
opportunities to purchase it directly from an undertaking outside Thailand. Therefore, 
Abbott did not breach Section 28.715 The reasoning being as follows: 
This is due to the fact that drug registration is subject to 
certain regulations required by the Food and Drug 
Administration on drug safety.  In addition, there has never 
been a reported case of direct order from the consumer to the 
company’s head office in the United States.  This is because in 
Thailand these drugs are normally available at hospitals and by 
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medical prescriptions only, especially for second-line drugs 
which must be prescribed by a specialist doctor.716   
 It is clear that in previous cases, the TCC did not have the tools to properly 
enforce abuse of dominance. But when it does, it does not do it in the right way. A one-
page reply seems as if the TCC could not be bothered. What was at stake was the lives of 
millions of poor people in Thailand and their chance to access medications that can save 
their lives at an affordable price. The TCC can argue that this consideration is not within 
the scope of its duties.  
There are more complaints on abuse of dominance lodged to the TCC, but none 
of them received much consideration from the TCC and there was no useful 
examination which is worth reading as the legal and economic analysis is clearly 
lacking.717  
F) TrueVisions Withdraws HBO from Its Pay-TV Service 
TrueVisions is a subsidiary of CP Group. CP Group hold 60.1% shares in True 
Corporation. And True Corporation holds 100% shares in TrueVisions. TrueVisions is 
the biggest pay-TV service provider. It is formerly known as UBC. The MCOT did not 
discipline UBC when it merged as demonstrate above. Now the National Broadcasting 
and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) is in charge of the television industry.718 
In December 2016, TrueVisions announced its plan to withdraw HBO channels from 1 
January 2017. It failed to give 30-day prior notice to its subscribers.719 Even if this 
practice violates the law, the NBTC decided not to fine TrueVisions but required it to 
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717 See OECD, ‘Contribution from Thailand’ (n 522) 5; UNCTAD, Review of  Recent Experiences in the 
Formulation and Implementation of  Competition Law and Policy in Selected Developing Countries: Thailand, 
Lao, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe (n 525) 25 - 31 
718 NBTC, ‘NBTC’s History’ <http://www.nbtc.go.th/About/history3.aspx> accessed 16 April 2017 
719 The Nation, ‘True Visions to stop HBO channel’ (26 December 2016) 
<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/breakingnews/30302866> accessed 16 April 2017 
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compensate affected subscribers and issued an administrative warning instead.720 The 
company agreed to pay marginal compensation to its customers.721 According to 
TrueVisions, only 700 – 1,000 customers are affected.722 
TrueVisions has 3,930,000 customer base in 2016 and revenue from subscription 
alone of almost 8 billion Baht.723 The TCC did not make any comment as to whether 
there was a case for consumers or not. In fact, this case could fall into section 25(3), but 
TrueVisions can easily eliminate the claims with the excuse that its decision was 
“reasonable”. According to the company, it could not renew the contract with HBO. 
However, considering the past experience of how the TCC handled the 
complaints. It is highly likely that it will refer the case to the NBTC as it did to the 
merger case almost 20 years ago. 
 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter demonstrated the disparities in general competition law 
enforcement by using case studies on abuse of dominance in Singapore and Thailand. 
                                                 
720 Bangkokbiznews, ‘ทรวูชิ ัน่สค์นืเงนิลูกา้กรณียกเลกิชอ่ง HBO’ (4 April 2017) [TrueVisions refunds customers for 
HBO channels withdrawal] <http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/741524> accessed 
4 April 2017 
721 Usanee Mongkolporn, ‘TrueVisions to increase payout after pulling HBO channels’ (21 February 2017) 
<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/business/corporate/30306784> accessed 16 April 
2017 
722 Bangkokbisnews, ‘TrueVisions refunds customers for HBO channels withdrawal’ (n 720) 
723 True, ‘True Corporation Public Company Limited’ 
<http://true.listedcompany.com/misc/PRESN/20170327-true-glance-4q2016.pdf> accessed 4 
April 2017 
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Despite being the first country in ASEAN to have enacted competition law without 
international pressure, Thailand has not succeeded in its enforcement and advocacy. 
Capacity building programmes supported by international organisations or from 
other NCAs as part of trade agreements do not seem to have a positive impact on the 
capacity and performance of the TCC. This is because the real problem is not in 
capacity, but authority, independence of the NCAs. What will impact the efficiency of 
competition law enforcement the most is the NCA itself. Without an independent and 
competent NCA, competition law enforcement will be hindered.  
The current structure of the TCC and the Office of the TCC are under control 
of the Government, politics, and big conglomerates. Conflict of interest is evident. The 
TCC is run by the part time Commissioners who can only meet to discuss any 
complaints if the Minister of Commerce convenes the meeting.  
The officers of the Office of the TCC are government officers under the DIT 
who work full time, but who are subject to transfer to other offices within the DIT at 
the disposal of the Secretary-General of the DIT. Hence, it is hard for them to obtain 
expertise acquired over years of experience.  
The new proposed Trade Competition Bill addresses these problems. However, 
it opens the door for Government interference in the new TCC by leaving the selection 
of the new TCC to the Selecting Committee which is comprised of government officials 
such as the Permanent-Secretary for the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of 
Finance. The Prime Minister or the Ministers can signal to the Selecting Committee who 
they prefer. It is up to the integrity of these highest ranking government officials whether 
they will satisfy the Prime Minister or the Ministers requests 
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The new Trade Competition Bill also prohibits businessmen from being selected 
as Commissioners, but it does not preclude their spouses and children. However, what 
aggravates the inefficiency of the dysfunctional structure of the TCC is not the TCA, but 
the Commissioners’ attitudes. They are the people who are supposed to advocate 
competition law and policy in Thailand. Yet they fear to make publicly available the legal 
reasoning and application of economic theories in their decisions in detail. They fear that 
they could be hold accountable and sued. This attitude is toxic to competition advocacy. 
How can the public learn anything from the TCC if they do not show the public how 
they came to their conclusions? The TCC holds that if their opinions were made 
publically available, the TCC would fee restricted to give their opinions freely. This thesis 
argues that no capacity building programme can cure this attitude. 
As for Singapore, although the Minister of Trade and Industry appoint the CCS, 
the independence of the Commissioners is not questionable. The SCA only limits the 
Commissioners who may have a conflict of interest in the transaction to refrain from 
taking part in any deliberation or decision of the CCS relating to that transaction and that 
they must be disregarded for the purpose of constituting a quorum of the CCS for such 
deliberation or decision. This includes an interest in transactions or projects by the 
spouses, parents, step-parents, sons, step-sons, daughters, step-daughters, adopted sons, 
adopted daughters, brothers, sisters, half-brothers, half-sisters, step-brothers, and step-
sisters of the Commissioners.  
If the TCA had a provision such as this, the TCC might have been able to deliver 
more infringement decisions. However, this statement may not be true as the Attorney 
General can drop a case by issuing a non-prosecution order on the ground of insufficient 
evidence as happened in the tragic case of the Japanese motorcycle manufacturers.  
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Regarding investigative and prosecution powers, the evidence is clear that the 
TCC cannot conduct its own investigation. Because the Attorney General and the 
Council of State agree that the TCC must appoint an investigative sub-committee to 
conduct the investigations. However, the opinion of the Council of State is not binding. 
It is the Court who decides, but this issue has never been submitted to the Court due to 
the veto from the Attorney General. The new Trade Competition Bill proposes an 
amendment in this matter. Under the new law, the Attorney General cannot drop the 
case like it did. A co-committee between the public prosecutor and the TCC must be 
appointed to consider the different opinions. If the TCC insists, the Attorney General 
must file the case to the Court.  
However, private enforcement in Thailand is unlikely to have a positive impact 
on the enforcement of the TCA, because private parties are allowed to claim damages 
only within one year after the date the injured person has or ought to have known the 
ground for action. Private parties have limited access to documents or evidence which 
are in possession of their opponents. Moreover, the costs of hiring a team of competent 
lawyers and economists to be able to prove to the court of the wrong doing can be high. 
To make the matter worse, under the law in Thailand, injured persons are only entitled 
to claim actual damages. There are no triple damages or punitive damages under the 
TCA, which can potentially render pursuing the case privately unworthy of the time and 
expenses. Private parties who are likely to be able to afford such expense and risk would 
be business entities rather than consumers.  
On the contrary, private litigation in Singapore under the SCA is more likely to 
have a positive impact on effective enforcement, because the court is bound to accept 
any relevant infringement decisions of the CCS, and the CAB, which establish that there 
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is an infringement. This encourages and facilitates private parties to claim damages owed 
to them with confidence. This practice requires an utmost accountability, competency, 
and transparency from the CCS to deliver its decisions. It is a great responsibility to be in 
charge of making decisions which are binding upon the courts. 
The administration of the CCS is divided into the Legal, Enforcement, and 
Business and Economics divisions. These divisions work closely to investigate the 
anticompetitive practices to create coherence to the approach and reasoning. On the 
contrary, each investigative sub-committee appointed by the TCC is in office for up to 
only two years. And each sub-committee investigates only one complaint. Therefore, 
there is no guarantee that the other investigative sub-committees will apply and interpret 
the TCA and take into account economic theories in a consistent manner. Moreover, it is 
possible under the TCA that one complaint may be investigated by more than one 
investigative sub-committee.  
In terms of abuse of dominance, Singapore and Thailand have different 
definitions as to what constitutes a dominant undertaking. The current TCA takes 
turnover into account to determine dominance. This produces disappointing results, 
especially in the Abbott’s AIDS Medication case which stopped the chance of millions 
of AIDS patients from having access to an affordable drug. The new Trade Competition 
Bill discards turnover from the definition of a dominant undertaking. But the 
Notification of the TCC on thresholds of market share must be issued for the provision 
on abuse of dominance to be operable. The question is when will that Notification be 
issued? 
The enforcement of abuse of dominance by the CCS deserves admiration. Due 
to the vigorous and extensive analysis of the law in SISTIC case, the CCS has received 
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full cooperation from dominant undertakings to provide voluntary commitments. 
Singaporean consumers surely have more choices whether they want them or not. As the 
SISTIC post-enforcement evaluation reveals there is a new entrant and consumers have 
more choices. Other incumbents dismissed the exclusivity clause in their agreements. 
One can at least surmise that market foreclosure is lessened.  
All evidence provided and examined in this chapter should suffice to 
demonstrate the difficulties if not impossibility of harmonising and converging all-sector 
competition law and policy in Thailand and Singapore. As rightly asserted by Both, ‘the 
absence of a workable competition law regime in one member state would prevent 
effective enforcement of competition policy at the regional level.’724 Although Thailand 
has a competition law regime, it is hardly qualified as ‘workable’. This is a potential 
obstacle to strategic measures to develop a regional strategy on competition policy and 
law convergence as set in the AEC Blueprint 2025.  How can one harmonise and 
converge the different fundamental competition ideologies in these countries? Singapore 
aims at efficiency and a competitive market. Thailand aims at fair and free competition. 
Singapore takes a purist regime. Thailand takes a mixed regime. The CCS is entrusted 
with power to issue infringement decisions which are binding upon the courts, the 
transparency and accountability is evident. The TCC is reluctant to even publish its 
decisions for the public to review due to the fear of being unable to be open and direct 
in making decisions. It seems as if between Thailand and Singapore alone already, the 
five driving forces of effective cooperation in competition law and policy as suggested by 
Both are lacking, let alone if all ten AMSs were taken into account.  
                                                 
724 Both, ‘Regionalisation of  Competition Policy: What Lessons Can Be Drawn for ASEAN from Other 
Region’s Experience?’ (n 302) 20 
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Moreover, giving up, judicial sovereignty, even slightly, is highly unlikely to be 
well perceived by the Thais. This should be considered very seriously. 
Thailand’s competitiveness is much lower than Singapore’s for many reasons. 
Having an inefficient competition law and policy is one of these reasons. Of course, if 
Thailand can improve its competition law enforcement, its overall GCI should improve 
too. And if all AMSs have efficient competition law and policy concurrently, it is highly 
likely that the competitiveness of ASEAN should increase. However, it is not necessarily 
solved by using a supranational approach if this does not suit the ASEAN way. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Does ASEAN need a supranational approach to its competition law and policy 
to create a highly competitive AEC? 
No, it does not. There are three main reasons. 
1. Competition law and policy is not the sole determinant factor of 
competitiveness. 
Professor Krugman is right to have said that competitiveness is a dangerous 
obsession. Leaders, law makers, and economists tend to overuse the concept for their 
own ends by emphasising its importance. This thesis agrees that the concept of 
competitiveness is indeed important, but should be used with caution.  
According to Professor Porter, if firms are competitive, a country is likely to be 
competitive too. A competitive nation is one that provides a high standard of living for 
its citizens, and has a high productivity. A country’s competitiveness is measured by 12 
pillars. Goods market efficiency is one of them. It is measured by 16 indicators, and 
some of these relate to competition law and policy, namely the effectiveness of 
antimonopoly policy, the intensity of local competition, and the extent of market 
dominance. Clearly, an effective competition law and policy alone cannot improve the 
overall competitiveness of a country if that country falls below average in all other 
indicators. 
This thesis found that despite having an effective antimonopoly policy, goods 
market efficiency, a smaller extent of market dominance, and a highly intense local 
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competition, the competitiveness of an AMS may not be as high as it should be. This is 
due to poor development. An AMS will reap the benefits of competition law and policy 
more fully if it is at least at the transition from Factor-Driven to Efficiency-Driven stage 
of development and if it is effectively enforcing its competition law and policy such as is 
the case in Singapore and Malaysia. If these factors are lacking a country will not yield 
the benefits of competition law and policy as much as it should such as is the case in 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
This does not mean that competition law and policy does not contribute to 
competitiveness or that it does not matter – it does, but only to a certain extent as 
explained above. ASEAN needs to improve the AMSs’ economic development along 
with effectively enforcing national competition laws. Thailand is at the Efficiency-Driven 
stage of development, but its lax competition law enforcement compromises the 
country’s chance of becoming more competitive.  
The role of the government is crucial to a country’s competitiveness as it 
influences all facets of the diamond. Efficient enforcement of competition law enhances 
rivalry, which puts pressure on firms to be more competitive and efficient. Effective 
competition law enforcement by NCAs signals to firms not to collude and to refrain 
from anticompetitive practices. NCAs represent the government’s role on keeping rivalry 
in the markets. Government is the key to firms’ competitiveness as it can hinder or 
enhance any of the diamond elements. Therefore, the NCAs are the key to 
competitiveness.  
Regulatory capture occurs when big conglomerates have power to influence 
policy makers to enact laws or unenforced the laws in their favour. It is the case of 
AMSs, especially Thailand. Experience from Taiwan and South Korea shows that 
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although countries might have been under authoritarian government such as military 
government which lack legitimacy of administration, competition law can be efficiently 
enforced provided there is political will to do so. The government and the NCA have 
direct impact on how competition law is applied and enforced. Therefore, in countries in 
factor-driven or in transition from factor-driven to efficiency-driven could have effective 
competition law system if their government and politicians aim to do so. As a 
consequence, chances of these countries to become more competitive increase. 
Professor Porter also suggests that it is better to increase competitiveness in each 
industry separately and improve them individually because it is not possible for a country 
to attain a high competitiveness in all sectors. This is true for a region as well. For 
ASEAN, it is more feasible to focus on the industry level, across the region, rather than 
attempting to increase the competitiveness of each member state in all sectors at the 
same time. Developing a regime of competition law in this manner will help ASEAN 
focus on the industries which are stated in the AEC Blueprints as the key industries to 
the competitive, innovative, and dynamic AEC. 
Experience from electricity regulation in six countries show that sectoral 
regulation and competition agency can collaborate and optimise the competitiveness and 
protection of competition process in a given market.  
2. A supranational approach is not compatible with the ASEAN way and 
the ASEAN Charter. 
There are two approaches to international cooperation in competition law: hard 
law and soft law. It is evident that the only region that successfully applies hard law 
approach is the EU. The establishment and history of the EU contribute to such success. 
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This is a unique characteristic of the existence of the EU which cannot be transplant 
anywhere. Each regional economic cooperation must find its own way. 
In order to facilitate the development of regional competition law and policy, 
scholars often argue for harmonisation, convergence, or even unification of competition 
law and policy. Many leading international organisations promote the idea of 
international competition law which yields varied levels of achievement. These attempts 
range from capacities building activities, cooperation, and information exchange to 
recommendation of best practices and model laws to regional competition law such as 
the EU model. 
Among the international organisations which promote harmonisation and 
convergence or unification of competition law, the ICN’s soft law approach appears to 
be more welcome than others. Its informal approach which is based on consensus and 
consultation and sharing of best practices and the publication of recommendations is 
compatible with the way ASEAN operates.  
The attempt to promote competition law and policy in bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements is evident. The majority of the trade agreements studied in this thesis 
contain provisions or a chapter on competition. But the majority of these are not subject 
to the dispute settlement mechanism of said agreements. This inclusion is considered as 
symbolic to demonstrate the value of competition and functions as a best endeavour to 
guarantee to foreign investors and citizens and domestic businesses the protection of 
their investments. When disputes arise they seek settlement through international trade 
arbitration tribunals such as ICSID and the WTO Dispute Resolution Body Panel.  
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 A supranational approach to competition law and policy has been applied in 
some trading blocs. This thesis examined the attempt of MERCOSUR and found that 
the experience of MERCOSUR in attempting to create a regional competition law with 
hard law approach, which is enforceable on its members without applying supremacy 
and direct effect doctrines, and enforced by intergovernmental bodies that have decision 
making powers but not investigative powers, has not yet succeeded. 
The suggestion of using the EU model is often made without regard for 
ASEAN’s history, the AMSs’ history, and the ASEAN way. The EU model only works 
for the EU, because it has been ingrained and rooted in the EU since the very beginning. 
The history of the EU is also unique. It is not transplantable. The financial costs of 
running such an organisation to oversee the effective enforcement of the regional 
competition law are high. The EU centralised the Commission power of enforcing the 
EU competition law, especially granting exemption under Article 101(3). It was effective 
and enabled the Commission to obtain expertise and ensured that the EU competition 
law is enforced uniformly across the region. Council Regulation 1/2003 decentralised the 
Commission’s power to apply EU competition law and the ECN is established to be a 
platform for the European NCAs to exchange their views and best practices. This is a 
reasonable approach for the EU given its characteristics. 
But this experience is useful to ASEAN only to a certain extent. ASEAN did not 
experience these great wars among members that require countries to come together and 
to stop fighting to ensure that Europe can prosper again. The reason for the 
establishment of ASEAN is mainly to maintain the stability of the region after the major 
powers withdrew following the end of WWII. It was not necessary for ASEAN to 
establish a supranational body to ensure that rules were obeyed as there were no rules 
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established between the AMSs in the Bangkok Declaration. The five founding fathers of 
ASEAN are all Foreign Ministers. It is not difficult to understand why the ASEAN way 
have taken over. The ASEAN way is a diplomatic way. It is not the law that is the 
supremacy in ASEAN as none was established. It is relationships, mutual recognition as 
equal partners, and respect for one another that is the core of ASEAN.  
Since the very beginning, AMSs embrace non-interference in internal affairs. 
Internal affairs are matters which each AMS will solve by itself. Other AMSs can only 
offer consultation. Any decision must be reached through consensus. All AMSs are 
treated equally regardless of size or GDP. The ASEAN way has been practiced all 
throughout its history. Now the ASEAN way has been formalised in the ASEAN 
Charter.  
The ASEAN Charter requires each AMS to contribute equally to the operational 
budget of the ASEAN Secretariat. The financial burden which may be incurred by the 
AMSs should be taken into consideration. A supranational body is highly unlikely to 
occur in ASEAN both because it is not in ASEAN’s nature, and because it is financially 
challenging.  
What if ASEAN takes a decentralised approach to regional competition law and 
policy as in the case of the EU post Council Regulation 1/2003 and uses the AEGC as a 
platform similar to the ECN? This is unlikely, because before the Council Regulation 
1/2003, the Commission and the EU Courts have ensured that there is a uniform 
enforcement of EU competition law. There exists a body of knowledge and 
jurisprudence and expertise in the application and interpretation of the regional 
competition law before the decentralisation took place.  
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If ASEAN had a regional competition law (which it does not), it is highly 
unlikely that relying on the NCAs to enforce such a law would have produced 
unification in the interpretation and application of the law. This is because there is no 
body of knowledge and expertise for the NCAs to refer to; the competencies of the 
NCAs are questionable, this is evident in the case of the TCC. Establishment of a 
supranational appellate body is required; and granting judicial power to this appellate 
body may not be welcomed by the AMSs. ASEAN has already agreed to the Vientiane 
Protocol to solve disputes arising out of its economic agreements through a panel of 
Senior Economic Officials. Why not make the most of that agreement? The Vientiane 
Protocol can be the ASEAN way of solving disputes instead of establishing an ASEAN 
Court of Justice. 
3. ASEAN has already begun its own sectoral approach to competitiveness 
across the region the ASEAN way. 
Since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the AMSs realised the importance of 
deeper economic cooperation. The idea of having a single market is agreed upon. The 
necessity in cooperation in competition law and policy is evident. Although the ASEAN 
Charter does not provide the possibility of creating a supranational body within ASEAN, 
the AMSs have adjusted themselves in adhering to a rule-based regime in economic 
cooperation. This shows the willingness of the AMSs to cooperate and strengthen, and 
deepen their commitments where and when necessary. 
In this regard, ASEAN has already created a single market in the aviation 
industry. Within ASEAN, the AMSs’ airlines can compete freely and fairly. The Aviation 
Agreements specify rules on abuse of dominance, state aids, and subsidy. The AMSs 
recognise the importance of an efficient and competitive aviation market. This is in 
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accordance with Professor Porter’s suggestion that it is more feasible to focus on 
competitiveness in a specific industry. 
Even if the effectiveness of the competition provisions in the Aviation 
Agreements is not formally analysed yet, it is evident that there are new entrants in the 
aviation industry intra ASEAN. There are definitely more low cost airlines hence 
consumers have more choices. New rivals are entering the market, so there is a good 
chance of more competitive ASEAN aviation industry. One can surmise that if more 
and more industries become competitive regionally, ASEAN’s competitiveness is likely 
to follow, provided that each AMS improves its economic development to be able to 
reap the benefit of efficient competition law and policy enforcement. 
What is evident at present are the difficulties and obstacles which will likely arise 
if ASEAN decides to harmonise and converge their national competition laws instead of 
taking a sectoral approach. Examples of abuse of dominance in Thailand and Singapore 
are examined in this thesis. Their disparities in enforcement, capacities, substantive, and 
procedural law render it almost impossible to converge these laws. Other than that, the 
TCC has issues with lack of accountability and transparency. An NCA cannot advocate 
competition law to stakeholders if it is not willing to disclose how it has come to the 
conclusion and decisions in a case. It is not difficult to learn from other NCA’s such as 
the CCS how to be accountable and transparent. The CCS website publishes and 
discloses useful information for the public which is easily accessed and obtained. 
Concealing non-confidential information of a case as well as the legal reasoning prevents 
stakeholders from criticising the TCC.  
Moreover, the TCC appears to lack the wit to find a solution to stop an 
incumbent from abusing its dominance even when the law provides the sword and the 
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shield. A knight who has a sword and shield, but does not know how to use them, is 
hardly a knight. The result of this was examined in chapter 5.  
Hence, it is much more logical and plausible to improve competitiveness through 
a sectoral approach than through a holistic approach. ASEAN has already started with its 
own way of approaching regional sectoral competition rules and policy. This incurs little 
financial burden on the AMSs compared to establishing a supranational organisation. It 
is worth a try. ASEAN has until 2025 to prove whether this sectoral approach can 
increase its competitiveness. If the AMSs also take the same approach to other 
industries, ASEAN’s competitiveness should be enhanced. 
Further studies on the development of competition rules for other industries 
through the negotiation of economic agreements among the AMSs as well as on the 
effectiveness of the Vientiane Protocol should complement the ASEAN way of a 
sectoral approach to competition law and policy.  
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ANNEX 1: TABLES 1 – 16: COMPETITIVENESS OF 
AMSs FROM 1999 – 2016 
Country names in red have enacted competition laws and countries’ 
abbreviations are based on the United Nations definitions.725 
Table 1: 1999 – 2000726  
 
Effectiveness of Antimonopoly Policy was measured by Executive Opinion 
Survey question: “Antitrust or anti-monopoly policy effectively promotes competition” 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
Intensity of Local Competition was measured by Executive Opinion Survey: 
“Competition in the local market is intense and market shares fluctuate constantly” (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
                                                 
725 United Nations Statistic Division, ‘Countries or Areas, Codes and Abbreviations’ (6 November 2013) 
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49alpha.htm> accessed 6 April 2016  
726 Klaus Schwab et al (eds), The Global Competitiveness Report 1999 (OUP 2000) 328, 332, and 336 
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Table 2: 2000 – 2001727  
 
Current Competitiveness Rankings demonstrate microeconomic competitiveness 
of firms in the countries728 
Table 3: 2001 – 2002729 
 
                                                 
727 Michael E Porter et al (eds), The Global Competitiveness Report 2000 (OUP 2000) 11,306, and 312 
728 This was taken from the Global Competitiveness Report 2000 – 2001, 11 
729 Michael E Porter et al (eds), The Global Competitiveness Report 2001 – 2002 (OUP 2002) 15,410, 411, and 
413 
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Effectiveness of Antimonopoly policy was measured by Executive Opinion 
Survey: “Anti-monopoly policy in your country” (1 = lax and not effective at promoting 
competition, 7 = effectively promotes competition) 
Intensity of Local Competition was measured by Executive Opinion Survey: “In 
most industries, competition in the local market is” (1 = limited and price-cutting is rare, 
7 = intense and market leadership changes over time) 
 
 
 
Table 4: 2002 – 2003730  
 
  
                                                 
730 Peter K Cornelius (ed), The Global Competitiveness Report 2002 – 2003 (OUP 2003) xv, 623, and 625 
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Table 5: 2004 – 2005 731  
 
5 stages of development 
 
Stage 1: 
 Factor-Driven 
Indonesia, Viet 
Nam, Philippines 
Transition from 1 
to 2 
Thailand 
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-
Driven 
Malaysia 
Transition from 2 
to 3 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-
Driven  
 Singapore 
Extent of Market Dominance was measured by Executive Opinion Survey: 
“Market dominance by a few enterprises is (1 = common in key industries, 7 = rare) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
731 Augusto Lopez-Claros (ed), The Global Competitiveness Report 2004 – 2005 (Palgrave Macmillan 2004) 59, 
68 – 69, 558, 560, and 563  
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Table 6: 2005 – 2006732  
 
 
5 stages of development 
 
Stage 1: 
 Factor-Driven 
Indonesia, 
Philippines, Viet 
Nam, Cambodia 
Transition from 1 
to 2 
Thailand  
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-Driven 
Malaysia 
Transition from 2 
to 3 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-Driven 
Singapore 
 
                                                 
732 Augusto Lopez-Claros (ed), The Global Competitiveness Report 2005 – 2006 (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 26, 
28 – 29, 32 – 33, 578, 579, and 580 
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Table 7: 2006 – 2007733  
 
 
5 stages of development 
 
Stage 1: 
 Factor-Driven 
Indonesia, 
Philippines, Viet 
Nam, Cambodia 
Transition from 1 
to 2 
Thailand  
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-Driven 
Malaysia 
Transition from 2 
to 3 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-
Driven 
Singapore 
 
 
                                                 
733 Augusto Lopez-Claros et al (eds), The Global Competitiveness Report 2006 – 2007 (Palgrave Macmillan 
2006) xxv, 13, 20 – 21, 479, 480, and 500 
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Table 8: 2007 – 2008734 
 
5 stages of development 
 
Stage 1: 
 Factor-Driven 
Indonesia, 
Philippines, Viet 
Nam, Cambodia 
Transition from 1 
to 2 
Thailand  
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-Driven 
Malaysia 
Transition from 2 
to 3 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-
Driven 
Singapore 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
734 Michael E Porter, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, and Klaus Schwab (eds), The Global Competitiveness Report 2007 – 
2008 (algrave Macmillan 2007), 9 - 10, 18 – 19, and 436 - 438 
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Table 9: 2008 – 2009735 
 
5 stages of development 
 
Stage 1: 
 Factor-Driven 
Indonesia, 
Philippines, Viet 
Nam, Cambodia 
Transition from 1 
to 2 
Brunei  
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-Driven 
Malaysia, Thailand 
Transition from 2 
to 3 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-
Driven 
Singapore 
 
  
                                                 
735 Michael E. Porter and Klaus Schwab (eds), The Global Competitiveness Report 2008 - 2009 (World 
Economic Forum 2008) 9 - 10, 16 – 17, 424, 470, and 471 
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Table 10: 2009 – 2010736  
 
5 stages of development 
 
Stage 1: 
 Factor-Driven 
Viet Nam, 
Philippines, 
Cambodia 
Transition from 1 
to 2 
Brunei, Indonesia 
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-Driven 
Malaysia, Thailand 
Transition from 2 
to 3 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-Driven 
Singapore 
 
  
                                                 
736 Klaus Schwab (ed), The Global Competitiveness Report 2009 – 2010 (n 229) 12 – 13, 18 – 19, 404 - 406 
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Table 11: 2010 – 2011737  
 
 
5 stages of development 
 
Stage 1: 
 Factor-Driven 
Viet Nam, 
Philippines, 
Cambodia 
Transition from 1 
to 2 
Brunei, Indonesia 
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-Driven 
Malaysia, Thailand 
Transition from 2 
to 3 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-Driven 
Singapore 
 
  
                                                 
737 Klaus Schwab (ed), The Global Competitiveness Report 2010 – 2011 (World Economic Forum 2010) 11, 20 
– 21, and 428 - 430 
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Table 12: 2011 – 2012738  
 
 
5 stages of development 
 
Stage 1: 
 Factor-Driven 
Viet Nam,  
Cambodia 
Transition from 1 
to 2 
Brunei, Philippines 
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-Driven 
Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia 
Transition from 2 
to 3 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-Driven 
Singapore 
 
  
                                                 
738 Klaus Schwab (ed), The Global Competitiveness Report 2011 – 2012 (World Economic Forum 2011) 11, 15, 
20 – 21, and 452 - 454 
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Table 13: 2012 – 2013739 
 
5 stages of development 
 
Stage 1: 
 Factor-Driven 
Viet Nam,  
Cambodia 
Transition from 1 
to 2 
Brunei, Philippines 
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-Driven 
Thailand, 
Indonesia 
Transition from 2 
to 3 
Malaysia, 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-Driven 
Singapore 
 
  
                                                 
739 Klaus Schwab (ed), The Global Competitiveness Report 2012 – 2013: Full Data Edition (n 110) 10, 13 18 – 19, 
and 450 - 452 
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Table 14: 2013 – 2014740 
 
 
5 stages of development 
 
Stage 1: 
 Factor-Driven 
Viet Nam, Laos  
Cambodia, 
Myanmar 
Transition from 1 
to 2 
Brunei, Philippines 
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-Driven 
Thailand, 
Indonesia 
Transition from 2 
to 3 
Malaysia, 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-Driven 
Singapore 
 
 
  
                                                 
740 Klaus Schwab (ed), The Global Competitiveness Report 2013 – 2014: Full Data Edition (n 111) 11, 15, 20 – 
21, and 470 - 472 
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Table 15: 2014 – 2015741 
 
 
5 stages of development 
 
Stage 1: 
 Factor-Driven 
Viet Nam, Laos  
Cambodia, 
Myanmar 
Transition from 1 
to 2 
Philippines 
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-Driven 
Thailand, 
Indonesia 
Transition from 2 
to 3 
Malaysia, 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-Driven 
Singapore 
 
  
                                                 
741 Klaus Schwab (ed), The Global Competitiveness Report 2014 – 2015: Full Data Edition (World Economic 
Forum 2014) 11, 13, 18 – 19, and 466 - 468 
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Table 16: 2015 – 2016742 
 
5 stages of development 
 
Stage 1: 
 Factor-Driven 
Laos,  Cambodia, 
Myanmar 
Transition from 1 
to 2 
Philippines,  
Viet Nam 
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-Driven 
Thailand, 
Indonesia 
Transition from 2 
to 3 
Malaysia, 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-Driven 
Singapore 
 
 
  
                                                 
742 Klaus Schwab (ed), The Global Competitiveness Report 2015 – 2016 (n 86) 12, 13, 129, 203, 229, 249, 271, 
297, 321, 345, and 367  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
SGP MYS THA IDN PHL VNM LAO KHM MYN
out of  140 countries 
effectiveness of Antimonopoly Policy Intensity of Local Competition
Extent of Market Dominance GCI
Overall Goods Market Efficiency
295 
 
ANNEX 2: GCI INDICATORS AND THRESHOLDS 
FOR STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT743 
Table 1: Basic Requirements  
 Stage of Development 
 Stage 1: 
Factor-
driven 
<2,000 US$ 
Transition 
from Stage 1 
to Stage 2 
2,000-2,999 
US$ 
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-
driven 
3,000-8,999 
US$ 
Transition 
from Stage 
2 to Stage 3 
9,000-17,000 
US$ 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-
driven 
>17,000 US$ 
Weight for basic 
requirements 
60% 40-60% 40% 20-40% 20% 
 
Pillar 1:  
Institutions 
Pillar 2: 
Infrastructure 
Pillar 3: 
Macroeconomic 
Environment 
Pillar 4:  
Health and 
Primary Education 
A. Public 
Institutions 
A. Transport 
Infrastructure 
Government budget 
balance 
A. Health 
1. Property 
Rights 
Quality of overall 
infrastructure 
Gross national 
savings 
Business impact of 
malaria 
Property rights Quality of road Inflation Malaria incidence 
IP* protection Quality of railroad 
infrastructure 
Government debt Business impact of 
tuberculosis 
2. Ethics and 
corruption 
Quality of port 
infrastructure 
Country credit rating Tuberculosis 
incidence 
Diversion of public 
funds 
Quality of air 
transport 
infrastructure 
 Business impact of 
HIV/AIDS 
Public trust in politicians Available airlines 
seat kilometres  
 HIV prevalence 
Irregular payments and 
bribes 
B. Electricity 
and Telephony 
Infrastructure 
 Infant mortality 
3. Undue 
Influence 
Quality of electricity 
supply 
 Life expectancy 
Judicial independence Mobile telephone 
subscriptions 
 B. Primary 
Education 
Favouritism in decisions 
of government officials 
Fixed telephone 
lines 
 Quality of primary 
education 
4. Public-Sector 
Performance 
  Primary education 
enrolment rate 
Wastefulness of 
government spending 
   
Burden of government 
regulation 
   
                                                 
743 Based on The Global Competitiveness Report 2015 – 2016 (n 86) 38 - 40 
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Efficiency of legal 
framework in settling 
disputes 
   
Efficiency of legal 
framework in 
challenging regulations 
   
Transparency of 
government 
policymaking 
   
5. Security    
Business costs of 
terrorism 
   
Business costs of crime 
and violence 
   
Organised crime    
Reliability of police 
services 
   
B. Private 
Institutions 
   
1. Corporate 
Ethics 
   
Ethical behaviour of 
firms 
   
2. Accountability    
Strength of auditing and 
reporting standards 
   
Efficacy of corporate 
boards 
   
Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests 
   
Strength of investor 
protection 
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Table 2: Efficiency Enhancers 
 Stage of Development 
 Stage 1: 
Factor-
driven 
<2,000 US$ 
Transition 
from Stage 1 
to Stage 2 
2,000-2,999 
US$ 
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-
driven 
3,000-8,999 
US$ 
Transition 
from Stage 
2 to Stage 3 
9,000-17,000 
US$ 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-
driven 
>17,000 US$ 
Weight for Efficiency 
Enhancers 
35% 35-50% 50% 50% 50% 
 
 
Pillar 5: 
Higher 
Education 
and Training 
Pillar 6: 
Goods 
Market 
Efficiency 
Pillar 7: 
Labour 
Market 
Efficiency 
Pillar 8: 
Financial 
Market 
Development 
Pillar 9: 
Technolog
ical 
Readiness 
Pillar 10: 
Market 
Size 
A. Quantity of 
Education 
A. 
Competition 
A. Flexibility A. Efficiency A.  
Technolo-
gical 
Adoption 
A.   
Domestic 
Market 
Size 
Secondary 
education 
enrolment rate 
1.  
Domestic 
Competition 
Cooperation in 
labour-
employer 
relations 
Availability of 
financial 
services 
Availability 
of latest 
technologies 
Domestic 
market size 
index 
Tertiary 
education 
enrolment rate 
Intensity of 
local 
competition 
Flexibility of 
wage 
determination 
Affordability 
of financial 
services 
Firm-level 
technology 
absorption 
B.  
Foreign 
Market 
Size 
C.  
Quality of 
Education 
Extent of 
market 
dominance 
Hiring and 
firing practices 
Financing 
through local 
equity market 
FDI and 
technology 
transfer 
Foreign 
market size 
index 
Quality of the 
educational 
system 
Effectiveness 
of anti-
monopoly 
policy 
Redundancy 
costs 
Ease of 
access to 
loans 
B. ICT 
Use 
 
Quality of 
math and 
science 
education 
Effect of 
taxation on 
incentives to 
invest 
Effect of 
taxation on 
incentives to 
work 
B.  
Trustworthi-
ness and 
Confidence 
Internet 
users 
 
Quality of 
management 
schools 
Total tax rate B.  
Efficient Use 
of Talent 
Soundness of 
banks 
Broadband 
internet 
subscriptions 
 
Internet access 
in schools 
Number of 
procedures 
required to 
start a 
business 
Pay and 
productivity 
Regulation of 
securities 
exchanges 
Internet 
bandwidth 
 
C.  
On-the-Job 
Training 
Time 
required to 
start a 
business 
Reliance on 
professional 
management 
Legal rights 
index 
Mobile 
broadband 
subscriptions 
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Local 
availability of 
specialised 
research and 
training 
services 
Agricultural 
policy costs 
Country 
capacity to 
retain talent 
Mobile 
telephone 
subscriptions 
Extent of staff 
training 
2.  
Foreign 
Competition 
Variable 
Country 
capacity to 
attract talent 
 Fixed 
telephone 
lines 
 
 Prevalence of 
trade barriers 
Female 
participation in 
labour force 
   
 Trade tariffs     
 Prevalence of 
foreign 
ownership 
    
 Business 
impact of 
rules on FDI 
    
 Imports as a 
percentage of 
GDP 
    
 A.  
Quality of 
Demand 
Conditions 
    
 Degree of 
customer 
orientation 
    
 Buyer 
sophistication 
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Table 3: Innovation and Sophistication Factors 
 
 Stage of Development 
 Stage 1: 
Factor-
driven 
<2,000 
US$ 
Transition 
from Stage 
1 to Stage 2 
2,000-2,999 
US$ 
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-
driven 
3,000-8,999 
US$ 
Transition 
from Stage 
2 to Stage 
3 
9,000-
17,000 US$ 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-
driven 
>17,000 
US$ 
Weight for 
Innovation and 
Sophistication 
Factors 
5% 5-10% 10% 10-30% 30% 
 
Pillar 11: Business Sophistication Pillar 12: R&D Innovation 
Local supplier quantity Capacity for innovation 
Local supplier quality Quality of scientific research institutions 
State of cluster development Company spending on R&D 
Nature of competitive advantage University-industry collaboration in R&D 
Value chain breadth Government procurement of advanced 
technology products 
Control of international distribution Availability of scientists and engineers 
Production process sophistication PCT patent applications 
Extent of marketing Intellectual property protection 
Willingness to delegate authority  
Reliance on professional management  
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ANNEX 3: CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF COMPETITION LAWS OF THE AMSs 
COUNTRY CURRENT 
COMPETITION LAW 
CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENT ON 
COMPETITION LAW 
PROVISIONS ON ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION/UNILATERAL 
CONDUCTS 
BRUNEI744 Competition Order, 2015  It is set to enter into force in 
phases. The country is in the 
process of recruiting and 
forming the Competition 
Commission. At the time of 
writing, the Competition 
Order is not yet enforced. 
Definition of a Dominant Position 
Section 2 Interpretation 
“"dominant position" means a situation in which one or more undertakings possess 
such significant power in a market to adjust prices or outputs or trading terms, without 
effective constraint from competitors or potential competitors within Brunei 
Darussalam or elsewhere”  
 
“Chapter 3: Abuse of dominant position 
Abuse of dominant position 
21. (1) Subject to section 22, any conduct on the part of one or more undertakings 
which amounts to the abuse of a dominant position in any market in Brunei Darussalam 
is prohibited. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), conduct may, in particular, constitute such an 
abuse of it consists in –  
     (a) predatory behaviour towards competitors; 
     (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
     (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or 
     (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of the contracts.” 
 
Enforcement of decision of Commission. 
Section 42 [4] No financial penalty fixed by the Commission under this section may 
exceed 10 per cent or such other percentage of such turnover of the business of the 
                                                 
744 ASEAN Secretariat, <http://www.asean-competition.org/select?country=Brunei> accessed 17 March 2017 
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undertaking in Brunei Darussalam for each year of infringement for such period, up to a 
maximum of 3 years, as the Minister may, by order published in the Gazette, prescribe.  
Cambodia745 Cambodia is still in the 
process of drafting the 
competition law. 
Cambodia endeavour to 
adopt the competition law as 
one of her commitments to 
ASEAN and WTO. The 
process involves working 
groups established by the 
Ministry of Commerce. The 
working groups cooperate 
with international experts 
from Australia Competition 
and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC). The draft law is 
expected to be submitted to 
the Council of Minister of 
Cambodia at the end of 2016 
and to the National Assembly 
by the beginning of 2017. 
The draft provisions on Abuse of dominance as of 7 March 2016. 
 
Article 4: Definitions 
“dominant position means a situation in which a person, either individually or together 
with other persons, is in a position in a market to act without effective constraint from 
competitors or potential competitors.” 
 
Article 7: Unlawful Activities by Persons in a Dominant Position 
“It is unlawful for any person or group of persons with a dominant position to abuse 
their dominant position, including by:  
     A. Requiring or inducing a supplier or customer to not deal with a competitor or 
potential competitor of the person in a Dominant Position;  
      B. Refusing to supply goods or services to a competitor or potential competitor;   
      C. Selling goods or services on condition that the purchaser purchases separate 
goods or services unrelated to the object of a contract, or forcing a purchaser to accept 
a condition unrelated to the object of a contract;  
      D. Selling goods or services below the cost of production;  
      E. Refusing to give a competitor or potential competitor access to an essential 
facility  
 
This Article 7 does not prohibit a person or persons with a dominant position from 
taking any step which has a reasonable commercial justification or represents a 
reasonable commercial response to the market entry or market conduct of a 
competitor.” 
 
Article 38: Penalties for Chapter II Conduct   
“In a Final Order under Article 33 of this Law, the Commission may impose an 
administrative fine for each violation of Articles 5, 6, 7,8 or 10 of this Law:  
      A. For natural persons, an amount of up to 10 (ten) percent of their total earnings 
during the years that the violation took place; and  
                                                 
745 ASEAN Secretariat, <http://www.asean-competition.org/select?country=Cambodia> accessed 17 March 2017  
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      B. For legal persons, an amount of up to 10 (ten) percent of the total revenues 
(obtained by that legal person and its related entities) from doing business in Cambodia 
during the years that the violation took place.  
The Order must specify the date by which the fine is to be paid.” 
Indonesia746 Law Number 5 Year 1999  Several amendments to the 
Law Number 5 Year 1999 
concerning Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices and 
Unfair Business Competition 
are taking place, especially on 
institutional status of Komisi 
Pengawas Persaingan Usaha 
(KPPU) Secretariat. The 
preparation of Presidential 
Regulation concerning 
Second Amendment of 
Presidential Decree Number 
75 Year 1999 on KPPU, in 
order to strengthen KPPU’s 
status to support its functions 
and duties.747   
Article 1(4) “Dominant position is a situation where an entrepreneur does not have any 
significant competitor in the relevant market with regard to the market share being 
controlled, or the entrepreneur is in the highest position among its competitors in the 
relevant market with regard to its financial capability, ability to have access to the 
suppliers or sales, and ability to adapt to the supply and demand of certain goods or 
services.” 
 
“Article 25 (1) Entrepreneurs are prohibited from taking advantage of their dominant 
position, either directly or indirectly, in order to:  
      a. impose trade terms with the intention to prevent and/or hamper the consumers 
to acquire competitive goods and/or services, both in prices or quality; or  
      b. restrict the market and technology development; or  
      c. hamper other entrepreneurs having the potential to become their competitors to 
enter the relevant market.  
(2) Entrepreneurs are in the dominant position as referred to under Paragraph (1) of 
this article if:  
      a. one entrepreneur or a group of entrepreneurs controls 50% (fifty percent) or 
more of the market share on  one type of goods or service; or  
      b. two or three entrepreneurs or groups of entrepreneurs control 75% (seventy five 
percent) or more of the market share on one type of certain goods or services” 
 
Administrative Sanctions Article 47  
“(1) The Commission is authorized to impose administrative sanctions to the 
entrepreneurs who have violated the provisions in this law.  
(2) Administrative sanctions as referred to under Paragraph (1) of this article shall be:  
      a. to revoke contracts as referred to in Articles 4 through 13, Article 15; and/or  
      b. to order the entrepreneurs to end vertical integration as referred to under Article 
                                                 
746 ASEAN Secretariat, <http://www.asean-competition.org/read-legislation-kppu-plays-important-role-in-indonesian-national-development-plan-for-2015-2019> accessed 17 
March 2017 
747 ibid 
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14; and/or 
      c. to order the entrepreneurs to stop activities proven to have caused monopolistic 
practices and/or unfair business competition and/or damages to the public; and/or  
      d. to order the entrepreneurs to end the abuse of their dominant position; and/or  
      e. to revoke the merger of the companies and acquisition of shares as referred to 
under Article 28; and/or  
      f. to impose compensation for damages; and/or g. to impose a fine at the lowest in 
the amount of Rp. 1,000,000,000 (one billion rupiah) and at the highest in the amount 
of Rp. 25,000,000,000 (twenty five billion rupiah).” 
 
Criminal Punishment Article 48  
“(1) Violations to the provisions in Article 4, Articles 9 through 14, Articles 16 through 
19, Article 25, Article 27 and Article 28 of this law is subject a criminal fine in the 
amount of at least Rp. 25,000,000,000 (twenty five billion rupiah) and in the amount of 
Rp. 100,000,000,000 (one hundred billion rupiah) at the most, or imprisonment at a 
maximum period of 6 (six) months.  
(2) Violations to the provisions under Article 5 through 8,m Article 15, Articles 20 
through 24, and Article 26 of this law is subject to a criminal fine in the amount of  at 
least Rp. 5,000,000,000 (five billion rupiah) and in the amount of Rp. 25,000,000,000 
(twenty five billion) rupiah at the most, or imprisonment at a maximum period of 5 
(five) months.  
(3) Violations to the provisions under Article 41 of this law is subject to a criminal fine 
in the amount of at least Rp. 1,000,000,000 (one billion rupiah) and at in the amount of 
Rp. 5,000,000,000 (five billion rupiah) at the most, or imprisonment at a maximum 
period of (three) months.”  
 
Laos Law on Business 
Competition 2015 
 Section 30 Market Dominance and Monopoly 
      Market dominance is when one or two undertakings or a group of undertakings 
which engage in business activities having market shares more than the specified 
percentage prescribed by the Business Competition Commission. 
      Monopoly is when there is only one undertaking or a group of undertakings operate 
in business activities to provide products or services in the relevant market. 
 
Section 31 Abusive conducts  
1. Unfairly price of products or services 
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2. Selling products or services below cost and selling poor quality products or 
services  
3. Refusal to deal  
4. Impose monopolistic conditions on provision of goods or services 
5. Imposing dissimilar conditions or price on the same goods or services  
6. Other conducts as specified in the law or relevant order748 
Malaysia Malaysia Competition Act 
2010 
 Interpretation  
2. “dominant position” means a situation in which one or more enterprises possess 
such significant power in a market to adjust prices or outputs or trading terms, without 
effective constraint from competitors or potential competitors” 
 
Abuse of dominant position is prohibited 
10. (1) An enterprise is prohibited from engaging, whether independently or collectively, 
in any conduct which amounts to an abuse of a dominant position in any market for 
goods or services. 
    (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), an abuse of a dominant 
position may include—  
         (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling price or other unfair 
trading condition on any supplier or customer;  
         (b) limiting or controlling—  
              (i) production;  
              (ii) market outlets or market access; 
Laws of Malaysia16 ACT 712 
              (iii) technical or technological development; or  
              (iv) investment, 
  to the prejudice of consumers;  
           (c) refusing to supply to a particular enterprise or group or category of 
enterprises;   
           (d) applying different conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties to an extent that may—  
                  (i) discourage new market entry or expansion or investment by an existing 
                                                 
748 These provisions are the author’s own translation from the original Laotian text. Section 32-36 prescribe the explanation of  each abusive behaviours as set out in Section 31. An 
expert casts doubt on whether this could hinder an effective competition as there is no umbrella clause. See David Fruitman, ‘Lao PDR Lays Foundation for Competition 
Regime’ (DFDL, 18 February 2016) <https://www.dfdl.com/resources/legal-and-tax-updates/lao-pdr-lays-foundation-for-its-competition-regime/> accessed 6 April 2017 
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competitor;  
                  (ii) force from the market or otherwise seriously damage an existing 
competitor which is no less efficient than the enterprise in a dominant position; or  
                 (iii) harm competition in any market in which the dominant enterprise is 
participating or in any upstream or downstream market;  
          (e) making the conclusion of contract subject to acceptance by other parties of 
supplementary conditions which by their nature or according to commercial usage have 
no connection with the subject matter of the contract;  
           (f) any predatory behaviour towards competitors; or  
           (g) buying up a scarce supply of intermediate goods or resources required by a 
competitor, in circumstances where the enterprise in a dominant position does not have 
a reasonable commercial justification for buying up the intermediate goods or resources 
to meet its own needs. 
   (3) This section does not prohibit an enterprise in a dominant position from taking 
any step which has reasonable commercial justification or represents a reasonable 
commercial response to the market entry or market conduct of a competitor. 
 (4) The fact that the market share of any enterprise is above or below any particular 
level shall not in itself be regarded as conclusive as to whether that enterprise occupies, 
or does not occupy, a dominant position in that market. 
 
Finding of an infringement 
40. (1) If the Commission determines that there is an infringement of a prohibition 
under Part II, it—  
      (a) shall require that the infringement to be ceased immediately;  
      (b) may specify steps which are required to be taken by the infringing enterprise, 
which appear to the Commission to be appropriate for bringing the infringement to an 
end;  
Competition 33 
      (c) may impose a financial penalty; or  
      (d) may give any other direction as it deems appropriate. 
 (2) The Commission shall, within fourteen days of its making a decision under this 
Part, notify any person affected by the decision. 
 (3) The Commission shall prepare and publish reasons for each decision it makes under 
this section. 
 (4) A financial penalty shall not exceed ten percent of the worldwide turnover of an 
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enterprise over the period during which an infringement occurred. 
 
General penalty 
61. Any person who commits an offence under this Act for which no penalty is 
expressly provided shall, on conviction, be liable—  
      (a) if such person is a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding five million ringgit, 
and for a second or subsequent offence, to a fine not exceeding ten million ringgit; or  
      (b) if such person is not a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding one million 
ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both, and for a 
second or subsequent offence, to a fine not exceeding two million ringgit or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both. 
Myanmar Competition Law 2015  Section 27 
“27. No businessman shall, by abusing influence in the market, carry out any of the 
following acts;  
     (a) selling the goods or providing services at price lesser than production cost or 
cost, insurance and freight (CIF) in order to cause competitors to leave the market; 
     (b) causing to the detriment of consumers by sale or purchase the goods or services 
at unreasonable price to market price or by fixing sale price for retailers;   
      (c) controlling the production, distribution of goods and providing services; 
restraining the market; obstructing the development of science and technology; and 
causing the detriment of consumers;   
      (d) laying down non-uniform commercial terms and conditions within the same 
market in order to cause unfair competition;   
      (e) laying down unfair terms and conditions upon other businesses in concluding 
contracts regarding goods and services or coercing to accept obligations which are not 
related directly to such contracts;   
      (f) preventing entering of new competitors into market by unfair means;   
      (g) refusing or allowing discriminately the use of main infrastructures or rare 
resources owned or utilized by oneself in order to prevent entry of new competitors 
into the market.” 
 
41. Any person who violates the prohibitions contained in section 15, section 19, 
section 22, section 26, section 27, section 31 or section 32 shall, on conviction, be 
punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or with fine not 
exceeding Kyat one hundred lakhs or with both. 
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Philippines Competition Act 2014  Section 4 Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act: 
      “(f) Control refers to the ability to substantially influence or direct the actions or 
decisions of an entity, whether by contract, agency or otherwise; 
      (g) Dominant position refers to a position of economic strength that an entity or 
entities hold which makes it capable of controlling the relevant market independently 
from any of a combination of the following: competitors, customers, suppliers, or 
consumers” 
 
Section 15 Abuse of Dominant Position 
“It shall be prohibited for one or more entities to abuse their dominant position by 
engaging in conduct that would substantially prevent, restrict or lessen competition: 
      (a) Selling goods or services below cost with the object of driving competition out 
of the relevant market: Provided, That in the Commission’s evaluation of the fact, it shall 
consider whether the entity or entities have no such object and the price established was 
in good faith to meet or compete with the lower price of a competitor in the same 
market selling the same or comparable product or service of like quality; 
      (b) Imposing barriers to entry or committing acts that prevent competitors from 
growing within the market in an anti-competitive manner except those that develop in 
the market as a result of or arising from a superior product or process, business 
acumen, or legal rights or laws; 
      (c) Making a transaction subject to acceptance by the other parties of other 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the transaction;  
      (d) Setting prices or other terms or conditions that discriminate unreasonably 
between customers or sellers of the same goods or services, where such customers or 
sellers are contemporaneously trading on similar terms and conditions, where the effect 
may be to lessen competition substantially; Provided, That the following shall be 
considered permissible price differentials: 
           (1) Socialized pricing for the less fortunate sector of the economy; 
           (2) Price differential which reasonably or approximately reflect differences in the 
cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from differing methods, technical 
conditions, or quantities in which the goods or services are sold or delivered to the 
buyers or sellers; 
           (3) Price differential or terms of sale offered in response to the competitive price 
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of payments, services or changes in the facilities furnished by a competitor; and 
           (4) Price changes in response to changing market conditions, marketability of 
goods or services, or volume; 
       (e) Imposing restrictions on the lease or contract for sale or trade of goods or 
services concerning where, to whom, or in what forms goods or services may be sold or 
traded, such as fixing prices, giving preferential discounts or rebate upon entities, where 
the object or effect of the restrictions is to prevent, restrict or lessen competition 
substantially: Provided, That nothing contained in this Act shall prohibit or render 
unlawful:  
           (1) Permissible franchising, licensing, exclusive merchandising or exclusive 
distributorship agreements such as those which give each party the tight to unilaterally 
terminate the agreement; or 
           (2) Agreements protecting intellectual property rights, confidential information, 
or trade secrets; 
      (f) Making supply of particular goods or services dependent upon the purchase of 
other goods or services from the supplier which have no direct connection with the 
main goods or services to be supplied; 
      (g) Directly or indirectly imposing unfairly low purchase prices for the goods or 
services of, among others, marginalized agricultural producers, fisherfolk, micro-, small-, 
medium-scale enterprises, and other marginalized service providers and producers; 
      (h) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling price on their 
competitors, customers, suppliers or consumers, provided that prices that develop in 
the market as a result of or due to a superior product or process, business acumen or 
legal rights or laws shall not be considered unfair prices; and 
      (i) Limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers, provided that limitations that develop in the market as a result of or due to 
a superior product or process, business acumen or legal rights or laws shall not be a 
violation of this Act: 
      Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed or interpreted as a prohibition 
on having a dominant position in a relevant market or on acquiring, maintaining and 
increasing market share through legitimate means that do not substantially prevent, 
restrict or lessen competition:  
      Provided, further, That any conduct which contributes to improving production or 
distribution of goods or services within the relevant market, or promoting technical and 
economic progress while allowing consumers a fait share of the resulting benefit may 
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not necessarily be considered and abuse of dominant position: 
Provided, finally, That the foregoing shall not constrain the Commission or the relevant 
regulator from pursuing measures that would promote fait competition or more 
competition as provided in this Act.” 
 
Section 29 Administrative Penalties. –  
      “(a) Administrative Fines. – In any investigation under Chapter III, Sections 14 and 
15, and Chapter IV, Sections 17 and 20 of this Act, after due notice and hearing, the 
Commission may impose the following schedule of administrative fines on any entity 
found to have violated the said sections: 
      First offense: Fine of up to one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00); 
Second offense: Fine of not less than one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) but 
not more than two hundred fifty million pesos (P250,000,000.00). 
      In fixing the amount of the fine, the Commission shall have regard to both the 
gravity and the duration of the violation. 
      (b) Failure to Comply With an Order of the Commission. – An entity which fails or 
refuses to comply with the ruling, order or decision issued by the Commission shall pay 
a penalty of not less than fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) up to two million pesos 
(P2,000,000.00) for each violation and a similar amount of penalty for each day 
thereafter until the said entity fully complies. Provided that these fines shall only accrue 
daily beginning forty-five (45) days from the time that the said decision, order or ruling 
was received. 
      (c) Supply of Incorrect or Misleading Information. – The Commission mat likewise 
impose upon any entity fines of up to one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) where, 
intentionally or negligently, they supply incorrect or misleading information in any 
document, application or other paper file with or submitted to the Commission or 
supply incorrect or misleading information in an application for a binding ruling, a 
proposal for a consent judgment, proceedings relating to a show cause, order, or 
application for modification of the Commission’s ruling, order or approval, as the case 
may be. 
      (d) Any other violations not specifically penalized under the relevant provisions of 
the Act shall be penalized by a fine of not less than fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) up 
to two million pesos (P2,000,000.00). 
      Provided that the schedule of fines indicated in this section shall be increased by the 
Commission every five (5) years to maintain their real value from the time it was set.” 
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Singapore Competition Act 2005  Abuse of dominant position 
47. 
“—(1) Subject to section 48, any conduct on the part of one or more undertakings 
which amounts to the abuse of a dominant position in any market in Singapore is 
prohibited. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), conduct may, in particular, constitute such an 
abuse if it consists in — 
(a)predatory behaviour towards competitors; 
(b)limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c)applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or 
(d)making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of the contracts. 
(3) In this section, “dominant position” means a dominant position within Singapore or 
elsewhere.” 
 
Enforcement of decision of Commission 
69. 
“—(1) Where the Commission has made a decision that — 
          (a) any agreement has infringed the section 34 prohibition; 
          (b) any conduct has infringed the section 47 prohibition; 
          (c) any anticipated merger, if carried into effect, will infringe the section 54 
prohibition; or 
          (d) any merger has infringed the section 54 prohibition, 
the Commission may give to such person as it thinks appropriate such directions as it 
considers appropriate to bring the infringement or the circumstances referred to in 
paragraph (c) to an end and, where necessary, requiring that person to take such action 
as is specified in the direction to remedy, mitigate or eliminate any adverse effects of 
such infringement or circumstances and to prevent the recurrence of such infringement 
or circumstances. 
      (2) A direction referred to in subsection (1) may, in particular, include provisions — 
          (a) where the decision is that any agreement has infringed the section 34 
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prohibition, requiring parties to the agreement to modify or terminate the agreement; 
          (b) where the decision is that any conduct has infringed the section 47 
prohibition, requiring the person concerned to modify or cease the conduct; 
          (ba) where the decision is that any anticipated merger, if carried into effect, will 
infringe the section 54 prohibition — 
               (i) prohibiting the anticipated merger from being carried into effect; 
               (ii)requiring any parties to any agreement that is directly related and necessary 
to the implementation of the merger (which would result from the anticipated merger 
being carried into effect) to modify or terminate the agreement, notwithstanding the 
agreement is excluded under paragraph 10 of the Third Schedule or the Commission 
has given guidance or a decision under section 45 or 46, as the case may be, that the 
agreement is unlikely to infringe, or has not infringed, the section 34 prohibition; and 
               (iii) requiring any person concerned with any conduct that is directly related 
and necessary to the implementation of the merger (which would result from the 
anticipated merger being carried into effect) to modify or cease that conduct, 
notwithstanding the conduct is excluded under paragraph 10 of the Third Schedule or 
the Commission has given guidance or a decision under section 52 or 53, as the case 
may be, that the conduct is unlikely to infringe, or has not infringed, the section 47 
prohibition; 
          (c) where the decision is that any merger has infringed the section 54 prohibition 
— 
               (i) requiring the merger to be dissolved or modified in such manner as the 
Commission may direct; 
               (ii) requiring any parties to any agreement that is directly related and necessary 
to the implementation of the merger to modify or terminate the agreement, 
notwithstanding that the agreement is excluded under paragraph 10 of the Third 
Schedule or the Commission has given guidance or a decision under section 45 or 46, as 
the case may be, that the agreement is unlikely to infringe, or has not infringed, the 
section 34 prohibition; and 
              (iii) requiring any person concerned with any conduct that is directly related 
and necessary to the implementation of the merger to modify or cease that conduct, 
notwithstanding that the conduct is excluded under paragraph 10 of the Third Schedule 
or the Commission has given guidance or a decision under section 52 or 53, as the case 
may be, that the conduct is unlikely to infringe, or has not infringed, the section 47 
prohibition; 
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          (d) where the decision is that any agreement has infringed the section 34 
prohibition, any conduct has infringed the section 47 prohibition or any merger has 
infringed the section 54 prohibition, to pay to the Commission such financial penalty in 
respect of the infringement as the Commission may determine; and 
          (e) in any case, requiring any party to an agreement that has infringed the section 
34 prohibition, any person whose conduct has infringed the section 47 prohibition, any 
party to an anticipated merger which, if carried into effect, will infringe the section 54 
prohibition or any party involved in a merger that has infringed the section 54 
prohibition — 
               (i) to enter such legally enforceable agreements as may be specified by the 
Commission and designed to prevent or lessen the anti-competitive effects which have 
arisen; 
               (ii) to dispose of such operations, assets or shares of such undertaking in such 
manner as may be specified by the Commission; and 
               (iii) to provide a performance bond, guarantee or other form of security on 
such terms and conditions as the Commission may determine. 
      (3) For the purpose of subsection (2)(d), the Commission may impose a financial 
penalty only if it is satisfied that the infringement has been committed intentionally or 
negligently. 
      (4) No financial penalty fixed by the Commission under this section may exceed 
10% or such other percentage of such turnover of the business of the undertaking in 
Singapore for each year of infringement for such period, up to a maximum of 3 years, as 
the Minister may, by order published in the Gazette, prescribe. 
      (5) The Commission shall, in any direction requiring the payment of a financial 
penalty, specify the date before which the financial penalty is to be paid, being a date 
not earlier than the end of the period within which an appeal against the direction may 
be brought under section 71.  
      (6) The Minister may, by order published in the Gazette, prescribe the interest 
payable on the outstanding amount of any financial penalty imposed under subsection 
(2)(d) and for payment by instalment (as may be directed by the Commission in its 
discretion) of any financial penalty imposed under subsection (2)(d).” 
 
Thailand Trade Competition Act 1999 Thailand is currently in the 
process of amending the Act. 
The National Assembly is 
Section 3. In this Act: 
“"business operator with market domination" means one or more business operators in 
the market of any goods or service who have the market share and sales volume above 
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expect to pass the amended 
Act within the end of 2017. 
that prescribed by the Commission with the approval of the Council of Ministers and 
published in the Government Gazette, having regard to the market competition;”749 
 
 
Section 25.  
“A business operator having market domination shall not act in any of the following 
manners:  
       (1) unreasonably fixing or maintaining purchasing or selling prices of goods or fees 
for services;  
      (2) unreasonably fixing compulsory conditions, directly or indirectly, requiring other 
business operators who are his or her customers to restrict services, production, 
purchase or distribution of goods, or restrict opportunities in purchasing or selling 
goods, receiving or providing services or obtaining credits from other business 
operators;  
      (3) suspending, reducing or restricting services, production, purchase, distribution, 
deliveries or importation without justifiable reasons, or destroying or causing damage to 
goods in order to reduce the quantity to be lower than the market demand;  
      (4) intervening in the operation of business of other persons without justifiable 
reasons.” 
 
Section 51.  
“Any person who violates section 25, section 26, section 27, section 28 or section 29 or 
fails to comply with section 39 shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
three years or to a fine not exceeding six million Baht or to both, and, in the case of the 
repeated commission of the offence, shall be liable to the double penalty.” 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
749 The Trade Competition Commission, upon an approval from the Cabinet, on 18 January 2007, has published criteria for business operator having market dominance. A business 
operator is considered dominant in a relevant market when it has market share at least 50% and total turnover of  at least one billion Baht (THB1,000,000,000.00). A group 
of  top three business operators is considered collective dominant when the group has totally 75% of  market share and total turnover of  at least one billion Baht 
(THB1,000,000,000.00). There is a safe harbour rule for a business operator which has market share less than 10% or total turnover less than one billion Baht 
(THB1,000,000,000.00). 
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Viet Nam Law on Competition 2004  Abuse of Dominant Market Position and Monopoly Position  
  
Article 11 Enterprises and groups of enterprises in dominant market position  
  
      “1. An enterprise shall be deemed to be in a dominant market position if such 
enterprise has a market share of thirty (30) per cent or more in the relevant market or is 
capable of substantially restraining competition.  
       2. A group of enterprises shall be deemed to be in a dominant market position if 
they act together in order to restrain competition and fall into one of the following 
categories:  
         (a) Two enterprises have a market share of fifty (50) per cent or more in the 
relevant market;  
         (b) Three enterprises have a market share of sixty-five (65) per cent or more in the 
relevant market; 
         (c) Four enterprises have a market share of seventy-five (75) per cent or more in 
the relevant market.” 
Article 13 Practices constituting abuse of dominant market position which are 
prohibited  
  
“Any enterprise or group of enterprises in a dominant market position shall be 
prohibited from carrying out the following practices:  
      1. Selling goods or providing services below total prime cost of the goods aimed at 
excluding competitors;  
      2. Fixing an unreasonable selling or purchasing price or fixing a minimum re-selling 
price goods or services, thereby causing loss to customers;  
      3. Restraining production or distribution of goods or services, limiting the market, 
or impeding technical or technological development, thereby causing loss to customers;  
      4. Applying different commercial conditions to the same transactions aimed at 
creating inequality in competition;  
      5. Imposing conditions on other enterprises signing contracts for the purchase and 
sale of goods and services or forcing other enterprises to agree to obligations which are 
not related in a direct way to the subject matter of the contract;  
      6. Preventing market participation by new competitors.” 
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Article 117 Forms of penalties to be imposed for breaches of laws on competition 
and measures for remedying consequences  
  
      1. For each practice in breach of the laws on competition, the individual or 
organization in breach must be subject to one of the following main forms of penalty:  
          (a) A warning;  
          (b) A fine.  
      2. Depending on the nature and seriousness of the breach, one or more of the 
following additional forms of penalty may also be applied to an individual or 
organization in breach of the laws on competition:  
          (a) Withdrawal of business registration certificate; revocation of the right to use a 
licence or practising certificate;  
          (b) Confiscation of exhibits and facilities used to commit the breach of the laws 
on competition.  
       3. In addition to the forms of penalty stipulated in clauses 1 and 2 of this article, 
one or more of the following measures for remedying consequences may also be 
applied to an individual or organization in breach of the laws on competition:  
           (a) Restructure of an enterprise which abuses its dominant market position;  
           (b) Division or separation of enterprises which merged or consolidated; 
compulsory re-sale of that part of an enterprise which was acquired;  
           (c) Public rectification;  
           (d) Removal of illegal terms and conditions from a contract or business 
transaction;  
       4. Where a practice in breach causes loss to the interests of the State or to the 
lawful rights and interests of other individuals or organizations, compensation must be 
paid for such loss in accordance with law.”  
  
Article 118 Level of fines for breach of laws on competition   
  
        “1. A body authorized to impose penalties may impose a fine up to no more than 
ten (10) per cent of the total turnover of the organization or individual in breach in the 
financial year preceding the year in which the prohibited practice took place where the 
breach involves an agreement in restraint of competition, an abuse of dominant market 
position or monopoly position, or an economic concentration.  
         2. The body authorized to impose penalties shall deal with unfair competitive 
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practices and other conduct in breach of this Law outside the cases stipulated in clause 
1 of this article in accordance with the laws on dealing with administrative offences or 
in accordance with relevant laws.  
         3. The Government shall provide detailed regulations on the level of fines 
applicable to practices in breach of this Law.” 
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ANNEX 4: ASEAN AVIATION MARKET TREND 
Table 1: Total number of passengers carried 
 
Table 2: Registered Carrier Departure Worldwide 
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Table 3: International Aviation: Aircraft Traffic750 
 
                                                 
750 Data used in this table extracted from ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2015 (ASEAN 
Secretariat Jakarta 2016) 187 <http://www.aseanstats.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/ASEAN-Statistical-Yearbook-2015_small_size.pdf> accessed 15 
April 2017 
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<http://law.dit.go.th/Upload/Document/%E0%B9%80%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B
7%E0%B9%88%E0%B8%AD%E0%B8%87%E0%B9%80%E0%B8%AA%E0%B8
%A3%E0%B9%87%E0%B8%88%20209-
52%20%E0%B8%AD%E0%B8%B3%E0%B8%99%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%88%E
0%B8%AA%E0%B8%AD%E0%B8%9A%E0%B8%AA%E0%B8%A7%E0%B8%
99.pdf> accessed 30 May 2016 
 
สาํนักส่งเสริมการแข่งขนัทางการค้า, แนวปฏิบตัิพฤติกรรมทางการค้าที่ไม่เป็นธรรมตามมาตรา ๒๙ 
แห่งพระราชบญัญัติการแข่งขนัทางการค้า พ.ศ. ๒๕๔๒ <http://otcc.dit.go.th/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Guidelines-under-Section-26.pdf> accessed 31 May 
2016 
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